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

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR. reports on a recent poll of scholars rating American presidents following the model of polls taken by his father, Arthur M. Schlesinger, in 1948 and 1962. Extrapolating from these poll results, he concludes that only presidents who did not stick to the middle-of-the-road but showed boldness and creativity were ranked among the "Greats" and "Near Greats."

BEN LOMBARDI reviews developments currently affecting Turkish politics. He compares current trends with events in Turkey that preceded the three military coups in 1960, 1971, and 1980, and suggests that intervention in that country's domestic politics by the armed forces is a distinct possibility.

GARETH DAVIES and MARTHA DERTHICK criticize scholarly claims that racial bias in the U.S. Congress accounts for decisions in 1935 not to cover agricultural and domestic workers under social insurance and not to enact a standard of need and assistance in Aid to Dependent Children. They argue that weighing in those decisions were also such factors as administrative feasibility, actuarial soundness, and interstate economic rivalry.

JAMES M. SCOTT examines the complex interactions of the White House, Congress, and the bureaucracy over U.S. policy toward Nicaragua during the Reagan administration. Based on the patterns of this case, he offers some conclusions about the way that American foreign policy making is understood.

ROBERT J. SPITZER criticizes arguments that the Constitution inherently provides the president with a line-item veto.

JOHN H. MAURER looks at the failure of Great Britain and imperial Germany to reach a naval arms control agreement before World War I. He concludes that Britain and Germany could only have reached an agreement to curtail their naval competition by first resolving the underlying political and security conflicts—a reality that still exists for other nations and other arms control agreements.

DEMETRIOS JAMES CARALEY

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Rating the Presidents: Washington to Clinton

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.

My father, the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, started it all nearly half a century ago. In 1948 he asked fifty-five leading historians how they rated the American presidents. The results, published in *Life* magazine just before Harry Truman confounded the prophets and won reelection, excited much interest and also much controversy. In 1962 the *New York Times Magazine* prevailed upon my father to repeat the poll. Again much interest and much controversy.

In 1996 the *New York Times Magazine* asked a less eminent historian, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., to replicate his father's poll. The results appeared in the issue of 15 December 1996 under the title "The Ultimate Approval Rating." Space limitations required the omission of much historical and methodological commentary. With the kind permission of the *New York Times Magazine*, here is the more complete report.

The Schlesinger polls asked historians to place each president (omitting William Henry Harrison and James A. Garfield because they died so soon after taking office) in one of five categories: Great, Near Great, Average, Below Average, and Failure.[1] The standard was not lifetime achievement but performance in the White House. As to how presidential performance was to be judged, the scholars were left to decide for themselves. It was assumed that historians would recognize greatness – or failure – when they saw it, as Justice Potter Stewart once proposed to recognize pornography.

Presidents might well have wondered (and some did): who are historians to arrogate to themselves the judging of presidential performance? Dwight D.

[1] Mrs. Leonard Lyons, after reading the *New York Times Magazine* article, wrote the author, not without justice: "Some categories other than yours come to mind: Dope, Lucky Stiff, Bumbler, etc. – which makes me realize how resilient Americans are if they can survive such as these."

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR. recently retired as Schweitzer Professor in the Humanities at the City University of New York Graduate Center. He has written books on the presidential administrations of Andrew Jackson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy as well as an overall analysis called *The Imperial Presidency*. He also served as special assistant to President Kennedy.

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Eisenhower, who did badly in the Schlesinger 1962 poll, accused the scholars of equating "an individual's strength of dedication with oratorical bombast; determination, with public repetition of a catchy phrase; achievement, with the exaggerated use of the vertical pronoun."[2] "History will treat me fairly," said Richard M. Nixon, drawing an odd distinction. "Historians probably won't. They are mostly on the left."[3]

Other presidents felt that people who had never been president could not possibly appreciate what presidents go through. "Trials and encouragement come to each president," wrote Calvin Coolidge in an unwonted lyrical outburst. "It is impossible to explain them. Even after passing through the presidential office, it still remains a great mystery. . . . Like the glory of a morning sunrise, it can only be experienced—it cannot be told."[4]

John F. Kennedy too came to doubt whether the quality of the presidential experience could be understood by those who had not shared it. My father sent his 1962 questionnaire to the historian who had written *Profiles in Courage* and *A Nation of Immigrants*. Kennedy started to fill it out; then changed his mind. "A year ago," he wrote my father, "I would have responded with confidence . . . but now I am not so sure. After being in the office for a year, I feel that a good deal more study is required to make my judgment sufficiently informed. There is a tendency to mark the obvious names. I would like to subject those not so well known to a long scrutiny after I have left this office."

He said to me later, "How the hell can you tell? Only the president himself can know what his real pressures and real alternatives are. If you don't know that, how can you judge performance?" Some of his greatest predecessors, he went on, were given credit for doing things when they could have done nothing else; only detailed inquiry could disclose what difference a president made by his individual contribution. War, he observed, made it easier for a president to achieve greatness. But would Abraham Lincoln have been judged so great a president if he had had to face the almost insoluble problem of Reconstruction?

For all his skepticism, Kennedy read the results of my father's 1962 poll with fascination. He was greatly pleased that Truman was voted a Near Great, nor was he displeased that Eisenhower came in twenty-second, near the bottom of the Averages. Later, jokingly or half-jokingly, he blamed Eisenhower's vigorous entry into the 1962 congressional elections on the historians. "It's all your father's poll," he said. "Eisenhower has been going along for years, basking in the glow of applause he has always had. Then he saw that poll and realized how he stood before the cold eye of history—way below Truman; even below Hoover. Now he's mad to save his reputation."[5]

[2] Dwight D. Eisenhower to James C. Hagerty, 18 October 1966 in R. Gordon Hoxie, *Command Decision and the Presidency* (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1977), 245.

[3] Richard M. Nixon on *Meet the Press*, 10 April 1988 (responding to a question by John Chancellor).

[4] Calvin Coolidge, *Autobiography* (New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corp., 1929), 234, 194.

[5] The Kennedy quotes are from Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 674–675.

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Kennedy was surprised that the historians voted Woodrow Wilson a Great, placing him number four after Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, while ranking Andrew Jackson only number six and a Near Great. Though a fine speaker and writer, Wilson, in Kennedy's view, had failed in a number of cherished objectives. Why did professors admire him so much? (I suggested that he was, after all, the only professor to make the White House.)

Kennedy was surprised too by Theodore Roosevelt's ranking – number seven and a Near Great; TR had really got very little significant legislation through Congress. Why should Wilson and TR rate ahead of achievers like James K. Polk (number eight) or Truman (number nine)? For Kennedy, the measure of presidential success was evidently concrete accomplishment. Presidents who raised the consciousness of the nation without achieving their specific objectives ought, he seemed to think, to rate below those, like Polk and Truman, who achieved their objectives even if they did little to inspire or illuminate the nation. Ironically, historians feel that Kennedy himself comes off better when measured by the TR-Wilson rather than by the Polk-Truman standard.

There is force in the argument that only presidents can really understand the presidency. But by the Coolidge-Kennedy doctrine only presidents would have the qualifications to rate presidents. Alas, few presidents have claimed that right. Indeed, the only presidential list I know comes, not surprisingly, from that plain-speaking history buff Harry Truman. In 1953 he named his eight best Presidents – in chronological order, Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Polk, Lincoln, Grover Cleveland, Wilson, and FDR – and his eight worst – Zachary Taylor, Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan, Ulysses S. Grant, Benjamin Harrison, Warren G. Harding, Coolidge, and Eisenhower.[6]

Meanwhile, scholars continued to play the rating game. Some felt that ratings on the Schlesinger basis were unduly impressionistic and subjective. Quantitative history was coming into vogue. Also political scientists, with their faith in typologies and models, were joining the fun. Would not the results be more "scientific" if presidents were given numerical scores against stated criteria? Then feed the figures into the computer.

So further polls were undertaken in the 1970s and 1980s with more pretentious methodologies. Some poll takers used only a few yardsticks: success in attaining objectives, for example; the relationship of objectives to the general welfare; the quality of political leadership; personal trustworthiness and integrity; impact on history. Others multiplied yardsticks. Thomas A. Bailey of Stanford, who regarded the Schlesinger polls as a Harvard-eastern elitist-Democratic plot, came up with no less than forty-three.

But the yardsticks were mostly too general to warrant mathematical precision or to escape subjective judgment. Their proliferation only produced lengthy and

[6] Harry S. Truman, "The Eight Best Presidents, the Eight Worst Presidents and Why," *Parade*, 3 April 1988.

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intimidating questionnaires. And, to judge by the results, the refinement of standards made little difference. However simple or complex the method, the final ratings turned out to be much the same. Even Bailey's own rankings were remarkably similar to the Schlesinger polls.

There have been nine Greats and Near Greats in nearly all the scholarly reckonings. Lincoln, Washington and F. D. Roosevelt are always at the top, followed always, though in varying order, by Jefferson, Jackson, Polk, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, and Truman. Occasionally John Adams, Cleveland, and Eisenhower join the top nine. The Failures have always been Grant and Harding, with Buchanan, Pierce, Fillmore, Taylor, and Coolidge always near the bottom.

The scholars' lists not seldom provoke popular as well as presidential indignation. For a long time FDR's top standing enraged many who had opposed his New Deal. "To rank him with Lincoln and Washington," the Detroit editor Malcolm Bingay wrote in 1948 about the first Schlesinger poll, "hits me as historical sacrilege."[7] As late as 1982, Robert K. Murray of Penn State, a leading scholar of presidential ratings, polled 846 historians. When they placed Franklin Roosevelt slightly ahead of George Washington (though still behind Lincoln), Murray was deluged with angry letters, "many being from the fanatic right," he wrote me, "whose fulminations know no bounds."[8] People today forget that Roosevelt was the most hated as well as the best loved president of the twentieth century. But now that even Newt Gingrich pronounces FDR the greatest president of the century, conservatives accept FDR at the top with stoic calm.

The choice of best and worst presidents has remained relatively stable through the years. There is much more fluctuation in between. Some presidents—particularly J. Q. Adams, Buchanan, Andrew Johnson, and Cleveland—have declined in the later polls, but the most striking change has been the steady rise of Eisenhower from twenty-second place in the Schlesinger 1962 poll to twelfth in David Porter's 1981 poll, to eleventh in the poll taken by Robert Murray and Tim Blessing in 1982, to ninth in Steve Neal's *Chicago Tribune* poll the same year and ninth again in Neal's *Chicago Sun-Times* poll in 1996. Had he lived long enough, Eisenhower might have raged less over the verdicts of scholars.

Several factors account for Eisenhower's ascent. The opening of his papers showed that the mask of genial affability Ike wore in the White House concealed an astute, crafty, confident, and purposeful leader. As Nixon typically put it, Eisenhower was "a far more complex and devious man than most people realized, and in the best sense of those words."[9] Moreover, the FDR model and the yardsticks in earlier polls contained a bias in favor of an activist presidency. After Vietnam and Watergate showed that presidential activism could go too far, Eisenhower appeared in a better light. The peace and harmony sentimentally recollected

[7] Malcolm Bingay, "Chides Historian for Hasty Appraisal of FDR As 'Great,'" *Akron Beacon-Journal*, 4 November 1948.

[8] Robert K. Murray to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., 15 March 1983.

[9] Richard M. Nixon, *Six Crises* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962; Warner paperback, 1979), 189.

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from Ozzie-and-Harriet days shone well against the turbulence of the 1960s and 1970s. The more his successors got into trouble, the better Eisenhower looked. Presidents sometimes do more for the reputations of their predecessors than they do for their own.

Over the years it has been periodically suggested that I replicate my father's polls. But the difficulty of making overall judgments about some of the presidents since Eisenhower stumped me—in the cases of Kennedy and Gerald Ford, because of the brevity of their time in office; in the cases of Lyndon Johnson, Nixon, and George Bush, because their foreign and domestic records are so discordant. Scholars, for example, might be inclined to rate Johnson higher in domestic than in foreign affairs and do the reverse for Nixon and Bush. And the most recent presidents always seem more controversial and harder to classify. Still the passage of time permits appraisals to crystallize. So in 1996 the *New York Times Magazine* took a new poll.

The question of disjunction still nags. "I find three cases," Walter Dean Burnham said, "which one could describe as having dichotomous or schizoid profiles. On some very important dimensions, both Wilson and L. B. Johnson were outright failures in my view; while on others they rank very high indeed. Similarly with Nixon." Alan Brinkley said: "There are presidents who could be considered *both* failures *and* great or near great (for example, Wilson, Johnson, Nixon)." James MacGregor Burns observed of Nixon, "How can one evaluate such an idiosyncratic president, so brilliant and so morally lacking? . . . so I guess to average out he would be average."

Another source of confusion comes from the reluctance of some respondents to confine their judgments to White House performance. Several presidents—James Madison, J. Q. Adams, Grant, Herbert Hoover, Jimmy Carter—had pre- or post-presidential careers of more distinction than their presidencies; and this evidently affected some of the ratings.

Yet the 1996 poll still shows a high degree of continuing scholarly consensus. In nearly all the polls since 1948, the same nine men top the list. Lincoln, with a unanimous Great vote, comes in first in 1996. Washington and FDR, as usual, are next; each had one Near Great vote. The big three are followed, as usual, by the Near Greats—Jefferson, Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, Truman, and Polk. Steve Neal's 1996 poll, with five yardsticks (political leadership, foreign policy, domestic policy, character, impact on history) and fifty-eight respondents, came up with the same nine men, plus Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan, who edged out Polk.

Polk's high ranking is always a puzzle for laymen. "Of all our array of presidents," James Thurber once imprudently wrote, "there was none less memorable than James K. Polk."[10] But Polk at 49 was the youngest man up to that time, and the only Speaker of the House of Representatives ever, to make the White House. He specified his objectives early on—to reduce the tariff, establish

[10] James Thurber, *Let Your Mind Alone!* (New York: Harper, 1937), 141.

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the independent treasury system, settle the Oregon boundary question, and acquire California—and worked efficiently and relentlessly to achieve them. His objectives have been criticized but not his ability. Besides, he kept the most complete of presidential diaries, which endears him to scholars.

The next batch, the High Averages, are led in the 1996 Schlesinger poll by Eisenhower, whose one Great vote and ten Near Greats are outweighed by a host of Averages. The same fate befalls John Adams with ten Near Greats and Kennedy with nine. Lyndon Johnson receives fifteen Near Greats from scholars who seem to have forgotten about Vietnam, but low ratings and two Failures awarded by those who remember Vietnam bring his score down below Kennedy's. Monroe and McKinley complete the High Averages.

Most presidents fall into the Average class. Recent presidents, too close for historical perspective, are likely to rise or fall in polls to come. Carter has one Near Great and two Failures, with the rest of his votes in between. Some admire his accomplishment in putting human rights on the world's agenda; others deplore his political ineptitude and the absence of any clear direction in his handling of domestic affairs.

Reagan, on the other hand, has seven Near Great votes, including some from liberal scholars impressed by his success in restoring the prestige of the presidency, in negotiating the last phases of the cold war, and in imposing his priorities on the country. But he also receives nine Below Averages and four Failures from those who consider his priorities—his attack on government as the root of all evil and his tax reductions that increased disparities between rich and poor while tripling the national debt—a disaster for the republic.

His score averages out a shade below that of George Bush, who receives no Near Greats but more Averages than Reagan and only one Failure. Bush's skill in putting together the coalition that won the Gulf War outweighs for many his seeming lack of purpose in domestic policy. Some respondents thought it premature to judge Clinton, but two vote him Near Great and two more a Failure, and he ends up Average.

Some exception has been taken to Reagan's rating as number twenty-five, placing him between Bush and Arthur and below Clinton. According to the March-April 1997 *Policy Review*, this "low assessment" was "the most astonishing part of Schlesinger's poll." The Reagan rating, the magazine continued, "invites suspicion that participants were selected as much for the conclusions they were likely to reach as for their scholarly credentials."[11] *Policy Review* then picked its own panel, including William F. Buckley, Jr., Henry Kissinger, Jeane Kirkpatrick, George H. Nash, Joshua Muravchik, Michael Barone, and others—a group that invites the same suspicion roused in *Policy Review* by my panel—and they joined seven of my respondents in putting Reagan in the Near Great category. As for the suggestion of bias in the selection of my thirty-two, William J. Ridings,

[11] Alvin S. Felzenberg, "'There You Go Again': Liberal Historians and the *New York Times* Deny Ronald Reagan His Due," *Policy Review*, March-April 1997.

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Jr., and Stuart B. McIver polled *seven hundred and nineteen* historians and political scientists for their 1997 book *Rating the Presidents*, published some months after the *New York Times Magazine* poll. The Ridings-McIver poll ranked Reagan even lower, number twenty-six, placing him between Hayes and Ford and below both Bush and Clinton.

The list of Failures shows a slight shift from past polls. Harding and Grant are, as usual, favorite Failures. Do they really deserve it? They are marked down because of the scandal and corruption that disgraced their administrations. But they were careless and negligent rather than villainous. Their sin was excessive loyalty to crooked friends. "Harding was not a bad man," as Theodore Roosevelt's daughter, Alice Roosevelt Longworth, put it. "He was just a slob."[13] The president who commuted the prison sentence of the Socialist leader Eugene V. Debs after Wilson refused to do so hardly merits the bottom slot as the worst of all presidents. Scandal and corruption are indefensible, but they may injure the general welfare less than misconceived policies.

In the new poll the ineffectual Franklin Pierce and the rigidly dogmatic Herbert Hoover tie with Grant as the best among the Failures. Next down the list comes Nixon. Most respondents, while recognizing Nixon's intelligence and drive, resolve the "schizoid profile" by concluding that his impressive ability is negated by his rather more impressive offenses against the Constitution. It is perhaps hard to demonstrate that the only president forced to resign from the office was not a Failure.

The nation's belated awakening to racial injustice explains why two presidents receive more Failure votes this time than in earlier polls: James Buchanan, whose irresolution encouraged the secession of the Confederate states; and Andrew Johnson, who, while a Unionist, was a stout believer in white supremacy. It seems reasonable to suggest that Buchanan, Andrew Johnson, Hoover, and Nixon damaged the republic a good deal more than did the hapless Grant and the feckless Harding.

Nine men, we have seen, have led the list from the first Schlesinger poll of historians nearly half a century ago. What do Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Polk, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Truman have in common? What do they, and Eisenhower too, who arrived too late for the 1948 poll, tell us about the qualities necessary for success in the White House?

Well, half were over six feet tall. The exceptions were Polk (5' 8"), Theodore Roosevelt (5' 10"), Wilson (5' 11"), Truman (5' 9") and Eisenhower (5' 10 1/2"). On the other hand, James Monroe, John Tyler, Buchanan, Chester A. Arthur, Taft, Harding, Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, Gerald Ford, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton were also six feet or more; so height by itself is no guarantee of greatness in the White House. Nor is education. Nearly half the prize group—Washington, Jackson, Lincoln, and Truman—never attended college. As for age, the average

[12] William J. Ridings, Jr. and Stuart B. McIver, *Rating the Presidents: From the Great and Honorable to the Dishonest and Incompetent* (New York: Citadel Press, 1997).

[13] Alice Roosevelt Longworth, *Crowded Hours* (New York: Scribner's, 1933), 324–25.

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age of the nine at inauguration or succession was 54 years; so youth is a comparative advantage.

Height and age are minor considerations. Intelligence helps, though Reagan—with his seven Near Greats—shows that an influential president need not have much. Maturity? The British ambassador called Theodore Roosevelt an arrested 11-year-old. Unflinching honesty? Deviousness is a presidential characteristic not confined to Eisenhower. Loyalty? This can be a presidential defect: remember Grant and Harding. Private virtues do not guarantee public effectiveness.

More to the point is the test proposed 125 years ago by our most brilliant historian, Henry Adams. The American president, he wrote, "resembles the commander of a ship at sea. He must have a helm to grasp, a course to steer, a port to seek."[14] The Constitution offers every president a helm, but the course and the port constitute the first requirement for presidential greatness. Great presidents possess, or are possessed by, a vision of an ideal America. Their passion is to make sure the ship of state sails on the right course.

If that course is indeed right, it is because they have an instinct for the dynamics of history. "A statesman may be determined and tenacious," de Gaulle once observed, ". . . but, if he does not understand the character of his time, he will fail."[15] Great Presidents have a deep connection with the needs, anxieties, dreams of the people. "I do not believe," said Wilson, "that any man can lead who does not act . . . under the impulse of a profound sympathy with those whom he leads—a sympathy which is insight—an insight which is of the heart rather than of the intellect."[16]

"All our great presidents," said Franklin D. Roosevelt, "were leaders of thought at times when certain ideas in the life of the nation had to be clarified." So Washington embodied the idea of federal union, Jefferson and Jackson the idea of democracy, Lincoln union and freedom, Cleveland rugged honesty. Theodore Roosevelt and Wilson, said FDR, were both "moral leaders, each in his own way and his own time, who used the presidency as a pulpit."[17]

To succeed, presidents must have a port to seek and must convince Congress and the electorate of the rightness of their course. Politics in a democracy is ultimately an educational process, an adventure in persuasion and consent. Every president stands in Theodore Roosevelt's bully pulpit. National crisis widens his range of options but does not automatically make a man great. The crisis of rebellion did not spur Buchanan to leadership, nor did the crisis of depression turn Hoover into a bold and imaginative president. Their inadequacies in the face of crisis allowed Lincoln and the second Roosevelt to show the difference that individuals can make to history.

[14] Henry Adams, "The Session, 1869–1870" in G. E. Hochfield, ed., *The Great Secession Winter of 1860–61 and Other Essays*, (New York: Sagamore Press, 1958), 197.

[15] Charles de Gaulle, *The Edge of the Sword* (New York: Criterion, 1960), 81.

[16] Woodrow Wilson, *Leaders of Men*, T. H. Vail Motter, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1952), 53–54.

[17] Anne O'Hare McCormick, "Roosevelt's View of the Big Job," *New York Times Magazine*, 11 September 1932.

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Of national crises, war is the most fateful, and all the top ten save Jefferson were involved in war either before or during their presidencies. As Robert Higgs has noted, five (Polk, Lincoln, Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Truman) were commanders-in-chief when the republic was at war, and four more (Washington, Jackson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Eisenhower) made pre-presidential reputations on the battlefield. Military metaphors even accompanied nonmilitary crises. In summoning the nation to battle against the Great Depression, Franklin Roosevelt called on Americans to "move as a trained and loyal army" and asked Congress for "broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe."[18]

Crisis helps those who can rise to it, and the association of war with presidential greatness has its ominous aspect. Still, two of the immortals, it should be noted, made their mark without benefit of first-order crisis. Jackson and Theodore Roosevelt forced the nation through sheer power of personality to recognize incipient problems—Jackson in vindicating the national authority against the state of South Carolina and against the Second Bank of the United States; the first Roosevelt in vindicating the national authority against the great corporations and against raids on the people's natural resources. As the historian Elting Morison admirably described this quality of noncrisis leadership: "Theodore Roosevelt could get the attention of his fellow citizens and make them think. He knew how to put the hard questions a little before they became obvious to others; how to make the search for sensible answers exciting; how to startle the country into informing debate; and how to move people into their thinking beyond short-run self-interest toward some longer view of the general welfare."[19]

We hear much these days about the virtues of the middle of the road. But not one of the top nine can be described as a middle-roader. Middle-roading may be fine for campaigning, but it is a sure road to mediocrity in governing. The succession of middle-roaders after the Civil War inspired James Bryce to write the notorious chapter in *The American Commonwealth* entitled "Why Great Men Are Not Chosen President."[20] The middle of the road is not the vital center: it is the dead center.

The Greats and Near Greats all recognized, in the aphorism of Pierre Mendes-France, that "to govern is to choose." They all took risks in pursuit of their ideals. They all provoked intense controversy. They all, except Washington, divided the nation before reuniting it on a new level of national understanding.

Every president would like to be loved by everyone in the country, but presidents who sacrifice convictions to a quest for popular affection are not likely to make it to the top. Harding was an immensely popular president. His death provoked an outpouring of national grief that observers thought unmatched since the death of Lincoln. Scholars are unanimous in pronouncing him a Failure.

[18] Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address.
[19] Elting Morison testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 19 January 1978.
[20] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (London: Macmillan, 1888), I, chap. 8.

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Presidents who seek to change the nation's direction know that they are bound to alienate those who profit from the status quo. Great presidents go ahead anyway. "Judge me," FDR said, "by the enemies I have made." Truman's approval rating at the end of his presidency was down to 31 percent. Look where he ranks now.

After his reelection, William Jefferson Clinton faces his rendezvous with history. Debarred by the 22nd Amendment from pursuing a third term, he must make his mark between now and 19 January 2001. This may not be easy. The 22nd Amendment, by turning reelected presidents into lame ducks, reduces their political potency. Second terms tend to be times of trouble: ask FDR, Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon, Reagan. On the other hand, lame-duckery, by liberating presidents from the demands of reelection, does allow them to run political risks for national benefits.

Clinton brings to the bar of history a rare combination of talents and infirmities. He is a man of penetrating intelligence. He has impressive technical mastery of complicated issues. He has genuine intellectual curiosity and listens as well as talks. He is a skilled and resilient politician. When the spirit moves him, he is capable of real eloquence, and the spirit moves him most of all when he confronts the supreme American problem—race. Racial justice appears to be his most authentic concern.

On the other hand, he lacks self-discipline. His judgment of people is erratic. His political resilience strikes many as flagrant opportunism. His reactions are instinctively placatory, perhaps from growing up in a household where the wrong words might provoke an alcoholic stepfather to violence. He rushes to propitiate the audience before him, often at his own long-term expense. His scandals and cover-ups are ripe for exploitation by a vindictive opposition. Who can tell how this combination of talents and infirmities will play out?

To make a mark on history, Clinton must liberate himself from polls and focus groups. Let him put his first-rate intelligence to work on the hard problems. Playing it safe, taking it easy, sticking to the middle of the road may make for a more comfortable second term. But following this course would put Clinton alongside William Howard Taft and Rutherford B. Hayes on the ratings list. Far better to anticipate the problems of the twenty-first century, to startle the country into informing debate, to move people into thinking beyond short-run self-interest toward some longer view of the general welfare and to propose remedies sufficient to the needs of the day. Only boldness and creativity, even if at times foiled and frustrated, will earn him a place among the immortals.

SCHLESINGER 1996 POLL

Method of calculation: the following numbers were assigned to each category—Great = 4; Near Great = 3; Average = 2; Below Average = 1; Failure = −2. Failure seems such a drastic historical judgment as to require special weighting. Then each score was divided by the number of mentions.

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	*Voting Breakdown**					
Rating	Great	Near Great	Average	Below Average	Failure	*Mean Score*
GREAT						
Lincoln	32					4.00
Washington	31	1				3.97
Franklin D. Roosevelt	31	1				3.97
NEAR GREAT						
Jefferson	12	16	1			3.38
Jackson	11	17	1			3.34
Theodore Roosevelt	10	18	1			3.31
Wilson	11	17			1	3.21
Truman	6	21	3			3.10
Polk	2	17	8	1		2.71
HIGH AVERAGE						
Eisenhower	1	10	20	1		2.34
John Adams		10	17	1		2.32
Kennedy		9	21	1		2.29
Cleveland		8	2	1		2.24
Lyndon Johnson		15	12	3	2	2.21
Monroe	1	1	22	2		2.15
McKinley		5	20	2		2.11
AVERAGE						
Madison	1	2	20	5	1	1.83
John Quincy Adams		1	18	8		1.74
Harrison			14	7		1.67
Clinton		2	17	5	2	1.58
Van Buren			18	8	1	1.56
Taft			17	9	1	1.52
Hayes			16	10	1	1.48
Bush			16	12	1	1.45
Reagan		7	11	9	4	1.42
Arthur			13	11	1	1.40
Carter		1	15	12	2	1.37
Ford			6	20	2	1.00
BELOW AVERAGE						
Taylor			6	17	3	0.88
Coolidge			7	16	4	0.81
Fillmore			3	20	3	0.77
Tyler			6	17	5	0.68
FAILURE						
Pierce				15	12	−9
Grant				9	18	−9
Hoover			11	9	10	−9
Nixon		2	4	5	20	−21
Andrew Johnson			2	7	17	−23
Buchanan				6	22	−38
Harding			2		26	−48

* Not every respondent voted for all the presidents, hence the discrepancies in the total number of votes.

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PARTICIPANTS IN 1996 POLL

Samuel H. Beer, Harvard University
John Morton Blum, Yale University
Alan Brinkley, Columbia University
Douglas Brinkley, University of New Orleans
Walter Dean Burnham, University of Texas
James MacGregor Burns, Williams College
Mario Cuomo
Robert Dallek, Boston University
Robert H. Ferrell, Indiana University
Louis Fisher, Library of Congress
Eric Foner, Columbia University
George Frederickson, Stanford University
Doris Kearns Goodwin
Norman Graebner, University of Virginia
Henry Graff, Columbia University
Stephen Hess, Brookings Institution
Morton Keller, Brandeis University
Louis Koenig, New York University
William Leuchtenburg, University of North Carolina
David Levering Lewis, Rutgers University
Arthur Link, Princeton University
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Joel Silbey, Cornell University
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Stephen Skowronek, Yale University
Hans Trefousse, City University of New York
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Turkey—The Return of the Reluctant Generals?

BEN LOMBARDI

In 1996 and 1997, the international community has watched political events in Turkey with interest and some dismay. The unusual attention to Turkish affairs is largely because of the electoral prominence of Islam, which has raised questions about the overall stability of the secular state founded by Kemal Ataturk. The West's image of Turkey is, to a large degree, grounded on Ataturk's vision of what his country should resemble—a program that has never entirely been achieved. Since the reforms of the late 1940s, Turkish democracy has repeatedly been confronted by the threat of political extremism, and the armed forces have as a consequence overthrown democratically elected governments on three separate occasions. Many of the conditions that prevailed at the time of the three coups appear to have returned. As Turkey is likely to continue to be confronted by these issues, direct intervention by the armed forces remains a possibility.

Domestic Political Developments

Since 1924, the country's political life has been dominated by Kemalism, the philosophy of state put forward by Mustafa Kemal. Later awarded the title Ataturk (father of the Turks), he based his political views on a renunciation of the discredited Ottoman legacy. Ataturk believed that Turkey, having lost all of its non-Turkish possessions, needed to develop a nationalism that was secular and statist. Emphasis should be placed, he argued, on the homogeneity of the Turkish people.[1] National and religious minorities were not to be recognized by the state. Ataturk also believed that the transformation of Turkey from an Islamic state into a secular

[1] Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus; The Foreign Policy of Turkey* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 55.

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republic was essential to the process of modernization. Authority should not, he asserted, rest on its connection to religious faith. The Caliphate and the Shariah, or Muslim holy law, were therefore abolished; education in public schools was to be strictly secular and focused on the pre-Islamic (pre-Ottoman) Turkish past; outward displays of religious faith were prohibited. By the mid to late 1990s, however, many of these Kemalist assumptions about modern Turkey's relationship with its Islamic heritage and Ottoman past appear to be undergoing a series of challenges.

Perhaps the most striking change has been the reemergence of Islam as a political force in Turkey. The noted analyst of Turkish affairs, Feroz Ahmad, has argued that this is a reassertion of the country's Islamic identity. Moreover, this development must be understood as "principally a cultured phenomenon [that] has few supporters who seek to return to the 'fundamentals of Islam' or to a state run according to the Sharia."[2] Kemalism, it would seem, was not entirely successful in severing the Turkish people from their cultural roots. Promoted through education, which was principally directed at cities and towns, secularism converted only a small minority. Ahmad observes that "this thin urban layer of Turkish society would see every manifestation of Islamic reassertion as reactionary and fanatical."[3]

Today, the focus of Kemalist concern is on the Islamic Welfare (Refah) party. However, Refah is only the latest incarnation of Islam in the political life of modern Turkey. Founded in 1983, Refah replaced an earlier Islamic organization, the National Salvation party (NSP) that had emerged in the late 1970s. The NSP rose quickly during a period of political change that saw the creation of a Turkish civil society in which organizations possessed an unprecedented level of autonomy from state interference. Asserting a strong, anti-Western viewpoint while espousing the modern goal of rapid industrialization, the NSP argued that "Turkey had a distinguished imperial past which was attributable to its success in combining military power with the building of an Islamic civilisation." Given that it was Westernization that had in its view weakened Turkish society, the NSP "promised a country which would be fully industrialized through economic cooperation with the Muslim world, the prerequisite of which was the return to Islam as the basis of social organization."[4] Although it drew its support from economic groups on the margin of society, the NSP was sufficiently strong politically that it participated in three coalition governments between 1973 and 1978.[5]

International concern about the growth of Islam in Turkey first emerged as a reaction to the success of Refah in the 27 March 1994 municipal elections.

[2] Feroz Ahmad, "Islamic Reassertion in Turkey," *Third World Quarterly* 10 (April 1988): 752.

[3] Ibid., 755.

[4] Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics, and Religion in Turkey" in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., *State, Democracy and the Military—Turkey in the 1980s* (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 125.

[5] Binnaz Toprak, "The Religious Right" in Irvin C. Shick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak, eds., *Turkey in Transition—New Perspectives* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 230.

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Under the charismatic leadership of a political veteran of the NSP, Necmettin Erbakan, Refah took 18.8 percent of the popular vote, more than double its previous total, and gained control of Turkey's two most secular cities, Istanbul and Ankara, twenty-nine other major cities, and 400 smaller towns. As a result, nearly two-thirds of the country's population now live under municipal governments run by Islamic fundamentalists.[6] In some cities, such as Konya and Diyarbakir, Islamic laws have already been introduced, alcohol has been banned, brothels have been closed, and women have been "encouraged" to wear the chador. Strongly antisecular, anti-American, and anti-European, a number of Islamic parties have declared their intention to work together in the future as a single political force to realize their common goal of preventing further Westernization.[7] At a November 1994 rally in eastern Turkey, Erbakan addressed thousands of Kurds as the "descendants of Saladin," a hero to many Turks, and pleaded for their support "to save the world from European infidels."[8] Under the direction of Refah, Turkish Islamists have followed a different path than their Arab counterparts who have evinced a greater interest in winning the hearts of the population rather than an electoral contest.[9] Refah is apparently interested in winning both campaigns—for the state and its people—simultaneously.

The 24 December 1995 general election further confirmed Refah's strength. A May 1995 public opinion poll indicated that it had already increased its support to 22.8 percent, while the governing True Path party could muster only 14.3 percent.[10] In the December vote, Refah emerged as the single largest political party in the new parliament with 21.4 percent of the popular vote, which translates into 158 seats in the 550-seat Grand National Assembly.[11] The result was not a complete success for Refah, for the two principal secular conservative political parties—Motherland and True Path—garnered 19.6 percent (or 132 seats) and 19.2 percent (or 135 seats) respectively.[12] Nevertheless, Refah's popular vote was substantially higher than in either the 1987 general election in which it received 7.2 percent or the 1991 election, when it obtained 16.9 percent of the electorate's support.[13]

[6] John Darnton, "Discontent Seethes in Once-Stable Turkey," *New York Times*, 2 March 1995.

[7] "Various Parties Form Islamic Alliance" (Ankara, *Turkish Daily News* in English, 17 June 1994) in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service—Western Europe (*FBIS-WEU-94-120*), 22 June 1994, 55–56.

[8] "Islamic Party Leader Condemns "'European Infidels'" (Paris, *AFP* in English, 21 November 1994) in *FBIS-WEU-94-226*, 23 November 1994, 57.

[9] In a recent analysis, Edward G. Shirley has written that fundamentalists in the Arab world "now aim at constructing an Islamic society independent of the state. Culture, not politics, is the first battleground." See "Is Iran's Present Algeria's Future?" *Foreign Affairs* 74 (May-June 1995): 23.

[10] See "Poll Predicts Victory for Islamic RP in Election" (Ankara, *Turkish Daily News* in English, 18 May 1995) in *FBIS-WEU-95-099*, 23 May 1995, 42.

[11] James Wyllie, "Turkey Succumbs to the Lure of Refah," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, March 1996, 124.

[12] "RP and Secular Rivals Jostle for Power," *Turkish Daily News*, 26 December 1995; and Roman Rollnick, "Turkish Poll Keeps the West Guessing," *The European*, 3 January 1996.

[13] Wyllie, "Turkey Succumbs to the Lure of Refah," 124.

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During their election campaigns, both the Motherland and True Path parties encouraged a "Refah-phobia" amongst the Turkish electorate. Erbakan's own speeches assisted in confirming some of the worst fears held by Kemalists about Refah. At the start of his campaign, the Refah leader promised to "work for a just order, to liberate Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Chechnya and Jerusalem." Later, he noted his intention to create "an Islamic United Nations, an Islamic NATO and an Islamic version of the EU. We will create an Islamic currency." On the day of the election, 24 December, he asserted that "Allah will make these elections the day of deliverance for all the people of our country." Campaign rhetoric is almost always extreme: it is, after all, a means of defining political distinctiveness. Nevertheless, the common Islamic theme running through Refah's message can only unsettle those committed to a secular state. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the ideological differences between Refah and its secular rivals have led many of the latter group to see the political divide in black and white terms.[14] "Your decision," then-Prime Minister Ciller noted in a speech the night of the election, "is to choose civilisation over darkness."[15]

Regardless of Kemalist and Western misgivings, the results of the 24 December election have reinforced Refah's legitimacy. President Demirel's decision to grant Erbakan the initial opportunity to fashion a government underscores the new political role of Refah in Turkish politics. This heightened profile has not been seriously diminished by Erbakan's failure to convince either of the leading conservative parties to support a Refah-led coalition. Nor was it undermined by the breakdown of talks with the Motherland party, when its leader, Mesut Yilmaz, was given the chance to form a government. Both these efforts failed because Erbakan was unable to provide his secular counterparts with an adequate guarantee that Refah would respect Turkey's democratic and secular political order.[16] That said, it is important to note that, unlike Algeria or Iran, Islam in Turkey is expressing itself along legitimate electoral routes. Indeed, prior to forming a coalition with the Ciller-led True Path party, Yilmaz stated:

> The main reason why the meetings with the RP [Refah] culminated in disagreement was not a matter of who would hold the chair or the distribution of ministries. The main reason we could not reach an agreement during this long process since our first meetings is that we were not convinced that we would be able to assume such a joint responsibility and run such a coalition in harmony. . . . had we and the RP reached a stage in which we found common ground for conciliation, we would have assumed this responsibility and would not have paid the slightest attention to these campaigns. . . . We believe that the RP is a legitimate party which should be included in the efforts exerted in running Turkey.[17]

[14] See "Ciller Cold Shoulders Erbakan," *Turkish Daily News*, 12 January 1996.

[15] "Turkish Firebrand Dreams of Islamic World Order," *Turkish Daily News*, 24 December 1995.

[16] Lowell Bezanis, "Turkish Coalition Government Talks Fail Again," *OMRI Analytical Brief*, 26 February 1996, vol. 1, no.13.

[17] "Turkey: Yilmaz Reports Failure to Reach Accord with RP" (Ankara, TRT Television in Turkish, 24 February 1996) in *FBIS-WEU-96-038*, 26 February 1996, 43.

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This endorsement by the new prime minister suggests a recognition that despite its opposition status Refah will likely remain a force in Turkish politics for some time to come. In the near term, the governing Motherpath (Motherland and True Path parties) coalition will have to adjust its policies if it wants to undermine Refah's growing popular support.

Refah's rising political fortunes since 1994 are due to several factors. Turkey's rapid urbanization and the migration of large numbers of rural workers into its cities may be partly the cause for the changes underway. Inflation, rising unemployment, and a general despair about the future offers fertile ground for Erbakan's call for a "just order." An additional factor might also be, as Refah itself has claimed, the public's perception that ethnic Turks and Kurds can only be united under the banner of Islam, thereby rejecting the anti-Kurdish policies of Kemalism and the government. Erbakan has also been particularly strident in asserting Islam as a solution for the growing domestic political malaise, which he blames on Ankara's abandonment of its religious heritage.

The surge in support for Islamic parties likely also reflects the public's dissatisfaction with mainstream political parties, which seem ineffective at solving the country's problems and have been afflicted by numerous corruption scandals.[18] Moreover, the death of former Prime Minister (1983–1989) and President (1989–1993) Turgut Ozal, who was known to be a devout Muslim, as well as a strong supporter of the NSP, effectively removed his Motherland party as a major competitor for Refah's supporters.[19] Following his party's success in the 1987 general election, Ozal deemphasized his linkages with Motherland's Islamic wing, with the result that many Islamists came to regard both him and his organization as opportunistic.[20] The commitment of the Motherland party to a secular, Western-style political program was underscored by its inability to form a coalition with Refah following the December 1995 election. Indeed, several newly elected deputies of the Motherland party openly threatened to resign in protest to Yilmaz's effort (sincere or not!) to fashion such a coalition.[21] Refah has capitalized on challenges to the Motherland's party's claim to be the successor of the NSP.

The West's policy during the civil war in Bosnia has led to a stronger identification of Turkish voters with the Islamic parties. Although only a minority (1 percent of the population) are of Bosnian origin, charges that the West has acquiesced to

[18] Henry Kamm, "Local Elections in Turkey May Set Fate of Sagging National Cabinet," *New York Times*, 28 March 1994; Henry Kamm. "Islamic Party in Turkey Does Well in Local Voting," *New York Times*, 29 March 1994; "Secular Turks' Fears," *Balkan News and East European Report*, 3–9 April 1994; and "Turkey Eyes Islam," *The Economist*, 2 April 1994. Similar views have been expressed since the December 1995 election. See "Turkey: Poll on Political Leaders, Democracy," (Istanbul, *Hurriyet* in Turkish, 17 March 1996) in *FBIS-WEU-96-056*, 21 March 1996, 30.

[19] Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics, and Religion in Turkey" in Heper and Evin, *State, Democracy and the Military*, 131.

[20] Feroz Ahmad, "Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey," *Middle Eastern Studies* 27 (January 1991): 18–19; and Ahmad, "Islamic Reassertion in Turkey," 767.

[21] "Government Crisis Jolts Parties," *Turkish Daily News*, 13 February 1996.

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the Bosnian Serbs' aggression and atrocities committed against the resident Muslim population generated considerable public sympathy in Turkey. A protest on 29 July 1995 against the Bosnian arms embargo drew a crowd of 50,000 in Konya, and many observers suspected that it was organized by a number of Islamic groups.[22] It has even been suggested that Turkish support for UN peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia was undertaken "in the hope of stemming the rising tide of fundamentalism at home."[23] Since the Dayton Peace Accord (November 1995), Ankara has also assumed a leading role within the Islamic world in organizing assistance (money and arms) for Bosnia-Herzegovina. As one analyst noted, Turkey's Balkan policy is pragmatic, but "domestic politics, in which Islamic feeling plays an increasing part, also plays a role."[24]

Whatever the reasons for Refah's success, it was the secularists who first opened the door to Islamic organizations. This began during the 1950s, when Prime Minister Adnan Menderes had governed with the support of traditional Muslim forces until his overthrow and execution by the military in 1960. Islamic political organizations then adopted a lower profile until the period prior to the third coup in 1980, after which politicians associated with Islamic parties were again arrested. In a marked contrast to the first two coups, in 1980 the importance of religion in the political life of the nation was proclaimed by military authorities.[25] The military leaders included obligatory religious teaching within the 1983 constitution and granted the right of sectarian teaching institutions to grant diplomas.[26] Undoubtedly, that approach was adopted in an effort to overcome the serious division that then characterized Turkish society and had left more than 5,000 people dead and 20,000 injured from 1977 to 1980. A combination of religion and nationalism was perceived as a means of linking both the moderate right and left wings of the Turkish political spectrum. Nevertheless, that policy let the Islamic genie out of Ataturk's bottle.

This conciliatory strategy was continued when the military rulers were succeeded by the Motherland party of the late Turgut Ozal, who united various political parties under his leadership.[27] In domestic affairs, Ozal's government and that of his successor Suleyman Demirel have also endorsed a religious presence in Turkish society and the development of an awareness of the people's Ottoman past. A former French ambassador to Turkey noted that Ozal promoted "a synthesis between Kemalism and what he considered to be the positive aspects of

[22] OMRI Daily Brief, 31 July 1995.

[23] Ian Mather, "Turkey breaks Balkan Taboo," *The European*, (7–13 April 1994): 1.

[24] "Turkey: Balkan Agenda," *Oxford Analytica Daily Brief*, 13 February 1996.

[25] "Islamic Influence in Police Force Viewed" (Ankara, *Turkish Daily News* in English, 14 April 1994) in *FBIS-WEU-94-078*, 22 April 1994, 40.

[26] See Oklay Akbal, "Les militaires complices de l'islamisme: Les généraux ont trahi Ataturk au nom d'Ataturk," *Courrier International*, no. 232, 13–19 avril 1995. This article was originally published in *Milliyet*, an Istanbul newspaper.

[27] "Islamic Influence in Police Force Viewed" (Ankara, *Turkish Daily News* in English, 14 April 1994) in *FBIS-WEU-94-078*, 22 April 1994, 40.

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Ottomanism. He believed that diversity in unity could contribute to strength and stability, just as it had under the Empire."[28] Abandoning Ataturk's brutal repression of religion, Ankara's new attitude was summed up in Ozal's statement that "[t]he state is secularized, but I am not; I am a Muslim."[29] As president, Demirel has also embraced this opinion, noting that secularism is not synonymous with atheism when 99.9 percent of the population are Muslims: "I think the application of secularism in the 1930s was a bit mistaken. People may have been satisfied with the application of secularism at the time. Some people may not have liked this, but we have to accept things according to the conditions of those times. There were claims that Islam was not an obstacle to development while secularism was seen as atheism. . . . Secularism is not against Islam."[30] This outlook has given rise to a new dynamic in state-society relations, the result of which has been a deeply rooted re-Islamization of Turkey.

The process of re-Islamization is a very public one. In addition to mandatory religious lessons in publicly funded schools, the number of Islamic or Imam schools has sharply increased in the last decade.[31] Indeed, since 1990, the budget of the Ministry for Religious Affairs has been larger than that of the Ministry of Education and Health.[32] Ironically, the democratization of Turkish politics has also assisted in bringing Islam into the open as politicians have been required to address (or, and perhaps more accurately, play to) the religious aspirations of the electorate. In the public media, Islam has also assumed an important position. At the beginning of 1993, according to the English-language *Turkish Daily News*, "Turkey had no fewer than 290 publishing houses, 300 publications including four dailies, some hundred licensed radio stations and about 30 likewise unlicensed television channels, all propagating Islamic ideology."[33]

Even the economy has not been immune to these developments. The boom that Turkey experienced in the 1980s was fuelled largely by Saudi financiers, who, it is reported, gave preferential treatment to Islamic brotherhoods and

[28] Eric Rouleau, "The Challenges to Turkey," *Foreign Policy* 103 (Summer 1996): 110. The nostalgia for the Ottoman period was not restricted to Ozal. In the Turkish press, contributions debate the relative merits of various sultans. During the 1994 campaign, Refah also declared that it wanted to institute the "Ottoman tradition in municipal affairs." However, they failed to explain what this tradition entailed. Ottoman has, in effect, become a metaphor for Turkey's golden age.

[29] National Defense Academy, "Turkey: Regional Power," *European Security—European Instabilities* (Vienna: 1993), 204. This chapter was based on an article by Christian Glatz published in *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, May 1992.

[30] "Demirel Cited on Islamic Factor in Turkey" (Ankara, *Turkish Daily News* in English, 21 April 1994) in *FBIS-WEU-94-083*, 29 April 1994, 54.

[31] For a discussion of the problem posed by the growing numbers and heightened profile of Imam schools, see Cemal Subasi, "Imam Preacher Schools Aim for Government Power" (Istanbul, *Notka* in Turkish, 16–22 April 1995) in *FBIS-WEU-94-102*, 26 May 1995, 23–30.

[32] National Defense Academy, "Turkey: Regional Power," *European Security—European Instabilities*, 204.

[33] Rouleau, "The Challenges to Turkey," 119.

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organizations.[34] An Islamic business community has emerged, which some Turkish secularists believe actively assists Refah. Founded in 1990, the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (*Musiad*) draws its membership from all levels of domestic industry. Musiad actively seeks to support Koranic interpretations of economic and business life. In political affairs, there is a congruence of views with Refah in a number of areas, including relations with the European Union and NATO. Given the electoral strength of Refah, it is reasonable to expect that organizations such as Musiad will become more prominent.[35]

Despite the increasing prominence of Islam in Turkish society and the growth in voter support for Islamic parties, most Turkish leaders remain cautious about sectarianism. In a 1992 interview, then Prime Minister Demirel rejected any concern about religious extremism in Turkey: "[a]s long as there is poverty, inequality, injustice, and repressive political systems, fundamentalist tendencies will grow in the world and find fertile soil for their development."[36] This understanding implies that the growth of an extremist Islamic presence in Turkish society is temporary and is dependent upon a failure of the modernization policies presently being implemented.[37] The question that naturally arises, therefore, concerns the degree to which the Turkish state can control the Islamic forces it has permitted to emerge. Demirel's belief that "secularism is the umbrella for freedom of religion and conscience in the Turkish Republic"[38] seems dangerously naive given the radical views of Islamic leaders like Erbakan. Relaxation of Ataturk's strict prohibitions on religious expression invites the possibility of determined antidemocratic groups purposefully misusing those freedoms. In the absence of clear electoral success, continued urbanization and the growth of Muslim political power further raise the spectre of political instability.[39] One Turkish daily warned that if Ankara does not realistically address the antisecularist movements and "save the state sector from the increasing threat of fundamentalist tendencies . . . Turkey will inevitably resemble Algiers in the not-so-distant

[34] National Defense Academy, "Turkey: Regional Power," *European Security—European Instabilities*, 204.

[35] "Turkey: Islamic Business," *Oxford Analytica Daily Brief*, 3 April 1996.

[36] "Demirel Interviewed on Pan-Turkism, Karabakh" (Moscow, *Novoye Vremya* in Russian, 29 September 1992) in *FBIS-WEU-92-198*, 13 October 1992, 43.

[37] Demirel repeated these views in "Creating a Community of Equals," *Harvard International Review* (Fall 1992): 32–33.

[38] See "Demirel Cited on Islamic Factor in Turkey" (Ankara, *Turkish Daily News* in English, 21 April 1994) in *FBIS-WEU-94-083*, 29 April 1994, 54–58; and "Ciller Calls Western Reporting on State 'Biased'" (Vienna, *News* in German, 1 June 1994) in *FBIS-WEU-94-106*, 2 June 1994, 44.

[39] Erbakan has been careful not to call for the violent overthrow of the state. His wife, Nermin Erbakan, has not been so reticent: "There aren't twelve million inhabitants of Istanbul, nor the sixty million Turks, but one-and-a-half billion Muslims in the whole world who are waiting for us. I hope that, tomorrow, we will celebrate the revolution." Quoted in Oklay Akbal, "Les militarires complices de l'islamisme; Les généraux ont trahi Ataturk au nom d'Ataturk," *Courrier International*, no. 232, 13–19 April 1995.

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future."[40] Such an outcome seems at present to be unlikely. Nevertheless, in the hope of avoiding such a confrontation, which has the potential to be extremely violent, Turkish leaders may decide to adopt further Islamic slants to their policies.

It is still too early to be pessimistic about Turkey, although it seems clear that the country has begun to redefine itself by drawing on pre-republican traditions. Nevertheless, sectarian demands have begun to exacerbate general social unrest. Concern about just that scenario accompanied the outbreak of urban rioting in March 1995, when alleged Islamic fundamentalists attacked coffeehouses in Istanbul leaving at least fifty people dead.[41] Demonstrations, organized to protest the attacks, led to clashes with police and security forces, with the result that violence soon spread to other cities, including Ankara. Publicly at least Turkish leaders refused to link the violence to domestic causes and, instead, then Prime Minister Ciller blamed "a very big multi-faceted provocation prompted by foreign circles," warning Turkish citizens against both right- and left-wing extremism.[42] This view was later repeated by a senior opposition member of the Grand National Assembly, who argued that the riots "had nothing to do with religious differences. We are seeing a social explosion, exploited by foreign powers."[43] Other observers argued that, while the riots may have been triggered by Islamic fundamentalists, they were as much about the social malaise that presently holds Turkey in its grip.

Economic Problems

A major factor in magnifying social discontent in Turkey must be the country's unstable economic situation. The German daily *Die Zeit* noted that for the Ciller government, 1995 "began with a catastrophe."[44] That characterization was not an overstatement. In 1994, inflation reached 149.6 percent, while gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 6 percent and unemployment rose by a comparable figure.[45] By early 1996, the national debt, largely accumulated during the time when Ozal was premier and used to fund economic modernization programs, stood at U.S. $67.8 billion.[46] Although this debt load was disguised for years by foreign investment flowing in to purchase treasury bills, political uncertainty has dissuaded

[40] "Islamic Influence in Police Force Viewed" (Ankara, *Turkish Daily News* in English, 14 April 1994) in *FBIS-WEU-94-078*, 22 April 1994, 40.

[41] Jonathon Rugman, "Turkish Violence Spreads to Ankara," *The Gazette* (Montreal), 15 March 1995.

[42] Quoted in Suna Erdem, "Amid Turkey Riots, Ankara Warns of 'Provocations'," *Reuters News Agency*, 16 March 1995.

[43] Jonathon Rugman, "Violence a Chilling Reminder of 1980 Chaos, Coup," *The Citizen* (Ottawa), 16 March 1995.

[44] Michael Schwelien, "Europa als Lebensretter," *Die Zeit*, 27 January 1995.

[45] It is estimated that since 1994, 500,000 people have lost their jobs. See Birgit Cerha, "Madame le Premier Ministre est une piètre politique," *Courrier International*, no.232, 13-19 April 1995, 11.

[46] "DYP Issues 'Early Warning' to Coalition Partner ANAP," *Turkish Daily News*, 28 March 1996.

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international money markets from continuing to favor Turkey. The failure to implement a tighter fiscal policy led to the major financial crisis of early 1994 and a need by Ankara to turn for assistance to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).[47]

Economic problems are affecting stability in the political arena. By early 1995, the poor showing of the economy ultimately led Demirel to distance himself from Tansu Ciller, whom he once had actively supported. During February 1995 interparty discussions, held to form a new government, Demirel publicly stated that in lieu of early elections he was considering appointing another prime minister. Noting that it was difficult to describe "the government as successful after inflation exceeded 150 percent," Demirel later agreed to reappoint Ciller.[48] Early elections became necessary when the Ciller government lost its parliamentary majority in late 1995. Many in Turkey's political elite welcomed the December ballot. "With early elections," the president noted, "Turkey would be revitalized. The newcomers would tackle their jobs with enthusiasm."[49]

Demirel's suggestion of political stagnation is valid. Ankara's capacity to promote domestic political harmony depends in part on its ability to manage the economy. However, the recognition of the problem by major political leaders does not mean a solution is in sight. Effective leadership has been dissipated by political infighting. The largest bloc of secularist Turkish voters remains as a consequence divided between the True Path and Motherland parties—a division due to differences over questions of leadership and, importantly, economic recovery policies. Recently, for example, Prime Minister Yilmaz commented that the Turkish economy is "sick." The implicit need for reform in Yilmaz's words drew an unexpected warning from his coalition partner, the True Path party, not to interfere with the "precarious balances" of the economy.[50]

On 7 March 1996, the Yilmaz Government announced its program in the Grand National Assembly. It committed itself to reducing inflation to single digits within five years, with a target of 50 percent for 1996. However, even an agreement within the coalition does not guarantee a clear direction to Turkish economic policy. In the area of economic reform, particularly the effort to cut public expenditure, the government's hands are likely to be tied by its reliance in parliament on the Democratic Left party (DLP).[51] Indeed, the new coalition was able to pass a necessary confidence vote in parliament only with the abstention

[47] Ziya Onis, "Turkey in the Post Cold War Era: In Search of Identity," *Middle East Journal* 49 (Winter 1995): 64–65.

[48] "Growing Rift between Demirel, Ciller Alleged" (Ankara, *Turkish Daily News* in English, 8 February 1995) in *FBIS-WEU-95-029*, 13 February 1995, 43.

[49] "Demirel Comments on Kurdish Issue, Elections" (Istanbul, *Milliyet* in Turkish, 2 May 1995) in *FBIS-WEU-95-089*, 9 May 1995, 53.

[50] "DYP Issues 'Early Warning' to Coalition Partner ANAP," *Turkish Daily News*, 28 March 1996.

[51] "Turkey's Secular Coalition Gov't Pass First Test With Leftist Help," *New Europe*, 17–23 March 1996.

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of the 80-deputy strong DLP faction.[52] Given the intense personal rivalries within the leadership of the Motherpath coalition and its reliance on a political party that does not necessarily share its priorities, the stability of the Yilmaz Government is questionable.

Without new policies that would reverse the country's fortunes, the economic situation is likely to continue to provide fertile ground for Islamic political parties. There is, nonetheless, a need to recognize that the situation can worsen. One analyst has cautioned that "[o]n the way towards a cautious re-Islamization, a secular and modernistic, but still Islamic state can only be successful if economic success can be achieved fairly soon. . . . Without an economic upswing, a massive increase of radical and fundamentalistic ideas and structures must be expected, both in Turkey as such and in the republics of the former Soviet Union."[53]

Rather than violently clashing with Turkish authorities, Refah has so far sought to address the worst effects of runaway inflation in what might be termed a social-democratic manner. Seeing that many of their constituents are unable to keep pace with rising prices, Refah-dominated municipal authorities have channelled efforts into ensuring housing and basic necessities for the disadvantaged in the cities. One senior Turkish journalist noted that, "If you can't pay your gas bill or your electric bill, they may call you in and discuss it and forgive it. Once they do that, you'll vote for Refah forever."[54] Such an approach not only alleviates misery, but also garners a broad-based grassroots support for the party.

The Kurdish Problem

The second source of discontent is Ankara's treatment of its Kurdish minority. Since 1984, Turkey has been waging what amounts to a civil war against Kurdish nationalism and, in particular, the Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK) or Kurdish Workers party. The PKK regularly engages in terrorist attacks against Turkish government targets, both military and civilian, and there is a strong suspicion that it has received support from Iran and Syria. A Socialist (possibly Marxist-Leninist) organization, it has grown from a handful of guerrillas to a major political force that Ankara believes could threaten the unity of the Turkish state.

Turkish opposition to the Kurds is based on the refusal by Ankara to recognize the existence of ethnic minorities within its borders. As a consequence, Ankara has refused to consider Kurdish requests for recognition as a national minority or for a degree of regional autonomy. Both Turks and Kurds have been taught

[52] See "Turkish Economy May Not Find Relief under New Gov't," *New Europe*, 10–16 January, 1996; and "Turkey: Economic Hurdles," *Oxford Analytica Daily Brief*, 18 March 1996.

[53] National Defense Academy, "Turkey: Regional Power," *European Security—European Instabilities*, 220.

[54] "Demirel Comments on Kurdish Issue, Elections" (Istanbul, *Milliyet* in Turkish, 2 May 1995) in *FBIS-WEU-95-089*, 9 May 1995, 53.

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that they are the descendants of a single pure Turkish race; but the Kurds, isolated in the highlands of eastern Anatolia, lost their true language and identity. In 1983, during the rule by the military, Law 2932 was incorporated into the Turkish constitution. The clear purpose of this legislation was the assimilation of the Kurds into the Turkish nation, and it prohibited the use of Kurdish for use "in the expression and dissemination of thought." This renewed offensive against Kurdish identity occurred at the same time as Kurds began to migrate into the Turkish urban centers. By the late 1980s, it was estimated that there were between 12 and 14 million ethnic Kurds living in Turkey, with 1.5 million in Istanbul and over one million in Izmir and Ankara.

The sudden death of Turgut Ozal in March 1993 removed from Turkey's political stage the one figure believed by both sides capable of implementing a new policy based on innovation and compromise. Under Ozal, Kurdish newspapers were permitted, a Kurdish research institute in Ankara was founded, and Kurds were once again allowed to use their ethnic, as opposed to Turkic, names. Since then, the PKK has accused Demirel of offering nothing but words. The PKK proposal for a federal state structure that would permit a degree of Kurdish self-government has continually been rejected by Ankara. Some hope for a resolution of this dispute reappeared early in 1993, when Ciller suggested that a "Basque solution" might be applied to this issue, permitting limited self-rule, a Kurdish education system, and access to state-sponsored broadcasting.[55] These views were immediately denounced by much of the leadership of the True Path party, and she subsequently withdrew them. Both Demirel and Ciller increasingly permitted hardliners to set the parameters and the pace of Ankara's Kurdish policy. As a result, the war resumed and reports indicate that up to 30 percent of the armed forces are now engaged in the struggle with the PKK.

A resolution to the Kurdish problem is as remote as ever. Turkish military incursions into Northern Iraq, twice in 1995 and again in early 1996, indicate that Ankara still possesses sufficient will to want to crush the PKK and other separatist sentiment. This is despite the costs to Turkey's international public image. Alongside the longstanding European disquiet over Ankara's Kurdish policies, most of the country's Western allies condemned the March 1995 raid into Iraq, with Germany and the United States using especially harsh language.[56] Yet, it appears that Turkey sees no other approach to the Kurdish issue. While it is reasonable to assume that the military might be an effective weapon against

[55] At the time of her accession to the premiership, Ciller stated that she would "embrace" the twelve million Kurds "with a mother's love." See Birgit Cerha, "Madame le Premier Ministre est une piètre politique," *Courrier International*, no. 232, 13–19 April 1995, 11.

[56] See *Keesing's Chronicle of World Events*, April 1995, 40522; "Germany Suspends Remaining Military Aid to Turkey," *This Week in Germany*, 31 March 1995; Steven Greenhouse, "US Support for Turk's Anti-Kurd Campaign Dims," *New York Times*, 29 March 1995; and Sami Kohen, "A Little Mideast War Tests Turkey," *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 March 1995, 7. For the reaction of U.S. political leaders, see the *Congressional Record*, especially speeches by Representative Steny H. Hoyes of Maryland, 20 January 1995, E146 and Senator Dennis DeConcini, 2 March 1994, 52231.

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insurrection and for the repression of territorially based ethnic groups, Turkey cannot use sufficient force and the Kurds are no longer so concentrated to accomplish these goals. Ankara's claim to be a European power also precludes the degree and types of violence necessary to solve the Kurdish question. On the other hand, a peaceful solution is equally improbable at this time. At its root, Kurdish autonomy is perceived to be a greater threat to Kemalism than even the re-Islamization of Turkish society. Ataturk's legacy of an all-embracing Turkish national identity would be effectively undermined if ethnic Kurds were granted special status.[57]

The instability threatened by the Kurdish insurrection is not likely to go away and in all likelihood will increasingly complicate Ankara's domestic and external policy agendas. The drain on the Turkish treasury caused by the military operations in Eastern Anatolia will exacerbate the economic situation throughout the country and, as a consequence, will feed the growing body of disaffected—a stratum from which organizations like Refah draw much of their support. Refah also benefits from the government's policy in that many of the new urban dwellers are ethnic Kurds fleeing the heavy hand of military occupation or the fear of PKK retribution. Moreover, beyond the country's borders, particularly in Western Europe, observers watch with dismay as popular support for Islamic parties seems to be eroding Kemalism. Disgusted by Ankara's Kurdish policy and alarmed by the growing political profile of Islam in Turkish politics, European Union (EU) member-states are less inclined than ever to support the country's application for membership,[58] which undermines the Kemalist objective of recognition as a member of the Western world. With both its internal and external political orientations challenged, Turkey's stability seems very fragile indeed.

Interventions by Turkish Armed Forces

If Turkey is entering a period of serious crisis, what mechanisms can it rely upon to maintain the modern republic? Some analysts have suggested that among national institutions, only the armed forces retain the public trust and respect. Since the end of single-party rule in 1950, they have intervened directly three times in the country's politics. In each instance, civilian control was restored after a transition period during which purported problems were addressed, justice meted out, new constitutions adopted, and economic growth accomplished. A short examination of each of the three interventions might offer some insight into what is the likelihood of another military coup.

[57] This point is made by Amatzia Baram of the University of Haifa. See Patricia Carley, *Turkey's Role in the Middle East; A Conference Report* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, January 1995).

[58] See Michael Binyon and Michael Kallenbach, "Iraq Attack Could Harm Turkey's EU Prospects," *The Independent*, 24 March 1995.

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The 1970 Coup d'Etat

On 27 May 1960, General Cemal Gursel led a coup d'etat that removed President Celal Bayar, Prémier Adnan Menderes, and his cabinet from power and dissolved the parliament. Several members of the Menderes government were charged with various crimes ranging from misuse of public funds to abrogation of the constitution and high treason. Arraigned before a joint civilian-military tribunal, a number of those charged were sentenced to prison terms and former Premier Menderes was executed.[59]

The 1960 coup occurred against a backdrop of escalating tension between the government and opposition that threatened to erupt into civil war. First elected in 1950, Menderes built on the liberalization measures that followed Ataturk's death in 1938, including a relaxation of laws that restricted the role of minorities and Islam.[60] Confronted with strong Kemalist opposition, the government repeatedly passed legislation designed to restrict freedom of the press to print material "designed to damage the political or financial prestige of the state" or "belittling persons holding official positions."[61] By 1959, growing hostilities between government and opposition supporters fuelled by a polarization of public opinion led to violent clashes. In April 1960, a series of large-scale student demonstrations paralyzed university campuses and led to bloody confrontations with police forces. The imposition of martial law in Istanbul and Ankara on 1 May and the confinement of demonstrators in detention camps failed to restore civil order.

Although public unrest had been growing over the previous year, the trigger for the coup appears to have been the 1 May decision to use the armed forces in an effort to regain control of the situation.[62] While some senior officers supported the government—Istanbul's martial law commander announced that his troops were authorized to fire on "even the smallest public assembly"[63]—others were not united behind this policy. One week after the declaration of martial law, the commander of land forces, General Gursel, was placed on a compulsory leave of absence. In his farewell message, Gursel urged his troops to steel themselves against the "greedy political atmosphere now blowing through the country." Such sentiments were clearly shared by others as well. Former President and

[59] See *Facts on File* 20 (29 December to 4 January 196): 481.

[60] For the Menderes government's programs and the public reaction, see Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 27 May to 3 June 1950, 10725–10726 and 29 May to 5 June 1954, 13598–13598.

[61] Ibid., 2–9 July 1960, 17501.

[62] In response to growing opposition, the government requested the Ankara garrison commander to draw up a plan for the defense of Ankara in the event of further unrest. According to contemporary reports, this plan was used as the basis for the military's seizure of power eleven days later. See ibid.

[63] Ibid., 17502. It is important to note, however, that while other senior officers did not support government policy, neither did they support the coup. Within the High Command, the chief of staff and Ankara's military governor were arrested the day of the coup. Although replaced, the Istanbul military governor was not detained.

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Ataturk colleague, Ismet Inonu, warned that "an oppressive regime can never be sure of the army."[64]

In a 27 May broadcast, Gursel rejected dictatorship and announced that the government had been overthrown to help establish an honest and just democratic order and to give over the administration of the state into the hands of the nation. In a press conference on 28 May, Gursel emphasized that the "purpose and the aim of the coup is to bring the country with all speed to a fair, clean and solid democracy. . . . I want to transfer power and the administration of the nation to the free choice of the people."[65] That same day, the military-dominated cabinet issued a policy statement promising respect for human rights and the abolition of all laws contrary to the Kemalist tradition.

The military dominated the political scene until October 1965. During that time, a series of conservative coalition governments led by former President Inonu held office. When free elections were once again permitted, Suleyman Demirel led his Justice party to victory. Demirel remained in office until the Turkish military forced his resignation in March 1971.

The 1971 Imposition of "Guided Democracy"

On 12 March 1971, the Demirel government was forced to resign after the commanders of the armed forces delivered an ultimatum to the president. Demanding a new government, Turkey's military leaders asserted the urgent need for a "strong and capable government" that could redress the "anarchical situation" in the country. A refusal to accept this demand, they warned, would result in the armed forces taking over the administration of the country.

The decision by the military high command to impose its will on the government followed three years of political violence and growing economic problems. As early as 1968, demonstrations had become so disorderly that Demirel warned "enemies of the state" that the government would not "allow the destroyers of the legitimate order to strangle democracy in the streets."[66] In the following three years, both left- and right-wing violence paralyzed Turkish politics and coincided with the deterioration of the economy. Although the government pursued policies that fostered an annual growth rate of nearly 7 percent, a serious balance of payments deficit had nonetheless emerged. Devaluation of the national currency took place in August 1970, but efforts to redress the economic fall were undermined by chronic inflation (78 percent from 1963 to 1968). Violent demonstrations by leftist forces and trade unions opposed to the government's economic program began in June 1970 and led to the imposition of martial law in Istanbul.

The use of the armed forces to support an unpopular government was resisted by senior commanders. In July 1970, the air force commander, General Muhsin

[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid., 17503.
[66] Ibid., 24637.

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Batur, sent a memorandum to President Sunay advocating a program of socioeconomic reforms and warning of the consequences if the government was unable to maintain public order. In late November 1970, Batur submitted a second memorandum that called for greater powers for the National Security Council and the convening of a constituent assembly. One month later, chief of the General Staff, General Memduh Tagmac, used his New Year's address to issue a strong warning to "all who may try to destroy the national integrity of the republican regime and Ataturk's reforms." "The armed forces," he stated, "whose mission is to protect the country against any danger from without or within, will smash any action directed against the country." Tagmac added that the drift to civil war could still be stopped "by the responsible constitutional bodies."[67]

Despite these warnings, the government seemed unable or unwilling to restore order, and the first three months of 1971 were characterized by a series of murders, bombings of government buildings, and reports of a planned leftist insurrection. However, the trigger for the military's ultimatum appears to have been the kidnapping of four American servicemen on 4 March and the violent clashes between students and police. On 12 March, Tagmac and the three service commanders handed a memorandum to the president which declared that "Parliament and the Government, through their sustained policies, views and actions, have driven our country into anarchy, fratricidal strife, and social and economic unrest; made the public lose all hope of reaching a level of contemporary civilization, a goal set by Ataturk; failed to realize the reforms stipulated by the [1961] Constitution; and placed the future of the Turkish republic in grave danger." It concluded by asserting that a "strong and credible government" was needed to "neutralize the current anarchical situation" and restore the state. After Demirel's resignation, the president publicly thanked the High Command, declaring that it had acted responsibly and he urged all Turks to support the new government.[68]

Instead of imposing direct rule in 1971, the military leaders saw their role as one of guiding the Turkish democratic process. Formed after consultations with the leaders of the major political parties, the new coalition cabinet governed with the support (and sufferance) of the armed forces. Suppressing violence, it implemented a sweeping set of socioeconomic reforms similar to those urged by General Batar in his November 1970 memorandum. Furthermore, it introduced legislation to restrict those forces on both the left and right wings of the political spectrum that had advocated policies opposed to the spirit of Kemalism.

The 1980 Coup d'Etat

On 11 September 1980, the newly elected government of Demirel was overthrown. Five days later, Chief of Staff General Kenan Evran declared that the

[67] Ibid., 24638.

[68] It may be that the action by the service chiefs was less radical than the demands of lower ranking officers. On 16 March, it was reported that more than 200 officers, including four generals and an admiral, had been transferred from their commands or cashiered, fuelling rumours that support for a military coup d'etat was strong within the armed forces. See ibid., 24640–24641.

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military was responding to domestic political anarchy. He reinforced this message by laying out the new regime's program, which included civil order, national unity, and a secular state based on social justice and human rights. Planned months in advance, the coup was welcomed by most Turks as an answer to the preceding years of economic and political stagnation. The delay in overthrowing the government seemed to reinforce the claims of the Turkish military—the "reluctant generals"—that they were sincere in their desire to prevent civil war and preserve the Kemalist republic.[69]

This coup was a response to an unstable political situation that the elected government seemed powerless to remedy. Extremists on both sides of the political spectrum, including Kurdish separatists, resorted to murder and other forms of violence. Prior to the coup, political leaders, rather than attempting to repress this antidemocratic behavior, reacted selectively: Demirel tended to excuse rightist violence, while Ecevit viewed leftist attacks as legitimate reactions to social injustice. Moreover, the economy, which had been expected to improve beginning in 1979, failed to do so. Instead, that year, inflation reached 117.4 percent, unemployment increased from 20 to 25 percent, and industrial production fell by almost 3 percent. The deteriorating economic situation meant that Ankara had to renegotiate agreements with the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the IMF, and was required to introduce measures—including liberalization of foreign investment laws—that many of Turkey's statist-minded leaders felt threatened national independence.[70]

More immediate to the coup was the legislative incapacity of the Turkish parliament. Between January and August, the legislative process was derailed by an increasingly bitter dispute between Demirel's ruling conservative Justice party and the more left-wing Republican People's party led by Bulent Ecevit. Furthermore, concern was growing about the radical demands by both the Islamic fundamentalist National Salvation party (NSP), led by Necmettin Erbakan and the extreme right-wing National Action party of former General Alparslan Turkes. The perception that political squabbling was taking precedence over the national interest was reflected in parliament's inability after more than 100 ballots to elect a new president of the republic. Frustration levels among Turkey's political leaders led to a number of intrigues to replace the Demirel government.

The armed forces were also affected by these developments. Martial law, imposed in December 1978 in thirteen of Turkey's sixty-seven provinces, was extended a year later to nineteen provinces, and by September 1980 was in effect in twenty. While targets for extremist violence were generally police officials, judges, and prominent politicians, in the six months prior to the coup, members of the armed forces also became subject to a number of attacks. By early September 1980, it was estimated that approximately 25 percent of the 475,000-man army

[69] Kenneth Mackenzie, "Turkey Under The Generals," *Conflict Studies*, January 1981, 3.
[70] *Keesing's*, 31 October 1980, 30541.

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was involved in maintaining civil order, a role not welcomed by the High Command.

Moreover, as Mehmet Ali Birand notes, it would have been impossible to expect them "to remain immune to the divisions and stirrings which had rent asunder the fabric of civil society." By early 1980, senior officers were becoming increasingly alarmed that the country's political polarization had begun to "seep into" the armed forces. Younger officers and NCOs were especially vulnerable to the right- and left-wing ideological exchanges. According to Birand, many of the new NCOs were former student political activists who had enlisted to escape death threats. Once in uniform, they proceeded to propagandize their views within the ranks and among the junior officers.[71]

While the coup was a response to a number of issues, as early as 1975, many officers had become convinced of the unworkability of the existing constitution.[72] It was not until December 1979, however, that Turkey's senior military leaders began to organize themselves to take political action. They decided to adopt a similar approach to that employed in 1970. On 27 December 1979, the High Command sent a letter to the president urging the country's leaders to "seek solutions and take measures jointly within an Ataturkist national perspective and within the current parliamentary democratic regime."[73] On 1 January 1980, a letter from General Evren was released to the public urging the formation of a broadly-based coalition government and parliament's speedy passage of antiterrorist measures. A week later, Evren published a list of over sixty political demands that the armed forces felt were necessary—demands that Demirel accepted but was subsequently unable to legislate because of the continuing partisan squabbling in the legislature.[74]

Throughout the ensuing nine months, a sense of crisis took hold of Turkey's political system, although the trigger for the coup appears to have been the fear of left-wing and Islamic extremism. Negotiations between Ecevit and Erbakan raised the fear of an anti-Western, pro-Moslem government. On 6 September, Erbakan attended a public rally of Islamic fundamentalists at which he called for the restoration of the Shariah. The next day, Ecevit gave a speech to a trade union gathering in which he urged the members to take violent action if they felt injustice existed. The government seemed powerless to respond to these provocations. On 7 September, Evren and the four service commanders decided that they would overthrow the civilian government on 11 September.

The Turkish military perceived their role as custodians of national legitimacy, restoring public order while preparing the country for a transition to a functioning

[71] Mehmet Ali Birand, *The General's Coup in Turkey—An Inside Story of 12 September 1980* (London: Brassey's, 1987), 62.

[72] Mackenzie, "Turkey Under The Generals," *Conflict Studies*, January 1981, 6.

[73] For a complete text of the letter, see Birand, *The General's Coup in Turkey*, 100.

[74] Mackenzie, "Turkey Under the Generals," 13.

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democratic system.[75] With little resistance, the armed forces took administrative control of the state through a five-member National Security Council (NSC) and appointed a civilian cabinet. Martial law was extended to all sixty-seven of Turkey's provinces. In an effort to clean-up Turkish politics, the military also ensured that those they regarded as accessories to the problems leading to the coup were no longer able to influence events: a 1981 decree by the NSC prohibited persons, such as Demirel and Ecevit, from participation in politics. The transition to civilian rule began when a new constitution was accepted by a popular referendum in 1982. The end of military rule came on 6 November 1983, when a general election yielded a victory for the Motherland party, with Turgut Ozal becoming prime minister.

The Armed Forces and the Contemporary Political Scene

This brief examination of the three coups suggests that the Turkish armed forces have intervened when either of two conditions prevail. The first involves threats to the legitimacy of Kemalism as the state ideology. Defense of Kemalism does not imply that Turkey's military leaders are necessarily supportive of democracy as a form of government. Under Ataturk, and until the democratic reforms of the late 1940s, Kemalism represented a form of authoritarianism. The military is, nevertheless, sensitive to threats directed at Kemalism, since that ideological framework is their source of legitimacy. In other words, the system of values inculcated by the armed forces is deemed to be inseparable from Ataturk's conception of the secular state. When those ideals have been threatened, or public order threatens the stability of the Kemalist republic, senior military officers have felt it necessary to intervene.

Defense of Kemalism is perhaps the most obvious impetus, and in all three coups public disorder suggested a broader political clash was in the offing. In 1960 and 1971, the differences between the government and opposition, and among the various opposition parties, appeared to be leading to anarchy. In 1980, the political elite was once again divided and incapable of governing effectively. The result was that a growing threat of insurrection by forces inimical to Kemalism, both Islamic and socialist, was halted by the coup. The armed forces appear to have seen their role as filling a void, a situation created by the incapacity of the otherwise legitimate authorities. To this day, public opinion holds that the military is the only remaining Kemalist institution.[76]

[75] Evren kept a diary beginning in late December 1979. The entry for 3 January is: "Returned from the weekly meeting with the President. Told me that Demirel was very dejected upon receiving the letter and contemplated resignation. I said, in return, that the letter wasn't designed to change the government or cause a political crisis. It wasn't addressed specifically to this government. I said that the intention was to alert all political parties, including the one in power, as well as all constitutional bodies." Quoted in Birand, *The General's Coup in Turkey*, 110.

[76] This point is made by Michael Schwelien, "Europa als Lebensretter," *Die Zeit*, 27 January 1995.

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The second cause for intervention appears to represent a rejection of the government's use of the armed forces to support explicitly partisan political objectives rather than the national interest. That military leaders have sought to avoid any measure of association with partisan politics fits well with the institution's image of its own place in Turkish society. Enjoying broad public support, the armed forces clearly have nothing to gain by becoming involved, except in the most exceptional situations, with the questionable antics of daily political life. The claim to being the custodians of national legitimacy could not be upheld were they to play an active political role. This factor was most clearly evident in the 1960 coup, when Menderes attempted to rely on martial law as a means of governing. Nevertheless, both the other coups were also heavily influenced by a growing concern that the armed forces were being drawn into partisan politics. In 1971, for example, only one month after the imposition of martial law in Istanbul, General Batur submitted his first memorandum to the president. The coup was launched six months later after two further, and increasingly explicit, warnings by military authorities. Although to a lesser degree, the 1980 coup was also presaged by a similar concern, expressed in reaction to the targeting of military officials by the PKK and the onerous demands of martial law.

Is it likely that the military will again intervene in Turkish politics? The factors that led to the three coups have clearly reemerged. The growing political prominence of Islam and the re-Islamization of Turkish society threatens to undo much of Ataturk's legacy that the armed forces have in the past sworn to protect. Yet, it must be recalled that the army leaders themselves gave a gloss of respectability to political Islam shortly after the 1980 coup. Nevertheless, that attitude may not be as acceptable in today's political climate.

Some observers of Turkish affairs have observed a growing concern, shared by a large segment of the officer corps, that Islamic fundamentalist groups have penetrated "Ataturk's" army.[77] This issue was first aired by Evren in January 1987, when a large number of cadets at military academies were expelled for Islamic activities.[78] In fall 1994, fifteen navy personnel were suspended and charged for similar offenses.[79] The new chief of the General Staff, General Ismail Hakki Karadayi, is reputed to be extremely intolerant of any Islamic presence in the armed forces. Since Karadayi assumed command in late 1994, several officers and NCOs have been removed from the military's ranks. In December 1994, thirty-five officers were forcibly retired "for their reactionary activities." In December 1995, a further fifty officers were dismissed when it was discovered that they had actively engaged in proselytizing fundamentalism.[80] The govern-

[77] "Differences between Ciller, Chief of Staff" (Istanbul, *Ozgur Ulke* in Turkish, 4 January 1995) in *FBIS-WEU-95-007*, 11 January 1995, 71.

[78] Feroz Ahmad, "Islamic Reassertion in Turkey," *Third World Quarterly* 10 (April 1988): 751.

[79] See "Religious Radicalism Infiltrates Turkish Armed Forces," *International Defense Review* 2 (1995): 9.

[80] See "Fundamentalist Personnel Withdrawn from Active Duty" (Istanbul, *Milliyet* in Turkish, 5 December 1994) in *FBIS-WEU-94-238*, 12 December 1994, 70.

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ment's desire not to alienate Islamic voters has not swayed the military from this policy. Indeed, it is reported that surveillance of "religious officers" was continued by personal order of Karadayi, contrary to former Prime Minister Ciller's request not to do so.[81] Moreover, in early 1996, both the armed forces and Interior Ministry ordered officers "to stay away from mosques used by soldiers, and to pray either at home or in public mosques, but never in uniform."[82]

The incapacity of the government to formulate effective economic policy continues to undermine civil and political stability. The former Ciller government's half-hearted effort to reform the economy and the questionable stability of the new Motherpath coalition suggest that little will be accomplished in the near term. Given its hostility to Ankara's Kurdish policy, it is also likely that the European Parliament will continue to vex relations between Europe and Turkey. The hoped for growth in Turkey's European exports will probably be adversely affected, as will the revenues from the transit of oil, a project still mired in the politics of post-Soviet Central Asia.

Despite these factors, there is another element that Turkey's military commanders must also consider prior to directly intervening in the country's politics. The end of the cold war has altered the geopolitics of the Near East. Turkish commentators are well aware of this and have argued that Turkey is no longer as important an ally as it was during the West's confrontation with the USSR. If this is true, and the matter is debatable (one need only examine current U.S. attitudes toward Turkey to see the varying perspectives), the question of the international community tolerating the overthrow of a democratically-elected government is worthy of consideration. In 1991, the West supported the coup in Algeria in an effort to prevent Islamic fundamentalists coming to power through the ballot box. Nevertheless, there is now a growing belief that military rule there will not stop the Muslim tide and that the West's interests are better served by arriving at a modus vivendi with fundamentalism. Fear of replicating the Iranian revolution and the intolerance of the Western liberal media and elite opinion for undemocratic practices have generated a revulsion for even pro-West military regimes. Turkish generals must, therefore, consider a paradox—the possibility of international isolation fomented by Western states as a consequence of seeking to save Ataturk's republic. After all three previous coups, the West responded quickly by recognizing the military authorities as the new government in Ankara. It is not clear that the same alacrity would, if at all, accompany another coup.

Even if the leadership of the Turkish armed forces does not yet believe that the conditions are ripe for directly intervening in the country's politics, the discussion of the possibility of another coup is in the political wind. On 3 January

[81] "Difference between Ciller and Chief of Staff" (Istanbul, *Ozgur Ulke* in Turkish, 4 January 1996) in *FBIS-WEU-95-007*, 11 January 1996, 70.

[82] Celestine Bohlen, "Turkish Army in New Battle In the Defense of Secularism," *New York Times*, 30 March 1996.

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1994, a warning letter signed by "Ataturkist officers" was sent to the cabinet and to all members of parliament. Stating that "the secular Turkish Republic . . . has been coming under major threats recently," the letter noted that "Ataturkist officers, who are duty bound to protect and defend the Republic" were seriously "perturbed."[83] Most commentators have dismissed this letter as not being the work of senior military officers. Nevertheless, in early 1995, Mesut Yilmaz noted that the state of the country was meeting all the criteria for a coup and added a warning: "If Turkey holds a two-round election this year, there will be no military coup of any sort; but if they keep up this gridlock and "me-you" squabbling, they will be the ones asking for a coup."[84] This concern is probably well founded. The three months it took to create a new government following the December 1995 election underscores the types of problems Yilmaz identified.

Naturally, the Turkish High Command is not unaware of what is happening. In an interview with retired General Kenan Evren, the leader of the 1980 coup stated the willingness of the army to intervene if Kemalism were seriously threatened: "If a danger should threaten to alter completely the Republic and its character, our reaction will be legitimate. In such a case, one abandons the principle of keeping the army out of politics. If a system based on the Shariah is advanced, even by democratic means, the Turkish armed forces would know not to remain spectators."[85]

It is not coincidence, therefore, that Karadayi chose the day before the 24 December 1995 general election to issue a veiled warning to Turkish leaders: "the Turkish Armed Forces are the most effective guarantor of the republic in Turkey, which is a secular, social and lawful state."[86] By early January 1996, the president was made aware of the "deep concern" of military commanders about Refah's electoral performance. Having twice been toppled by coups, Demirel was thereby prompted to issue a public statement on 5 January 1996 in which he advised the armed forces that, "there is no need to fear or feel concern. You may dislike or regret the outcome of the election, but you should act in accordance with its consequences . . . Therefore, acting with suspicions and prejudice could threaten peace in society. Let us believe in ourselves and our state."[87] Later, in a March 1996 interview, Demirel stated that, while there was no evidence of military intervention in the discussions leading to the formation of the Motherpath

[83] "Coup Rumors Abound After Ataturkist Officers' Letter" (Istanbul, *Yeni Gunaydin* in Turkish, 5 January 1995) in *FBIS-WEU-95-006*, 10 January 1995, 60.

[84] See "Politicians Said Expecting Military Coup" (Istanbul, *Milliyet* in Turkish, 17 January 1995) in *FBIS-WEU-95-030*, 14 February 1995, 42.

[85] Quoted in Oklay Akbal, "Les militaires complices de l'islamisme," *Courrier International*, No. 232, 13-19 April 1995.

[86] "Chief of Staff Warns of 'Reactionary Elements'" (Istanbul, *Sabah* in Turkish, 23 December 1995) in *FBIS-WEU-95-247*, 26 December 1995, 27.

[87] "Demirel Told of Military Concerns About a Welfare-led Government," *Turkish Daily News*, 9 January 1996.

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coalition, he nonetheless told the chief of the General Staff that there was a "need to remain calm"[88]

Despite concerns by Turkish policy makers, the end of the cold war has not reduced the geostrategic importance of Turkey, even if the ensuing complications of the new era have focused the attention of the Western powers elsewhere. Nevertheless, if a sustained focus on Turkish affairs is not forthcoming, the West may be confronted with a situation in which failure to comprehend the complexities of Turkey's internal political dynamics will lead to surprises for policy planners in Western foreign and defense ministries. All seem to be setting the stage for a return to military rule. As all of the causes—ineffective political leadership, the growing challenge of Islam, economic malaise, and PKK terrorism—for the three military interventions in the past figure prominently in Turkey today, one of these surprises could very well be another coup d'etat.

POSTSCRIPT

The current turbulence in Turkish politics means that analysis is always being superseded by the latest events. The thesis and conclusion of this article nonetheless remain valid. Since this article was written, perhaps nothing has so shaken the Kemalist elite in Turkey as the accession of Erbakan to the premiership. After six months of wrangling among political leaders, in June 1996 Refah and True Path agreed to govern together. Their program is a curious blending of Refah's Islam-based social justice and closer relations with the Muslim world, alongside True Path's commitment to Western values and the country's long-standing alignment with NATO, Europe, and the United States.

Since assuming the reins of power, the Erbakan government has displayed a relatively moderate outlook. An early decision by the coalition to increase public sector wages (by 50 percent) earned it some public support while seriously threatening the economic recovery of the past year. However, evidence of pragmatism might not indicate any abandonment by Erbakan of his Islamist principles or the political objectives that he has long espoused.[89] Certainly, at the municipal level, Refah mayors have not hesitated to impose Islamic guidelines when they had the power to do so. In Erbakan's home-town of Konya, where Refah has governed since 1989 and garnered 41 percent of the vote in the 1995 municipal election, alcohol is prohibited, women's dress regulated, new mosques constructed, and recently several Western films were banned.

The Refah-True Path coalition agreement has a duration of four years. It is interesting to note that in the distribution of cabinet responsibilities, Erbakan and Refah have acquired control over most of the government departments (housing, public works, highways, and family affairs) directly involved in the disbursement of monies for public welfare. The True Path party retains control over the Finance,

[88] "President Suleyman Demirel," *Turkish Daily News*, 15 March 1996.

[89] See the interview with Erbakan in *Der Spiegel*, 17 June 1996.

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Defense, and Foreign Ministries, in addition to the more controversial Religious Affairs portfolio. If Refah's public support grows, Erbakan might be inclined to seek a new mandate at the end of the initial two years thereby ending the coalition. Should Refah find sufficient electoral support to govern on its own, the political moderation it has so far exhibited might well disappear. At present, it is extremely unlikely that Refah could win a majority in a new general election, as the secularist forces are too strong. However, it is likely that Refah will see its support grow should the coalition provide good government and offer some redress to the social ills in the country.[90] So far, neither of these goals has been accomplished and corruption in government is a more pressing public issue than ever before. That said, Refah's future influence should not be underestimated, as only a year ago most analysts regarded an Erbakan government as improbable.

Reports suggest that there is considerable hostility between the two coalition parties and their leaders. Nevertheless, it is strongly believed that Ciller is continuing to support Refah in order to prevent a parliamentary inquiry of corruption charges against her. If this is true, True Path's support will only last as long as she retains authority in the party. Cracks are beginning to appear; however none of these challenges has yet been sufficient to undermine her leadership.[91] Refah, for its part, continues to push an agenda laden with political symbolism. In late 1996, Erbakan urged the building of mosques in prominent Istanbul locations and stated he was prepared to introduce legislation to permit female civil servants to wear head scarves.

The Kemalist reaction to Refah's efforts has invariably been hostile. Reports suggest that the armed forces are keeping a close watch on the direction the government takes. Evidence of this concern can be found in the response to a political rally convened in the city of Sincan in early February 1997. The morning after a speech by the Iranian ambassador calling for the reimposition of the Shariah, the military diverted a column of tanks through the core of that city.[92] The mayor of Sincan was subsequently arrested and the Iranian ambassador expelled. Given the military reaction to a similar event in 1980, the meaning of the army's message was not lost on Erbakan.

Since Refah first came to power, the chief of the General Staff has repeatedly declared that the armed forces will not allow the secular state to be dismantled.[93] At the same time, senior military commanders have declared that a military coup

[90] See "Erbakan Says Gov't Keen to Probe Security Scandal," *New Europe*, 1–7 December 1996; "Erbakan's Comments on 'Sacrifice Hides,' Mosques" (Istanbul, *Turkiye* in Turkish, 5 February 1997) in *FBIS-WEU-97-026*, 5 February 1997; and Stephen Kinzer, "The Islamist Who Runs Turkey, Delicately," *New York Times Magazine*, 23 February 1997.

[91] "Ciller Warns Deputies to Keep Quiet on Coalition's Future," *Turkish Daily News*, 11 April 1997.

[92] "Sincan Meeting Seen Angering Military Forces" (Istanbul, *Hurriyet* in Turkish, 4 February 1997) in *FBIS-WEU-97-024*, 4 February 1997; and "Tanks Roll Through Sincan in 'Show of Strength'" (Istanbul, *Hurriyet* in Turkish, 5 February 1997) in *FBIS-WEU-97-024*, 5 February 1997.

[93] Umit Enginsoy, "Islamic Rift in Turkey Will Deepen," *Defense News*, 10–16 March 1997.

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will not occur.[94] They have rightly argued that were the military to overthrow the government, Turkey's prospects of membership in the EU would be irreparably damaged. Nevertheless, throughout the first half of 1997, there were very real concerns that the military's patience with the government was wearing thin and that a coup was in the offing. Indeed, on 28 February 1997, the National Security Council (MGK), which is dominated by the armed forces, demanded that Erbakan curtail the "tide of radical Islam."[95] It is too soon to predict the outcome of this latest intervention, but the Turkish media, recalling the events of 1971, referred to the outcome of the MGK meeting as a "soft coup."[96]*

[94] "Former Army Chief Rules Out Coup d'Etat" (Milan, *Corriere della Sera*, in Italian, 24 February 1997) in *FBIS-WEU-97-036*, 24 February 1997.

[95] See *Turkish Daily News* from 28 February until 15 March 1997. Numerous articles on the growing tension between the government and the military, and the possibility of a coup, were printed.

[96] "Top Generals Stage 'Soft Coup,'" *New Europe*, 9–15 March 1997.

* This article expresses only the author's opinions and should not be construed as in any way representing the policy or views of either the Department of National Defence or the government of Canada. I wish to thank Pierre Allard, Leanne Fischer, and Michael Margolian for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.

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

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
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Race and Social Welfare Policy: The Social Security Act of 1935

GARETH DAVIES AND MARTHA DERTHICK

Recent years have seen an outpouring of scholarship devoted to the origins of United States social policy, much of it focusing on the alleged underdevelopment and bifurcated character of the America welfare state. One group of social scientists has developed what Theda Skocpol calls a "polity-centered" approach, according to which the policy decisions and institutional legacies of one era condition and constrain subsequent policy making.[1] A second group of scholars has highlighted the role that gender distinctions, and challenges to those distinctions, played in shaping welfare innovations and backlashes during the formative years of the welfare state.[2] And a third cluster of social scientists has pioneered an approach that centers on the racial politics of welfare.[3]

It is with this third group that the present article is concerned. That the politics of race and the politics of welfare are intertwined in contemporary America is incontestable, and it is equally apparent that their interrelationship today has to be understood in historical context. Scholars such as the sociologist Jill Quadagno

[1] See introduction to Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Margaret Weir, *Politics and Jobs: The Boundaries of Employment Policy in the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); and introduction to Weir, Ann Shola Orloff, and Skocpol, eds., *The Politics of Social Policy in the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).

[2] See, for example, Mimi Abramovitz, *Regulating the Lives of Women: Social Welfare Policy from Colonial Times to the Present* (Boston: South End Publishing, 1988); Linda Gordon, *Pitied But Not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of Welfare, 1890–1935* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994); Gwendolyn Mink, *The Wages of Motherhood: Inequality in the Welfare State, 1917–1942* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).

[3] See next paragraph.

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and the political scientist Robert Lieberman have, therefore, opened up a promising and important line of inquiry as they explore the way in which race has informed the politics of social policy during the period since the federal government first entered this arena in a big way in the 1930s.[4] Other contributors to this debate include social scientists, such as Mimi Abramovitz, Linda Gordon, and Gwendolyn Mink, whose primary interest is in gender but who also have been attentive to the racial context of social policy making.[5]

Quadagno believes that race has played a crucial role in undermining federal social policy agendas for over sixty years, and that this persistent pattern can tell us much about the politics of welfare today. Accordingly, while her recent book *The Color of Welfare* is primarily concerned with the fate of Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty, she is also concerned to place its rise and fall in a broader historical context: "The motor of American history has been the continual reconfiguration of racial inequality in the nation's social, political, and economic institutions. It is this characteristic that has impeded the development of a comprehensive welfare state."[6]

Quadagno believes that the relationship between race and social provision first became important during the New Deal. Franklin Roosevelt extended new "social rights" to the industrial white working class; but the price for this advance was paid by African Americans, who were consistently discriminated against in New Deal programs and agencies. But New Dealers did more than capitulate to white racism. In addition, they set in place programmatic and institutional legacies that widened the existing racial division within the working class, dimming prospects for future social innovation.

Linda Gordon sees the Social Security Act of 1935 as the beginning of a forty-year process via which the United States developed the stratified welfare system that we know today:

> [I]n 1935, Social Security excluded the most needy groups from all its programs, even the inferior ones. These exclusions were deliberate and mainly racially motivated, as Congress was then controlled by wealthy southern Democrats who were determined to block the possibility of a welfare system allowing blacks freedom to reject extremely low-wage and exploitive [sic] jobs as agricultural laborers and domestic servants.[7]

The same claim undergirds the recent work of Lieberman and Quadagno. They argue that the Roosevelt administration, though it initially favored a comprehen-

[4] See Jill S. Quadagno, *The Color of Welfare: How Racism Undermined the War on Poverty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994); Robert C. Lieberman, "Race, Institutions, and the Administration of Social Policy," *Social Science History* 19 (Winter 1995): 511–542; and Lieberman, "Race and the Organization of Welfare Policy" in Paul E. Peterson, ed., *Classifying by Race* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 156–187.

[5] See sources previously cited.

[6] Quadagno, *Color of Welfare*, 15.

[7] Gordon, *Pitied But Not Entitled*, 5.

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sive, racially-inclusive system of social supports, capitulated to southern racists upon whom it was politically dependent. The Committee on Economic Security (CES), which drew up the administration proposal, had favored coverage of almost all workers under the old-age insurance and unemployment compensation provisions of the act. This was to be expected, given the president's universalist conception of social security. Congress, however, chose to exclude agricultural and domestic workers, thereby depriving most African Americans of coverage.[8] The same "compromise with racism," to use Abramovitz's phrase, occurred in the case of public assistance. Having first envisioned strong federal standards in the old-age assistance and aid to dependent children (ADC) programs to ensure adequate and equitable benefits, Roosevelt again bowed to southern pressure, agreeing to a highly decentralized program that perpetuated discrimination in the South.[9]

Our primary concern in this article is with these claims about the initial passage of the Social Security Act, but it might also be worthwhile to summarize the broader historical claims to which they lead, given their contemporary relevance. Gordon argues that although growing numbers of women and African Americans were incorporated in the federal welfare state between 1935 and the 1970s, they tended to be consigned to increasingly stigmatized public assistance programs, particularly ADC (later Aid to Families with Dependent Children, or AFDC). With social security becoming more generous and popular during this same period, the bifurcation that had been present at the outset grew more acute, reaching fruition in 1972 with the passage of Supplemental Security Income, which "left only AFDC as a maligned 'welfare' program."[10]

Lieberman sees both the initial bifurcation and its subsequent evolution rather differently. In his view, social security began as a program that excluded blacks, but the facts that it was centrally administered and that federal administrators were relatively color blind meant that it had from the outset the potential to include African Americans, to the extent that the act was amended or occupational patterns changed. This has in fact happened, and Lieberman believes that social security today is "perhaps the closest thing to a race-blind social program that the United States has ever known."[11] With ADC/AFDC, the picture is quite different; the divisive politics of race have been fanned by discretionary, decentralized administrative arrangements: "potentially the most inclusive part of the Social Security Act, [it] has invited racial discrimination and has developed toward retrenchment and endless controversy."[12] In the 1960s a powerful welfare rights

[8] Many white persons were also excluded by this decision. Nine percent of the United States population in 1930 was African American, while 21.4 percent of employed persons were in agricultural occupations. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789–1945* (Washington, DC; U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO), 1949), 25 (Series B 13-23) and 63 (Series D1-10).

[9] Abramovitz, *Regulating the Lives of Women*, 317.

[10] Gordon, *Pitied But Not Entitled*, 5.

[11] Lieberman, "Race, Institutions, and the Administration of Social Policy," 513.

[12] Ibid.

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movement challenged this dichotomy between old-age insurance (OAI) and ADC, demanding a federally guaranteed income for all Americans. However, it was unable to "overcome the New Deal legacy of institutional fragmentation, and it ultimately foundered on the turbulent politics of racial conflict that continues to haunt American social policy."[13]

Quadagno also sees the 1960s as a decade when the limits of New Deal social policy were boldly but unsuccessfully challenged. Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty, launched in 1964, was a response to the problem of "how to reorient the nation's social policy agenda so that it could eradicate, rather than reinforce, racial inequality."[14] But this bid to create an "equal-opportunity welfare state" was foiled by the very institutional legacies from the New Deal era that it sought to surmount. Moreover, the political value of exploiting rather than ameliorating racial difference came to the fore after 1968 with the Nixon Southern strategy; and the demise of Johnson's Office of Economic Opportunity in 1973 "wiped the inner cities off the legislative agenda for the next twenty years."[15] Regarding the racial politics of social policy in the 1990s, Quadagno is pessimistic. Even social security, pacé Lieberman, remains a racially conditioned program if one examines coverage and benefit levels: "Rather than transferring income from rich to poor, it transferred income from African Americans to whites."[16] Looking to the future, and highlighting the stark economic divisions between the races today, Quadagno warns that "A comprehensive welfare state that enhances the rights of citizenship cannot be erected on the foundation of racial segregation."[17]

Having provided just a brief introduction to the way that a number of able scholars have explored the link between race and welfare policy, in the remainder of this article we will take a closer look at their central claims about the origins of the American welfare system. If race-based accounts of American welfare state development do not yet represent the conventional wisdom, they clearly do constitute an important strain of recent scholarship. Our main purpose here, however, is to suggest the formidable limitations of racially deterministic approaches to United States policy. The following explanation focuses initially upon the passage of old-age insurance, and then on the public assistance provisions of the Social Security Act.

Old-Age Insurance: The Historical and Institutional Context

According to Lieberman, "The Old Age Insurance provisions of the Social Security Act were founded on racial exclusion." He continues:

[13] Ibid., 537.
[14] Quadagno, *Color of Welfare*, 10–11.
[15] Ibid., 57.
[16] Ibid., 160. Quadagno attributes this pattern to the shorter life expectancies of African-Americans.
[17] Ibid., 186.

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> In order to make a national program of old-age benefits palatable to powerful southern congressional barons, the Roosevelt administration acceded to a southern amendment excluding agricultural and domestic employees from OAI coverage. This provision alone eliminated more than half of the African Americans in the labor force and over three-fifths of black southern workers. The systematic exclusion of blacks through occupational classifications was crucial to the passage of the act.[18]

This version of events is perhaps intuitively reasonable, and considerable evidence can be mustered in its support. First, it is true that agricultural and domestic employees were excluded from OAI despite having been included in the administration proposal, and that a majority of black workers were thereby initially barred from coverage. Second, many other countries by 1935 did include these same groups, implying that the practical obstacles to their incorporation were not insurmountable. Third, southern legislators played a crucial role in rewriting the administration bill in committee. Fourth, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) saw these actions as racially based at the time: its general counsel, Charles H. Houston, pondering both the social insurance and public assistance provisions of the bill, observed that "from a Negro's point of view it looks like a sieve with the holes just big enough for the majority of Negroes to fall through."[19]

Finally, if one considers other New Deal legislation, it becomes clear that it frequently left loopholes that permitted discrimination against blacks. Walter White, secretary of the NAACP, was protesting in 1935 against "widespread color discrimination under the New Deal."[20] He was referring in particular to the Agricultural Adjustment Act, but Quadagno's book reveals a broader and consistent pattern of discrimination: labor legislation, house-financing arrangements, the state employment services, and the public housing program all tolerated blatant racism.

Nevertheless, if one takes a closer look at the rationale for excluding agricultural and domestic workers from social insurance, the waters become muddied in ways that cast serious doubt on a race-based explanation. Quadagno and Lieberman each refer to the international context, the latter claiming that "More than half of the other countries with compulsory, contributory old-age insurance systems covered farm workers and domestics."[21] This may be true, but the point also needs to be made that these groups had characteristically been excluded from coverage at the outset. Indeed, the legislators who revised the administration's bill in committee were told by Abraham Epstein, director of the American Association

[18] Lieberman, "Race, Institutions, and the Administration of Social Policy," 514–515.

[19] U.S. Congress, Senate, *Economic Security Act*, Hearings before the Committee on Finance, 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1935), 641.

[20] "Bias Against Negro Laid to New Deal," *New York Times*, 8 January 1935.

[21] Lieberman in Peterson, ed., *Classifying by Race*, 163. Quadagno refers to the same evidence in "Welfare Capitalism and the Social Security Act of 1935," *American Sociological Review* 49 (October 1984): 645.

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for Old Age Security, that "No other country on earth . . . dared to try to include the agricultural workers and the domestic servants at first."[22]

In Britain, the Asquith government's 1909 pension plan had eschewed the insurance principle altogether and had done so in part on the grounds that its adoption would require setting up a complex administrative machinery.[23] And when the same Liberal administration did decide to take the plunge in 1911, unemployment insurance coverage was initially restricted to just seven skilled trades employing little more than two million workers. Some critics asked Home Secretary Winston Churchill why coverage should not be made universal, given his extravagant praise for the insurance principle. In response, he told the House of Commons that his actuaries were unable to furnish adequate information on other workers. It would be futile, however, to wait for the results of additional research: the only way to demonstrate the feasibility of comprehensive coverage was to make a start, and he had selected "a definite group of trades which will admit of steady and practical observation." He told his critics that "Those . . . who demand . . . an immediate universal system of compulsory unemployment insurance are in fact as much the enemies of compulsory insurance as those who are opposed to it in toto."[24] Correspondingly, those who counseled caution were the best friends of universal coverage. Churchill, placing himself in this latter category, assured an audience at Manchester's Free Trade Hall that if the modest beginning he proposed "proves a success the attempt and the system will not stop there. It will be extended, and in proportion as experience and experiment justify its extension, in proportion as the people of this country desire its extension, it must eventually cover, in course of years, the whole of our great industrial community."[25]

Clearly the administrative and actuarial obstacles to universal insurance applied as much to old-age provision as to unemployment, and the problem exercised even the most fervent advocates of the contributory principle. In the United States, Abraham Epstein outlined one particular objection to universalism in his book *Facing Old Age*: "It is evident that it can only be made to apply to persons who are in regular employment. It is next to impossible to collect contributions from persons who are irregularly employed, from agricultural laborers, from those who are their own employers, from women who work at home not for wages, from small merchants, and so forth."[26]

[22] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, *Economic Security Act*, Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, 74 Cong., 1 sess. (1935), 559.

[23] Jose Harris, *William Beveridge: A Biography* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 101.

[24] *Parliamentary Debates*, 5th Series, House of Commons, vol. 26, 497.

[25] Churchill's enthusiasm for universal coverage was nowhere more apparent than in this speech. He went so far to say that: "If I had to sum up the immediate future of democratic politics in a single word I would say 'Insurance'." Winston Churchill, "The Budget and National Insurance," Speech at the Free Trade Hall, Manchester, 23 May 1909, reprinted in Churchill, *Liberalism and the Social Problem* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1909), 311.

[26] Abraham Epstein, *Facing Old Age* (New York: Knopf, 1922), 221.

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Related to the question of administrative capacity was the issue of "actuarial soundness." Social insurance was based on a range of prior private and voluntarist schemes—trade union funds, friendly societies, private insurance companies. Although the inadequacy of such schemes had prompted state intervention in the first place, social insurance enthusiasts were wont to embrace some core assumptions of the old order, even as they called for risk pooling, flat-level benefits, and broadened coverage. For one thing, these private economic interests remained politically important: were "social insurance" to appear more akin to general assistance than to scientific actuarial principles, its political standing would be greatly diminished. For another, British New Liberals, like American Progressives, were attracted by the notion that social progress could be achieved through the cool, rationalistic approach of new knowledge, and social insurance seemed to exemplify the intellectual advance that underpinned the new activism. Moreover, the British experience with unemployment insurance confirmed the fiscal dangers of breaking too dramatically with the actuarial practices of the private sector: the program became bankrupt in the 1920s in the wake of its politically popular but financially insupportable extension to workers outside of the industrial workforce. Even these extensions, incidentally, had not gone so far that agricultural and domestic workers were included. Influenced by this unhappy experience with blending the social insurance and general assistance principles, a 1934 Royal Commission insisted upon their firm separation, and the dichotomy remained evident in the comprehensive welfare state that the Attlee government introduced in Britain after 1945.

But perhaps a more useful international comparison would be with Canada, which like the United States was a latecomer to the social security scene; its federal unemployment insurance law was not passed until 1940.[27] Here too, agricultural and domestic workers were excluded from coverage, along with hospital workers, teachers, and government workers: only 42 percent of the labor force was included.[28] In addition to the two factors of administration and actuarial soundness, two further issues contributed to this highly cautious approach. Both had to do with federalism, and each has obvious relevance to the debate over social policy south of the 49th parallel. First, the Canadian provinces, like the American states (and not just the southern states), were worried about the implications of social innovation for their labor markets. An inevitable product of a decentralized and economically variegated polity, this concern existed quite independently of the peculiar racial dynamic in the American South. Second, the degree to which the federal government in each country had the constitutional authority to introduce nationwide social assistance programs was unclear. In 1935, the Conservative government of R. B. Bennett had claimed that the general welfare clause of the British North America Act, together with the taxation power,

[27] Canada did not adopt old-age insurance until 1951.

[28] Leslie Pal, *State, Class, and Bureaucracy: Canadian Unemployment Insurance and Public Policy* (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), 39.

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permitted the federal government to introduce nationwide social insurance. The Canadian Supreme Court, however, had declared the Employment and Social Insurance Act to be unconstitutional, and the Privy Council upheld the ruling in 1937.[29]

In the United States, it was the striking down of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act that called into question the constitutionality of the entire New Deal. Frances Perkins, the Labor secretary, suggested in 1946 that it was "difficult now to understand fully the doubts and confusions in which we were planning this great new enterprise in 1934." In 1997, it is perhaps still more difficult to do so, but it may be useful to bear in mind her recollection that "The problems of constitutional law seemed almost insuperable."[30]

Old-Age Insurance: The Debate of 1934–1935

These comparisons suggest that the conservatism of the Social Security Act of 1935 when it came to social insurance may have reflected a lot more than racism. It is highly misleading to say that the "Roosevelt administration acceded to a southern amendment excluding agricultural and domestic employees from OAI coverage."[31] As Lieberman himself acknowledges elsewhere in his *oeuvre*, the initiative came not from Congress but from Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, whose conservatism was fiscally rather than racially based, and whose Bureau of Internal Revenue had warned that social insurance simply would not work if these two groups were included within OAI.[32] The train of events was as follows: CES staff members followed precedent in excluding agricultural and domestic workers on administrative and actuarial grounds, but were overruled by Perkins and Harry Hopkins, members of the CES, both of whom wanted to get as close to universal coverage under social insurance as was legislatively possible, as did the president. Once Morgenthau had been apprised of the implications of this decision, he urged the House Ways and Means Committee to adopt an amendment that *he* suggested, excluding the two groups on traditional grounds.[33] The agreement of the southerners in his audience no doubt reflected racial factors, but the initial suggestion was not based on race.

[29] Frank Strain and Derek Hum, "Canadian Federalism and the Welfare State: Shifting Responsibilities and Sharing Costs" in Jacqueline S. Ismael, ed., *The Canadian Welfare State: Evolution and Transition* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1987), 357.

[30] Frances Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew* (New York: Viking Press, 1946), 286.

[31] Lieberman, "Race, Institutions, and the Administration of Social Policy," 514–515. (This is part of a larger quote that was reproduced above.)

[32] For the relevant portions of Morgenthau's testimony, see House Hearings, *Economic Security Act*, 901–902.

[33] Edwin Witte, *The Development of the Social Security Act* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), 152; Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew*, 297.

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Moreover, committee members seem to have believed that they were following the will of the president as well as the Treasury secretary in amending the bill, although neither Morgenthau nor Roosevelt acknowledged as much. The *New York Times* reported that Morgenthau's suggested amendments "were generally thought to bear the stamp of the administration." Committee members wanted clarification on this matter and were worried that if they passed the administration bill unaltered, the president would accept sweeping amendments in the Senate in a way that would embarrass both the committee and the House as a whole. This had happened on a number of recent occasions.[34]

But even if it had been southerners whose initiative removed agricultural and domestic workers from the administration's bill, it might be misleading to interpret this as an important defeat for the administration. From the outset, administration witnesses demonstrated a strikingly relaxed attitude toward the text of their Economic Security bill. Perkins, Morgenthau, and the executive director of the CES, Edwin E. Witte, were among those who encouraged legislators to give it the most careful scrutiny and make whatever changes seemed necessary, so long as they were congruent with the basic philosophy of the measure. Perkins outlined the CES's philosophy in the following terms: "This committee has felt . . . that it was primarily the duty of those who are elected by the American people to determine the policy of the American people."[35] And on the opening day of House hearings, Witte emphasized that the CES had "no thought that this program as presented should necessarily be passed without any changes":

> The Committee [on Economic Security] intends to present to you honestly the entire problem. It expects and desires the cooperation of the Congress in working out this problem. If, in your judgment, any parts of this program should be changed, of course, that is your privilege. That is what we expect. Our purpose primarily is to give you information, to serve you and assist you in every manner that we can.[36]

This flexibility brought big dividends in the view of Paul Douglas, a strong supporter of comprehensive social insurance. Writing in 1936, he noted that the bill had "emerged in a much clearer and more logical fashion after having been revised by the committee."[37]

The administration's flexibility is nowhere more apparent than with the thorny question of agricultural and domestic workers. It was not just racists and not even just fiscal conservatives who nourished doubts regarding the desirability of including agricultural and domestic workers in the 1935 bill. Witte told the Finance Committee that "We recommend that they be included . . . but, frankly, the administrative difficulties cannot be disregarded and you may wish to exempt these groups at the outset."[38] The most outspoken critic of the proposed inclusion

[34] "Put Security Bill Up to Roosevelt," *New York Times*, 6 February 1935.
[35] House Hearings, *Economic Security Act*, 173.
[36] Ibid., 8–9.
[37] Paul Douglas, *Social Security in the United States* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939), 99.
[38] Senate Hearings, *Economic Security Act*, 198.

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of these two categories was Epstein, scarcely an exemplar of southern racism. Addressing the Finance Committee, he told a respectful audience of the dangers of inclusion. Farmers and domestic workers obviously needed help "as much and even more so than industrial workers," but legislators must be aware of the "terrifically difficult" logistical problem that they posed. Starkly predicting that "You are not going to collect it," Epstein feared "an administrative problem which will become a fizzle and therefore react ultimately against the whole plan." He had an alternative suggestion: "Let us wait at least a couple of years and we will see if the administration can really properly take on the job, and we have acquired some experience, and the farmers themselves see that it is good for them, and then we will take them in. . . ."[39]

In light of these points, Congress's exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers from OAI and unemployment coverage is eminently unsurprising. To summarize the nonracial factors that contributed to the decision: legislators had been told that these groups had always been excluded from new social insurance programs, and that the Treasury was not capable of administering the CES bill; the most active private advocate of social insurance had told them that the inclusion of these groups might endanger the long-term prospects of the entire social security program; Roosevelt was suspected of favoring the Morgenthau amendments; and administration officials, at pains to appear deferential, emphasized that their bill could only benefit from careful congressional scrutiny. If race contributed to the enthusiasm of southern legislators for revision, then it was joined with these other factors.

Moreover, the creators of social security in the United States did not see these exclusions as permanent, but rather as temporary expedients. Also excluded from social security in 1935 were the self-employed, seamen, and employees of churches, colleges, hospitals, and charities, not to mention all government employees. These decisions were based not on race but on a range of other considerations that apply equally well to agricultural and domestic workers: the familiar administrative difficulties, perceived actuarial obstacles, and the belief that many members of these groups would not desire to be included in this new scheme of compulsory taxation. Roosevelt viewed the 1935 act as a foot in the door and publicly anticipated the day when social insurance would be universalized and the dole vanquished. During the next two decades the principle of social insurance was embedded and popularized just as he had hoped, and consequently extended to new groups, including, in 1950, agricultural and domestic workers.

The Politics of Public Assistance in 1935

The evidence for the influence of race is stronger for public assistance than for social insurance, but still considerably less strong than racial interpretations suggest. We will assume with other analysts that the crucial event was Congress's

[39] Ibid., 514–515.

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refusal to include as a condition of grants-in-aid that the states pay "a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health." But it is worth mentioning that if the Roosevelt administration had seriously intended to confine the discretion of the states and create a national program, it would have had to address eligibility as well as benefit levels. This it did not do, except to limit residence requirements and set a standard of age (at least 65 years) for old-age assistance.

The most strenuous objections to the "reasonable subsistence" language came from southern legislators, notably two Virginians—Harry F. Byrd in the Senate, who invoked the doctrine of the states' sovereignty, and Howard W. Smith in the House, whose testimony before the Ways and Means Committee was surprisingly forthright in the matter of race. Lieberman and Abramovitz tell us that this southern resistance to federal standards was driven by the desire to keep blacks in their place. Lieberman believes that grand rhetoric about state sovereignty such as Byrd used was "merely a stand-in for racial supremacy." Abramovitz concurs that "beneath the states' rights argument, southern states . . . feared that such a federal standard would require equal treatment of whites and blacks."[40]

In some respects, the contemporary record supports this explanation for defeat of a national standard of need and assistance. Witte, who testified before committees in both houses and attended their executive sessions, wrote that Byrd was "supported by nearly all of the southern members of both committees, it being very evident that at least some southern senators feared that this measure might serve as an entering wedge for federal interference with the handling of the Negro question in the South."[41] And then there was Smith, saying that "Of course, in the South we have a great many colored people. . . ." Earlier he had remarked that $30 per month for the average farm laborer in a rural area "would be affluence." "To put him on a pension at age 65 of $30 a month is not only going to take care of him, but a great many of his dependents, relatives, and so on, who could much better be employed working on a farm."[42]

Our account will put the southerners' position in the larger context of the interstate political economy and argue that for them to accept the administration's bill would have been irrational, irrespective of race. Although southerners led opposition to the decency and health standard, within Congress only Senator Robert F. Wagner of New York explicitly supported it. With ample reason, southerners argued that the bill was biased in favor of the wealthier states. Most of them reacted by striving to protect the autonomy of their states. Others, whom

[40] Lieberman, "Classifying by Race," 168; and Abramovitz, "Regulating the Lives of Women," 317.

[41] Witte, *The Development of the Social Security Act*, 143–144. See also Thomas H. Eliot, *Recollections of the New Deal: When the People Mattered* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992), 110–111. As counsel to the Committee on Economic Security, Eliot drafted the administration's bill. He recalls southern opposition to detailed grant-in-aid conditions, but does not link it to race.

[42] House Hearings, *Economic Security Act*, 976, 974. Much of Smith's testimony is ambiguous in regard to race. He could be referring to impoverished white persons as well.

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the advocates of a racial interpretation overlook, reacted by calling for a wholly national program of aid.

In contrast to the proponents of a racial interpretation, who tend to focus on Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) because of its putative association with race, we will focus on old-age assistance (OAA). The association between ADC and race had yet to be established in 1934–1935. Mothers' aid, the state-level program on which ADC was built, was concentrated in the urban North, which at that time was largely white. A study of caseloads in 1931, covering approximately half of recipients nationwide, showed that 96 percent of the mothers were white, 3 percent Negro, and 1 percent "other." Mothers' aid hardly existed for women who were divorced, deserted, or never married. It was often called "widows' aid," because that is what it was. As of 1931, 82 percent of the families receiving mothers' aid for which the mother's marital status had been determined were families of widows. Nothing in the administration's bill in 1935 would have changed standards of eligibility; the bill did not address marital status, nor did the CES report hint at any such thing. Southerners may have detected a threat of federal intervention, beginning with pressure, in the form of grants proffered, to create programs that were not yet well established in the region. Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina had not enacted mothers' aid laws, while Arkansas and Mississippi did not have them in operation even though enacted.[43] But the threat to create a racially inclusive program at this point was more speculative than immediate.

We choose to focus on OAA, because that is what Congress did in 1934–1935. In the Depression-era politics of poor relief, ADC was the tail to the elephant of OAA. The report of the Committee on Economic Security, which was the charter for social security legislation, recommended the decency and health standard only for OAA. It is not mentioned in the section on aid to dependent children. The administration's bill applied it as well to ADC, but this was an afterthought. ADC grant conditions were modeled after those for OAA, except that the matching formula was less generous—one-third rather than one-half of the states' spending. Congress behaved similarly, reaching decisions for OAA after extended consideration, and then with little further thought replicating them in ADC.

During the Depression the aged mobilized politically on a massive scale, bringing intense pressure on both state and national officeholders to act on their behalf. At the extreme, represented by Louisiana's Senator Huey Long, some political figures endorsed national pensions for all elderly persons without regard

[43] For descriptions of the program prior to enactment of the Social Security Act, see *Social Security in America: The Factual Background of the Social Security Act as Summarized from Staff Reports to the Committee on Economic Security* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1937) 236; Winifred Bell, *Aid to Dependent Children* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), chap. 1; and Christopher Howard, "Sowing the Seeds of 'Welfare': The Transformation of Mothers' Pensions, 1900–1940," *Journal of Policy History* 4 (1992): 188–227.

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to need. But the responsible, moderate position, defined by President Roosevelt and embraced by Democratic committee chairmen in the House and Senate, was for a shared federal-state program confined to the most needy. It would use federal grants-in-aid to the states, a method that was expected to contain and distribute costs by diffusing the pressure from the aged.

Consistent with a common pattern of policy making in the federal system of the United States, the administration's bill borrowed from the law and practice of leading states in order to create a standard for the rest. The "decency and health" language was contained in the old-age assistance laws of New York and Massachusetts.[44] The bill would have required all states to enact it in order to qualify for aid. Similarly, the bill promised to pay half of the cost of each individual recipient's pension, up to a maximum federal payment of $15 per month, a figure deduced from the fact that the most generous state-level programs were paying maximums of $30 per month.

The effect of the federal law would have been to relieve the most generous states, which were also typically the most wealthy, of half of the cost of their old-age assistance programs. In the twenty states that had no such programs as of 1935, which included all of the Deep South states, the federal law was designed to induce their enactment. These states would have had to begin raising revenue for old-age pensions, and if they wanted to maximize their federal grant, they would have had to pay pensions equivalent to those of the most wealthy states.[45]

Southern states protested that they could not afford to meet the standard that was being set, which was a standard of the North and West. Per capita income in 1929 ranged from $269 per year in South Carolina to $1,164 in New York; per capita tax collections in 1939 ranged from $12.83 in Mississippi to $36.39 in California.[46] Representative Smith opened his argument before the Ways and Means Committee by claiming that if half of the Virginia population over 65 qualified for pensions, and if the state's share for each were $15 per month (enough to match the federal offer), the state would have to raise an additional $10 million per year. This approached Virginia's annual total of general revenue, which Smith put at $12 million.[47] Other southern states made comparable claims. The Arkansas legislature, formally pleading its inability to raise the matching funds that federal grants would require, begged Congress not to require them.[48]

Furthermore—and this was what outraged Byrd—states faced the prospect that if federal administrators judged their programs to fall below a standard of

[44] Senate Hearings, *Economic Security Act*, 67.

[45] Characteristics of the old-age pension laws of the states as of 1934 are summarized ibid., tables 14 and 15, p. 50.

[46] Erik W. Austin, *Political Facts of the United States Since 1789* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 425; Tax Foundation, *Facts and Figures on Government Finance* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), 24th ed., 248.

[47] House Hearings, *Economic Security Act*, 974.

[48] *Congressional Record*, 79, 15 April 1935, 5707.

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"decency and health," they would be denied federal grants altogether. Federal "bureaucrats" would be empowered to tell the states how much they must spend.[49]

This prospect was no figment of the Virginians' imagination; it was what the framers of the act frankly intended. This was evident from the testimony both of Senator Wagner, who sponsored the administration's bill in Congress and was the lead witness before the Finance Committee, and of Witte. Wagner implied that $40 per month was the correct standard of health and decency, and he tangled with one senator—Daniel Hastings, a Republican of Delaware—whose state was spending only $9 per recipient. They had the following exchange:

> Senator Hastings. You are expecting us to contribute as much as $15 and I have a notion that you would expect us to contribute as much as $25 if we are going to participate in this at all.
>
> Senator Wagner. I think Delaware can afford it, can it not?
>
> Senator Hastings. That is what I supposed.
>
> Senator Wagner. In spite of the fact that you can afford it, you have contributed only $9 per month.[50]

Wagner and Witte faced deeply skeptical questioning from other members of the Finance Committee even before Byrd opened his defense of state sovereignty, charging that the federal administrator of aid would be the "dictator of State legislation."[51] Witte pointed out that if the committee did not like giving federal administrators discretion to determine when a standard of "decency and health" had been met, it could choose to set in monetary terms an explicit nationwide standard of need and assistance, or it could remove from the bill the authority for federal administrators to withhold grants as a means of enforcement. Witte defended federal administrative discretion on the ground that "it would permit adjustments for all portions of the country," but with customary tact and deference added that the decision "is entirely for your determination."[52]

Congress defined its own course. Following the lead of the Ways and Means Committee, within which the administration's bill was thoroughly recast, Congress dropped the decency and health standard as a grant-in-aid condition, and instead provided that grants should be given "for the purpose of enabling each State to furnish financial assistance, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State. . . ."[53] The administration's bill had attempted an extraordinary degree of intrusion into state policy making and finance; the outcome, presumably in reaction to this attempt, was an emphatic assertion of the states' independence. Besides this phrase in the law, the committee reports and the statements of the committee chairmen on the floor were explicitly reassuring to the advocates of

[49] Senate hearings, *Economic Security Act*, 72–78.
[50] Ibid., 14.
[51] Ibid., 72.
[52] Ibid., 81–82.
[53] *U.S. Statutes-at-Large*, vol. 49, 620, 627.

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states' sovereignty. "[The bill] does not vest dictatorial powers in any Federal officials," the Ways and Means Committee report said.[54] "[Grant-in-aid conditions] do not involve dictation by the Federal Government, but only establish standards which will make it reasonably certain that the States are honestly trying to meet the problem of the dependent aged. The administration of the pension grants is left to the States, as is their amount."[55]

To suppose that this action is to be explained simply on grounds of white southerners' defense of racial superiority requires one to ignore or discount very heavily the economic interest of all of the poorer states in maximizing their gain from the new offer of federal grants; the interest of all states in maintaining autonomy in budgeting and finance; the widespread animosity toward central administrators, as manifested in the remarks even of so loyal and liberal a Democrat as John W. McCormack of Massachusetts;[56] and the great practical difficulty of imposing a national standard at a time when social, economic, and cultural differences among states were far greater than they are today. It should also be noted that Congress did not adopt the extreme states' sovereignty position that Witte hypothetically put to it; it did not eliminate from the bill authority for the federal administrative agency to withhold grants as a means of enforcing grant conditions.

In debate on the House floor, the central argument of southerners and also representatives of other poor states[57] was that the bill discriminated against the aged in the poorest states by requiring of all states, regardless of fiscal capacity, the same 50 percent level of matching funds. Southerners typically reacted by asking that the matching requirement be reduced or even eliminated.[58] The southern position received little support from representatives of wealthier states.

A few populist southerners were to be found among those members of Congress who favored a purely national program. Representative John McClellan of Arkansas, for example, went beyond the position of his state's legislature to argue that the responsibility of the federal government was "direct to every Amer-

[54] "The Social Security Bill H. Rept. 615," 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1935), 16.

[55] "The Social Security Bill S. Rept. 628," 74th Cong., 1st sess. (1935), 6.

[56] "I do not want professional social workers of the Federal Government coming into Massachusetts and dictating to the old people of my State. . . . The law shall be administered by local hands, responsible to local public opinion." *Congressional Record*, 79, 16 April 1935, 5978.

[57] See, for example, the remarks of Representative Harold Knutson of Minnesota, who presumed to speak for states in addition to his own. Citing North Dakota and West Virginia in particular, he complained that the old-age assistance program would "work a great injustice in a number of states that are bankrupt or nearly so." *Congressional Record*, 79, 10 April 1935, 366. Per capita income in North Dakota in 1929 was $365; in West Virginia, $460. Austin, *Political Facts*.

[58] For example, see the amendments offered by Representatives William M. Colmer and Aaron Lane Ford of Mississippi, *Congressional Record*, 79, 18 April 1935, 5969–5970. For a scholarly argument that the federal public assistance program imposed unequal financial burdens on different regions and should be revised to allocate grants-in-aid according to a principle of equalization, see Clarence M. Heer, "Financing the Social Security Program in the South," *Southern Economic Journal* (1937): 291–302.

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ican citizen who comes within the class to be benefited, irrespective of State citizenship. . . . State boundary lines should not be regarded."[59] Representative Aubert C. Dunn of Mississippi argued that "This bill should be amended so as to definitely assure our people who reach the age of 60 years and are in need that they will be comfortable and will not be compelled to depend upon local politics to give them that which is righteously theirs."[60] It is quite conceivable that the South would have accepted a wholly national program of means-tested public assistance, but there is no way of knowing, because no responsible national office holder proposed one. Onerous grant-in-aid conditions that applied to the states' own programs were more threatening to states' sovereignty than purely national programs.

Writing on the fiftieth anniversary of the Social Security Act, Wilbur Cohen, one of its architects, judged the omission of the decency and health standard "the most significant long-range loss."[61] However, even had the language been included in the act of 1935, it would have been hard to implement in a substantial way for at least a generation. Ironically, many states proceeded to incorporate the decency and health standard in their own laws even after Congress dropped it.[62] That is what the authors of the administration's bill intended them to do—and that is probably as much as the federal executive branch would have been capable of compelling them to do in the short run. Without support from Congress and the federal courts, it would have been very hard to force poor states to meet a particular monetary standard of assistance through the use of executive discretion. Most likely, the language would have begun to bite only in the late 1960s, when the welfare rights movement developed and turned to the courts to attack the welfare policies of the states. Then, the language would have given the litigators something to pin their cases on.[63]

The Influence of Race: A Summary

Race appeared furtively in the discussions of 1935. Witte seems to have been surprised by his encounter with it: "The fact is that it had never occurred to any person connected with the Committee on Economic Security that the Negro

[59] *Congressional Record*, 79, 15 April 1935, 5706.

[60] Ibid., 5671.

[61] "The Social Security Act of 1935: Reflections Fifty Years Later" in *The Report of the Committee on Economic Security of 1935 and Other Basic Documents Relating to the Development of the Social Security Act* (Washington, DC: National Conference on Social Welfare, 1985), 9.

[62] Richard Sterner, *The Negro's Share* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943), 272–274. Sterner reported that in the early years of the old-age assistance program (1937–1940), Negroes in the South received benefits out of proportion to their share of the population but that the degree of their overrepresentation was very likely less than what need would have dictated.

[63] R. Shep Melnick, *Between the Lines: Interpreting Welfare Rights* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), chaps. 4 and 5; Martha Davis, *Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement, 1960–1973* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

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question would come up [in connection with conditions for old-age assistance]."[64] On the floor of the Senate, Huey Long brought the subject up defiantly, with a demagogue's brute candor: "The colored people are among the poorest people we have. . . . How many of them will ever get on the pension rolls? . . . That may seem like cheap demagoguery, but I am not afraid to say it."[65] Before the Ways and Means Committee, Howard Smith betrayed a casual, artless racism by asking that the states be allowed "to differentiate between persons."[66]

Only two witnesses before the Ways and Means Committee addressed the subject directly, the NAACP's Houston, who asked for coverage of agricultural and domestic workers under social insurance, and one from the department of race relations of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, who asked that Congress prohibit racial discrimination in programs shared with the states. Neither elicited sympathetic questioning, let alone support.[67]

Unable or unwilling to engage the subject of race directly, policy makers engaged it, if at all, indirectly through decisions about the locus of government responsibility. Insofar as policy was nationalized, the potential for racial fairness increased. The crucial questions are how far nationalization was carried in the Social Security Act, and, insofar as nationalizing measures failed of adoption, to what extent the failure was attributable to the white South's desire to perpetuate a racial caste system.

Title II, which created social insurance for retired persons, was of immense significance—a breakthrough in the nationalization of American social policy. As such, it met no significant southern opposition. Whether the failure to cover agricultural and domestic workers in 1935 was racially motivated is problematic. We tried to show that the evidence for such an interpretation is less than compelling. In any case, the temporary omission of such workers was less significant than was the creation of a new, wholly national program of retirement insurance.

Had the decency and health standard been enacted in the public assistance titles, that too would have represented a nationalizing breakthrough, though of uncertain effect in the short term. Southern opposition to it was undoubtedly made more intense by racial motives, but we have tried to show that a purely racial interpretation of the Southern position, let alone Congress's acceptance of it, is drastically oversimplified. Southerners had ample economic motivation to oppose the terms of the administration's bill.

Moreover, to stress what Congress took out of the public assistance titles overlooks what it left in. The Social Security Act made poor relief a public responsibility and delocalized it by requiring state financial participation and mandatory statewide operation of relief programs. This was a major step toward more generous social provision—"quite at variance with our past record and

[64] Witte, *Development of the Social Security Act*, 143–144.
[65] *Congressional Record*, 79, 14 June 1935, 9294.
[66] House Hearings, *Economic Security Act*, 974.
[67] Ibid., 796, 597.

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history," Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi, chairman of the Finance Committee, observed in floor debate.[68] In the past, the needy aged had received help from private charitable organizations or from county or city governments, with or without state participation. This major step, which used the national government's money and power to lever the state governments' money and power, was taken despite numerous pleas from southern congressmen that their states could not afford to participate. Members of Congress raised no objections to the requirement of mandatory statewide operation, which administrative planners judged to be crucial. On the contrary, when Witte suggested that federal administrators might conclude that "reasonable subsistence" could vary as between urban and rural localities, Senator Thomas P. Gore of Oklahoma objected that this would lead to unacceptable inequalities.[69] If southerners had wanted to discriminate between counties more and less heavily black, presumably they would have objected to the requirement of mandatory state-wide operation.

The Social Security Act also limited the states' use of residence requirements, a significant step toward nationalization, and opened the way for federal supervision of administration by stipulating that state plans must "provide such methods of administration . . . as are found by the [Social Security] Board to be necessary for the efficient operation of the plan." Proponents of a racial interpretation have attached significance to the fact that Congress in 1935 specifically exempted from federal supervision the "selection, tenure of office, and compensation of personnel."[70] Strained to begin with, this interpretation overlooks the fact that only four years later Congress reversed itself and explicitly authorized the requirement of merit systems of personnel administration.[71]

No more than Congress was the president prepared for a wholesale nationalization of social policy. Roosevelt never advocated any such thing. His administration sought to bring old-age assistance programs into being in the twenty states where they had not been enacted yet and to make sure that state programs were effectuated as such. He took the centrality of the state governments in domestic affairs as a given, and he wanted them to bear their share of the financial burden. When in 1939 liberals tried to introduce federal minimum grants of $7.50 per month per recipient, which would have substantially increased benefits in the poorer states, Roosevelt protested. "Not one nickel more," he said. "Not one solitary nickel. Once you get off the . . . matching basis the sky's the limit, and before you know it, we'll be paying the whole bill."[72]

[68] *Congressional Record*, 79, 17 June 1935, 9440.

[69] Senate Hearings, *Economic Security Act*, 82.

[70] Lieberman, "Race, Institutions, and the Administration of Social Policy," 520.

[71] For an account of how federal requirements were applied in one northern state, see Martha Derthick, *The Influence of Federal Grants: Public Assistance in Massachusetts* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).

[72] James T. Patterson, *The New Deal and the States: Federalism in Transition* (Newport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981; copyright 1969 by the Princeton University Press), 93. Patterson attributes the quotation from Roosevelt to Arthur J. Altmeyer, *The Formative Years of Social Security* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 112.

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To accept the fundamentals of federalism may have implicitly acknowledged the importance of race, depending on how much weight one gives to southern exceptionalism as an underpinning of the institution itself. Accurately to weigh the significance of race in social policy making would require taking the analysis to this deeper level, at which the very form of governing institutions is explained. However, even without going to that deeper level, the case can be made that race had a latent influence on the politics and policy outcome of 1935. According to this argument, it would be the very absence of race from the deliberations that most eloquently attested to the impact of discrimination on New Deal policy making.

Had there been more than one African-American in Congress, had there been any from the South, or black voters in the South in numbers sufficient to influence white Congressmen, or had the NAACP enjoyed greater influence—in short, had African-Americans been admitted to full political participation—then debate over social security might have proceeded very differently. Issues of racial fairness might have surfaced explicitly, producing at least a clearer revelation of motives if not substantively different policy choices. More pressure would have existed to include agricultural workers and domestics, no matter what the administrative difficulties.[73]

In 1935, the existing form of federalism per se had a powerful influence on policy. In choosing to have shared programs for public assistance, the president and Congress were building on precedent. In creating federal grants-in-aid for public assistance, they were planting a familiar institution of intergovernmental relations in new policy terrain. With southerners in the lead, Congress limited the scope of the proposed innovation, but did not for one moment consider defeating it in defense of state and local autonomy. To what extent Congress acted proximately out of racial motives is necessarily obscure, because a discriminatory political system artificially suppressed consideration of race. But it is precisely this caveat that should make contemporary social scientists cautious in asserting the primacy of racial motivation in retrospective analysis, the more so since the range and probable weight of nonracial factors become so obvious when one takes the trouble to reconstruct the political debate of 1935.*

[73] We are indebted to Richard M. Valelly for urging us to develop this point. The lone African-American in Congress was Arthur W. Mitchell of Chicago. His remarks on the floor indicated sympathy for the southerners' position on public assistance: "I do not think it means much for us to pass a law that will help Illinois, my State, because it might have resources to meet the requirements of the bill; and Massachusetts, that has already met them, and a number of other States, while the State of Alabama and the State of Mississippi and the State of Minnesota, and other poor States could not meet the requirements." *Congressional Record*, 79, part 5, 15 April 1935, 5692.

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Interbranch Rivalry and the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua

JAMES M. SCOTT

In January 1981 President Ronald Reagan took office determined to do something about what he considered a growing tide of Soviet expansionism. To do so, his administration developed a strategy to aid anti-Soviet insurgencies in the Third World in their attempts to overthrow Marxist regimes. Eventually labeled the Reagan Doctrine, the strategy had matured enough by 1985 for the president to assert that the United States "must not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression."[1] In 1986 he declared, "America will support with moral and material assistance your right not just to fight and die for freedom, but to fight and win freedom . . . in Afghanistan, in Angola, in Cambodia, and in Nicaragua."[2] However, a conflict developed over the application of the Reagan Doctrine to Nicaragua, where rebels known as the contras opposed the Sandinista government, which came to power in a successful revolution in 1979. This conflict reflected the high priority assigned the issue by the president and the intense scrutiny given the policy by Congress. Since the policy-making process extended over several years and included many players, the Nicaragua case makes for a splendid study in the American foreign policy-making process. This article examines the case, illuminates several salient features of American foreign policy making, and argues for a more complex framework for policy-making studies.

[1] Ronald Reagan, "State of the Union Address," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 21 (March 1985): 145.

[2] Ronald Reagan, "State of the Union Address," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 22 (March 1986): 139.

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American Foreign Policy Making

Analysts who speak of foreign policy as the product of the executive branch alone ignore the shifting balance of power built into the American system by the Framers of the Constitution. The document itself is ambiguous on the division of their powers, so the precise role and responsibility of each branch is also unclear, creating an invitation to struggle. When consensus over objectives is absent, as has been the case since the Vietnam War and in many periods of American history prior to the cold war, neither branch can dominate foreign policy. Moreover, apart from crisis decisions (situations with high threat to important values, short decision time, and, usually, surprise and a possibility of violence), which are handled by small groups of high-level executive branch officials, most foreign policy in noncrisis situations is not clearly and uniformly dominated by the executive branch. Hence, treating foreign policy as the exclusive province of the executive branch is a narrow focus that does not reflect the complexity that flows from constitutional ambiguity, that is manifested in U.S. history, and that ignores important features of American foreign policy making. Three of these features stand out: first, several identifiable actor sets exist; second, foreign policy consists of several types; and third, the policy-making process is cyclical, offering multiple points of access to policy makers.

Actor sets may be divided into the three categories: presidential (small groups consisting of the president and his closest circle of advisers); bureaucratic (executive branch actors from the foreign policy agencies and other relevant organizations); and congressional (leadership, committees, subcommittees, and individual members). Any one set or a combination of two or more may be influential on various policies or at various stages in policy making, and all three may include or be influenced by nongovernmental actors. Hence, policy making will involve numerous dynamics—various small group, bureaucratic, and organizational processes, and a wide range of congressional activity and legislative procedures.

Differentiating among types of foreign policy is also useful; it reveals that no single actor set truly dominates all foreign policy making. For example, crisis decisions can be distinguished from both structural policy (which involves how resources are used and includes procuring and locating personnel and materiél and providing funds for assistance and other programs) and strategic policy (which includes long-term, noncrisis policies that identify the basic goals and tactics of the United States toward other countries and organizations and develop the basic strategies toward achieving those objectives).[3] For each type of policy, a different constellation of actors with a distinctive set of relationships forms. The president and the executive branch uniformly dominate only crises. Structural policy tends

[3] Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin, *Congress, the Bureaucracy, and Public Policy*, 5th ed. (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1991), 22–24; Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay, eds., *Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993).

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to be dominated by subgovernment relationships between congressional subcommittees and bureaucratic agencies. Congress can be expected to be involved extensively here, along with private individuals and groups. Strategic policy may be affected by any actor set, although the institutional presidency tends to dominate the agenda and initiate policy. In essence, the circle of actual or potential policy makers widens when strategic or structural policies are examined.

The policy-making process exhibits two important features. First, the process is not linear with a clear beginning and end. Instead, its stages proceed in cycles with the implementation and evaluation stages feeding back to the agenda-setting and formulation stages. Second, the stages allow the involvement of different actor sets at different points in the process. Dominance in one phase does not necessarily indicate domination of the entire process. Instead, different actor sets may influence policy at different stages, and each may have tools particularly useful in specific situations. As a result, a secondary actor set may become dominant in the next cycle of the process.

These three factors suggest that the predominant image of American foreign policy making must be replaced. This image presents a series of concentric circles beginning with the president and expanding outward to include advisers, bureaucracies, Congress, and the public. (See Figure 1.) According to this representation, the influence and relevance of actors decrease with distance from the center of the circles. To the extent that this image suggests that the White House is central to the foreign policy process, it is generally useful. However, it is often taken to mean the White House is always the center of policy making, which is less accurate. Figure 2 presents a better model that reflects this point and the three factors identified above.

The three actor sets—The White House, the foreign policy bureaucracy, and Congress—are embedded in the larger circles of societal forces (nongovernmental actors including the media, interest groups, and public opinion) and international forces. Any one of the actor sets can influence a policy. Since each circle contains more than one actor, rival alliances made of members of each actor set might exist and compete. This image suggests that different constellations of actors form and shift across different policies or stages of the process, indicating that policy making may take any of at least five constellations, which may be arrayed on a continuum (Figure 3). At the ends of this continuum, one branch dominates the other. Moving toward the middle indicates more balanced involvement of all actor sets.

The Reagan Doctrine and Nicaragua: March 1981–December 1982

In the 1980 election, Ronald Reagan advocated the elimination of all assistance to the Nicaraguan government. As a candidate, he ran on a platform that condemned the "Marxist Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua" and pledged support for the "efforts of the Nicaraguan people to establish a free and independent

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FIGURE 1
The Presidential Preeminence Image



government."[4] Immediately on taking office, high-ranking policy makers suspended and then canceled economic aid to Nicaragua. Then the administration began to formulate more coercive measures. In February 1981, when Robert McFarlane (then assistant to Secretary of State Alexander Haig) submitted a proposal for a coordinated political, economic, military, and covert approach to the Central American crisis (El Salvador and Nicaragua), the issue reached the White House.[5]

[4] Alan Riding, "Central Americans Split on U.S. Voting," *New York Times*, 4 August 1980.

[5] See "Covert Action Proposal for Central America," a 27 February 1981 memorandum contained in National Security Archive, *The Iran-Contra Affair: The Making of a Scandal, 1983–1988* (Alexandria, VA: Chadwyck-Healey, 1990). [Hereafter referred to as NSA collection.]

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FIGURE 2
The Shifting Constellation Image



Formulating the Policy

The National Security Planning Group (NSPG) considered alternatives in March 1981. CIA Director William Casey, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, National Security Adviser Richard Allen, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick met and produced a plan to support domestic opposition groups in Nicaragua and anti-Sandinista forces gathering in Honduras

FIGURE 3
A Spectrum of Policy-making Models

Presidential Leadership	Bureaucratic Leadership	Interbranch Competition	Subgovernment Leadership	Congressional Leadership

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with a $19.5 million covert program, which President Reagan authorized in early March.[6] Casey brought the vague finding to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, where he described it as a political and propaganda program in Nicaragua and a regional effort to stop the flow of weapons into El Salvador.[7]

Initially this limited forerunner to Reagan Doctrine aid was linked to a diplomatic initiative, support for which within the administration was centered in the State Department. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders and Ambassador to Nicaragua Lawrence Pezzullo opened negotiations with the Sandinistas. They hoped to use the threat of American pressure and the promise of U.S. aid as levers to induce the Sandinistas to moderate their foreign policy and reduce their ties to the Soviet Union. In August 1981, Enders proposed a nonaggression treaty with Nicaragua and offered to "encourage the Nicaragua exiles . . . to moderate their behavior" and to ask Congress to renew economic assistance. In return, the United States expected the Sandinistas to "stop training and supplying Salvadoran guerrillas, to give pluralism a chance in their country . . . and to limit their military buildup.[8] Enders's approach failed for two reasons. First, administration hard-liners Casey, Weinberger, Kirkpatrick, William Clark (consultant to the State Department and friend to Reagan), and others objected to the initiative. This "war party" worked to block a settlement, "because that would end any hope of getting Nicaragua back from communism."[9] Second, the Sandinistas initially rejected it, noting that the United States was only promising to make efforts to meet Sandinista concerns. Follow-up efforts produced only more suspicion and the opening died in October. From then on, administration "covert and overt warriors replaced the diplomats."[10]

The collapse of the diplomatic initiative prompted a second round of policy formulation. In the fall of 1981, a Central America policy review commenced in a Restricted Interagency Group (RIG) consisting of Duane Clarridge (CIA), Thomas Enders (State), General Paul Gorman (Joint Chiefs), Nestor Sanchez (Defense), and either Alfonso Sapia-Bosch or Oliver North (NSC Staff). The RIG generated options for a National Security Council (NSC) discussion on 16 November 1981. The options paper, which leaked to the press, contained

[6] United States Congress, House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views*, 100th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1987). [Hereafter, *IC Report*.]

[7] Robert A. Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), 237.

[8] Thomas Enders, "Strategic Situation in Central America: Statement before the Subcommittee of Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 14, 1981," *Department of State Bulletin* (February 1982), 77.

[9] William LeoGrande, "Rollback or Containment: The U.S., Nicaragua, and the Search for Peace in Central America," *International Security* 11 (Fall 1986): 91.

[10] Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition*, 235.

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alternatives including military action against Cuba, support for an interdiction force in Nicaragua, cooperation with Argentina for paramilitary action to overthrow the Sandinistas, and a relatively benign expansion of political aid to internal opposition groups.[11] According to Robert Gates, then CIA deputy director of intelligence, there was "no agreement within the administration . . . on our real objectives."[12] The members of the NSC were basically divided between those seeking "rollback" and those desiring "containment," but they finally managed to agree on the paramilitary option. Many administration officials felt that the other options were either too costly or too extreme, and "there was no other way to do it."[13] Hence, while Casey was the chief proponent of contra aid, the others attending the meeting supported the policy for other reasons: Weinberger and White House aides James Baker and Michael Deaver to avoid direct American military involvement; Edwin Meese to prevent inaction; and Haig as a suboptimal substitute for direct action against Cuba.[14]

On 17 November 1981, President Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 17 approving a new $19.95 million program to organize anti-Sandinista rebels against "the Cuban presence and Cuban-Sandinista support structure in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America."[15] On 1 December, he signed an intelligence finding authorizing the program and assigning the responsibility for organizing a 500-member "interdiction force" to the CIA under the control and supervision of the White House.[16] Casey stressed this purpose when he presented the finding to the Intelligence Committees later in December, calling the program a limited "attempt to interdict weapons and to put just enough pressure on the Sandinistas to keep them from delivering their revolution wholly to Communism . . . nobody [is] talking about overthrowing anybody."[17]

Applying the Reagan Doctrine

Following the White House decision, the CIA provided aid, support, training, and advice to the rebels, at first through the Argentine and Honduran militaries and then directly. Rebel operations against personnel, infrastructure, agriculture, and commodities accelerated in the spring of 1982. After the first attacks, the Sandinistas declared a state of emergency, closed down the press, and mobilized troops.[18]

[11] "CIA's Nicaragua Role," *New York Times*, 17 March 1982.

[12] See Robert Gates, 14 December 1984 memorandum entitled "Nicaragua" (in NSA collection).

[13] William Casey, quoted in Peter Rodman, *More Precious than Peace: The Cold War and the Struggle for the Third World* (New York: Scribner's, 1994), 237.

[14] See Lou Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 354–356.

[15] *IC Report*, 2.

[16] See "Ronald Reagan, Presidential Finding on Covert Operations in Nicaragua, December 1, 1981" (in NSA collection).

[17] Quoted in Joseph E. Persico, *Casey: From the OSS to the CIA* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1990), 274–275.

[18] Alan Riding, "Nicaragua Places Forces on Alert," *New York Times*, 17 March 1982.

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The administration also began a verbal assault on Nicaragua to generate a foundation of support for the insurgency in preparation for the time the paramilitary operation became public. Using testimony, the release of certain intelligence data, and speeches, this campaign centered on three themes. Administration officials publicized alleged Sandinista human rights abuses, a Soviet and Cuban military buildup in Nicaragua, and Nicaraguan support for the El Salvadoran rebels.[19]

In addition, the State Department tried once more to tie the paramilitary program to a diplomatic initiative and reopened negotiations with Nicaragua. The department's efforts, led by Enders, prompted increasing pressure from administration hard-liners. Efforts toward a diplomatic settlement in 1982 with the assistance of Mexico and Venezuela were halted when new National Security Adviser William Clark, Casey, Kirkpatrick, members of the Defense Department, and the newly-strengthened NSC staff argued that negotiations with communists were futile and useful only to silence critics in Congress and the public.[20] By mid-1982 Enders was removed and the administration became committed to the paramilitary option.

Evaluating the Policy

Although the administration dominated the initial policy making, by March 1982 publicity surrounding American support for the Nicaraguan rebel activity grew. This attention prompted members of Congress to voice opposition to such activities and to use the institution's oversight powers to begin attempts to restrict American policy. The first serious action occurred in the summer, when the House Intelligence Committee attached classified language to the Intelligence Authorization Act prohibiting the use of CIA funds to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. This restriction passed both houses in September and served as a warning shot for the administration. In December 1982, the classified restriction was attached to a defense appropriations bill and signed by the president on 21 December 1982. Intelligence Committee Chairman Edward Boland (D-MA) offered the amendment, which came to be known as Boland I, to replace a proposal

[19] See Elliott Abrams, "Human Rights Situation in Nicaragua: Statement before the Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 25, 1982," *Department of State Bulletin*, April 1982, 69–71; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, *Human Rights in Nicaragua. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 97th Congress, 2d sess., 25 February and 1 March 1982 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982); Thomas Enders, "Strategic Situation in Central America"; and "Democracy and Security in the Caribbean Basin: Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, February 1, 1982," *Department of State Bulletin*, March 1982.

[20] See LeoGrande, "Rollback," 94–97, who also notes that an NSC paper called the diplomatic approach "an obstacle to U.S. policy." Also, a 3-page State Department document criticized "Mexico's *unhelpful* role" in trying to bring about negotiations. See Alan Riding, "Mexican Officials Obtain U.S. Plan for Region," *New York Times*, 16 August 1982. (Emphasis added.)

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to prohibit funds for any operations in or against Nicaragua. It passed the House 411-0 and began the second phase of U.S. policy making.[21]

The Reagan Doctrine and Nicaragua: December 1982–August 1987

In 1983 and 1984, Congress indicated that it would not allow the president to exercise unchallenged control over policy toward Nicaragua. In March 1983, reports from Nicaragua demonstrated that, whatever American goals were, the contras were fighting to overthrow the Sandinistas and liberate Nicaragua.[22] Congressional and public criticism increased substantially. President Reagan responded by trying to allay Congress's suspicion, stating, "We do not seek [the government of Nicaragua's] overthrow. Our interest is to ensure that it does not infect its neighbors through the export of subversion and violence. Our purpose . . . is to prevent the flow of arms to El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica."[23] The president did not reassure Congress, nor did he prevent it from trying to reformulate policy. A central cause of this failure was William Casey's testimony to the House Intelligence Committee in April 1983 that the contras had increased to 7,000, and CIA spending was expected to exceed $45 million by the end of the year.[24]

Banning the Reagan Doctrine: 1983–1984

In the first of a series of actions and reactions, Congress used its legislative powers to seize the initiative and set policy. On 12 April 1983, the House Foreign Affairs Western Hemisphere Subcommittee chaired by Representative Michael Barnes (D-MD) voted to end all American support for the contras.[25] This spurred the House and Senate Intelligence Committees to begin actions to reshape or clarify American policy. In the House, the committee also supported an aid ban. The Senate Intelligence Committee, controlled by the Republican majority, voted only to require the administration to "articulate, in a clear and coherent fashion, its policy objectives" in Nicaragua.[26]

The administration reacted swiftly to dissuade Congress from interfering. First, it appointed a bipartisan commission headed by Henry Kissinger to recom-

[21] United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Congress and Foreign Policy, 1982* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1983), 87; *IC Report*, 33.

[22] See Christopher Dickey, "Well-armed Units Show Strongholds," *Washington Post*, 3 April 1983; and "Rebel Odyssey," *Washington Post*, 4 April 1983.

[23] Ronald Reagan, "Central America: Defending Our Vital Interests: Address before a Joint Session of Congress, April 27, 1983," *Department of State Bulletin*, June 1983, 4.

[24] Cynthia Arnson, *Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976–1993* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 125.

[25] Ibid., 127.

[26] Quoted in *IC Report*, 33–34.

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mend a program of action that would build "a national consensus on a comprehensive U.S. policy for the region" and preempt congressional interference.[27] Simultaneously, the administration conducted a media blitz to generate support for Reagan Doctrine aid to the rebels. Administration officials again gave speeches and appeared before Congress characterizing Nicaragua as a Marxist-Leninist state tied to Cuba and the Soviet Union. For example, President Reagan told a joint session of Congress that "Nicaragua, supported by weapons and military resources provided by the communist bloc, represses its own people, refuses to make peace, and sponsors a guerrilla war against El Salvador." He warned that he did "not believe that a majority of the Congress or the country is prepared to stand by passively while the people of Central America are delivered to totalitarianism, and we ourselves are left vulnerable to new dangers."[28]

To assist this effort, the administration created an office in the State Department to improve "public diplomacy" on Nicaragua. The Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean (S/LPD), coordinated by a working group from the NSC Staff, "arranged speaking engagements, published pamphlets, and sent materials to editorial writers. . . . [using] Government employees and outside contractors."[29] In addition, it resorted to tactics bordering on a deliberate disinformation campaign that the Iran-contra investigating committees concluded were "prohibited covert propaganda activities."[30]

Also, to mollify its congressional critics, the administration declared its support for the effort by the foreign ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama to mediate a regional peace settlement. This opening, known as Contadora for the Panamanian island on which the ministers met, began in January 1983. However, the administration's commitment was for congressional consumption only. Hard-liners, including William Clark, Jeane Kirkpatrick, William Casey, Caspar Weinberger, and President Reagan himself viewed the negotiations with contempt and suspicion. According to Secretary of State George Shultz,

[27] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 23 July 1983, 1493. In the end, the Kissinger Commission's report was largely ignored, although National Security Decision Directive 124 ("Central America: Promoting Democracy, Economic Improvement, and Peace," 7 February 1984, declassified 19 December 1991) combined some of its recommendations with the results of a NSPG policy review. On the commission's report, see William LeoGrande, "Through the Looking Glass: The Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America," *World Policy Journal* 1 (Spring 1985): 251–284.

[28] Ronald Reagan, "Central America," 4. See also George Shultz, "Struggle for Democracy in Central America: Address before the World Affairs Council," *Department of State Bulletin*, May 1983, 10–13; and Thomas Enders, "Nicaragua: Threat to Peace in Central America. Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, April 14, 1983," *Department of State Bulletin*, June 1983, 76–80.

[29] *IC Report*, 34.

[30] Ibid., 34. On the S/LPD, see William Clark's memorandum, "Public Diplomacy (Central America), July 1 1983"; a 12 March 1985 paper entitled "Public Diplomacy Action Plan: Support for the White House Educational Campaign"; and a 13 March 1985 memorandum entitled "White Propaganda Operation" (all in NSA collection). See also Robert Parry and Peter Kornbluh, "Iran-Contra's Untold Story," *Foreign Policy* 68 (Fall 1988): 3–36.

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the hard-liners "wanted no part of a diplomatic effort. . . . To them, diplomacy was an avenue to 'accommodation.'"[31] Hence, they tried persistently to block negotiations. In April 1983, an NSC paper reflected their view. It suggested that serious negotiations were impossible because Marxists could not be trusted. Therefore, the paper argued, the administration should "coopt" the negotiations to "avoid congressionally mandated negotiations which work against our interests."[32] President Reagan also dismissed the Sandinistas as negotiating partners. In one meeting he declared that "our participation [in the negotiations] is important . . . to get support from Congress." He then added, "if we are talking about negotiations with Nicaragua, that is so farfetched to imagine that a Communist government like that would make any reasonable deal with us, but if it is to get Congress to support the anti-Sandinistas, then that can be helpful" [sic].[33]

The administration's attempts to influence and persuade Congress had mixed results. The House was not persuaded: on 28 July 1983, members voted 228-195 to pass the Boland-Zablocki Amendment, which barred funds for "support of military or paramilitary activities in Nicaragua." The provision was retained in the Intelligence Authorization Bill passed in October 1983 by a 227-195 vote.[34] The administration was more successful in the Republican-controlled Senate, which did not take up Boland-Zablocki. The Senate Intelligence Committee instead settled for a new statement of purpose. An NSPG meeting on 16 September 1983 produced a revised finding altering the objective of American aid. The new finding defined the purpose of the contra program:

> to induce the Sandinistas and Cubans and their allies to cease their support for insurgencies in the region; to hamper Cuban/Nicaraguan arms trafficking; to divert Nicaragua's resources and energies from support of Central American guerrilla movements; and to bring the Sandinistas into meaningful negotiations and constructive, verifiable agreements with its neighbors.[35]

When the administration sent this finding to the Senate Intelligence Committee, the committee authorized funds for the contras.

The reconciliation process between the House and the Senate resulted in a compromise that capped aid at $24 million and also prohibited the administration from using CIA contingency funds, thus ensuring that future funds would have to be authorized by Congress. Moreover, the new finding committed the administration to a negotiated settlement, a purpose that enjoyed broad support on Capitol

[31] George Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State* (New York: Scribner's, 1993), 305.

[32] This paper, entitled "U.S. Policy in Central America and Cuba Through Fiscal Year 1984, Summary Paper," may be found in the *New York Times*, 7 April 1983.

[33] "Minutes, National Security Planning Group Meeting on Central America, June 25, 1984," 7 (in NSA collection).

[34] U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Congress and Foreign Policy, 1983* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 47, 49–52; *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 22 October 1983, 2163.

[35] "Presidential Finding on Covert Operations in Nicaragua, September 19, 1983," 1 (in NSA collection).

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Hill. Therefore, while the initiative was not reversed because of disagreements between the House and Senate, limits were placed on funding, and Congress placed itself in the loop for future decisions.

Determined to prevent any further congressional limits on contra aid, the administration turned to its control over policy implementation and the foreign policy bureaucracy. Decisions by the RIG and NSPG (between September 1983 and January 1984) authorized the CIA to expand the contras and conduct its own attacks on Nicaraguan installations. The most controversial of these direct attacks occurred after the president and the NSPG agreed on 6 January 1984 to a RIG proposal to allow the CIA to mine Nicaraguan harbors.[36] This decision was taken without congressional consultation, in defiance of congressional restrictions and concerns. Moreover, it occurred without a proper briefing of the intelligence committees, which were not informed until mid-March. Even then, the act and the CIA's involvement were obscured: one sentence of Casey's briefing stated "mines have been placed," leaving the impression that the contras had undertaken the effort. In April the *Wall Street Journal* revealed that the CIA had not only performed the operation, but had also instructed the contras to claim credit.[37] This prompted an angry letter from Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) to Casey: "I am pissed off. . . . Bill, this is no way to run a railroad. . . . This is an act violating international law. It is an act of war. For the life of me, I don't see how we are going to explain it."[38]

Both the House and Senate overwhelmingly adopted resolutions condemning the act. Then, in spite of administration opposition, on 25 May the House voted 241-177 on a bill to bar any military or paramilitary activities against Nicaragua (Boland II). In the summer the Senate reluctantly accepted the ban, which was attached to a popular jobs bill. Later that October, both houses passed a resolution (H.J.Res. 648) that included Boland II, and the president signed it.[39] According to Edward Boland, the amendment "ends U.S. support for the war in Nicaragua."[40] Boland II stated:

> During Fiscal Year 1985, no funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or any other agency or entity involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended for the purpose or which would have the

[36] *IC Report*, 36; Roy Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in Nicaragua, 1981–1987* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 194.

[37] David Rogers, "U.S. Role in Mining Nicaraguan Harbors Reportedly is Larger than First Thought," *Wall Street Journal*, 6 April 1984. According to a 2 March 1984 memorandum entitled "Special Activities in Nicaragua," the mines were placed and "in accord with prior arrangements, [the contras] took credit for the operation" (in NSA collection).

[38] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 14 April 1984, 833.

[39] In the fall of 1984, reports about the CIA preparation of a so-called assassination manual ended an effort to restore funding. See Bob Woodward, *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981–1987* (New York: Pocket Books, 1987), 44-49; and Arnson, *Crossroads*, chap. 6.

[40] *Congressional Record*, 10 October 1984, H11974.

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effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement or individual.[41]

Modifying the Ban: 1985–1986

Having lost the initiative to Congress, the administration was forced to persuade Congress to reverse itself and provide aid. Intense bargaining and often-bitter conflict occurred in the process. According to National Security Adviser Robert MacFarlane, the president expressed his "strong wish that we not break faith with the contras" in January 1985, and instructed MacFarlane "to do everything possible to reverse the course of the Congress and get the funding renewed."[42] NSC staff member Oliver North began drafting legislative proposals with the understanding that the strategy was "to bite off a little at a time and start moving back to full support" of the contras.[43]

Since the Reagan Doctrine could not be reapplied without congressional authorization, the administration made a strong effort to persuade a majority of Congress to reinstate contra aid. First, the administration tried to renovate the contras' image, forming a new civilian leadership and describing them as "our brothers," "freedom fighters," and "the moral equal of our founding fathers" in "almost daily presidential speeches and phone calls."[44] Also, S\LPD swung into high gear. Administration officials orchestrated a campaign in which S\LPD prepared themes, talking points, and literature for administration officials and supporters. In addition S\LPD prepared articles and papers to be published under the names of private citizens (for example, opinion pieces for contra leaders Alfonso Robelo and Adolpho Calero to sign and submit to the *Washington Post* and *New York Times*). A blizzard of activity "projected over seventy publications, conferences, briefings, and meetings with editorial boards to further the contra cause" in the weeks before the vote in Congress.[45]

Finally, President Reagan coupled his request for $14 million in aid with a proposal for a cease-fire and negotiations between the Sandinistas and contras. During the talks the administration promised to provide only nonlethal aid to the contras. Assistant Secretary of State Langhorne Motley described the proposal as "an alternative to two extremes the American people want to avoid—a second Cuba . . . and a second Vietnam"—and argued that contra aid would pressure

[41] Ibid., H11980.

[42] United States Congress, House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, *Testimony at Joint Hearings before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition*, 100th Congress, 1st sess., vols. 100-1-1-100-12 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987), vol. 100-2, 43 [hereafter, *IC Hearings*].

[43] Ibid., vol. 100-7, 268.

[44] *IC Report*, 48.

[45] Arnson, *Crossroads*, 191. See also the memos identified in footnote 30.

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the Sandinistas to negotiate in good faith.[46] The proposal and Motley's description were an attempt to convince Congress that the administration sought a political solution while bracketing the administration's preferred course with unpalatable alternatives (Cuba or Vietnam) that made contra aid seem necessary and desirable.

Congress forced the administration to compromise almost immediately. Republican leaders informed the president that military aid would scuttle the initiative, so the White House changed the request to solely nonlethal aid—"food, medicine, clothing, and other assistance [for] survival and well-being and not for arms, ammunition, and weapons of war."[47] The compromise convinced the Senate to approve the request 53-46 on 23 April 1985. It failed, however, to persuade a majority in the House, which rejected the proposal 248-180 on 24 April. The House also rejected the Democratic alternative that substituted $10 million in refugee relief and $4 million to assist the peace talks.[48] Promising "to return to the Congress again and again," the president declared that Congress was "voting to have a totalitarian Marxist-Leninist government here in the Americas, and there's no way for them to disguise it."[49]

The next day, when headlines around the country reported that Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega was to visit Moscow, the administration's view seemed to be substantiated. Afraid of being cast as soft on communism, conservative Democrats in the House led by Dave McCurdy (D-OK) presented a $27 million nonlethal aid proposal that the White House endorsed. Still, in a debate laden with red-baiting, a letter from President Reagan to McCurdy was required to turn the tide. The president's letter again committed his administration to "political, not military solutions in Central America" and assured McCurdy that "we do not seek the military overthrow of the Sandinista government."[50] On 12 June the House passed the bill 248-184, and both houses accepted it after the reconciliation process. It prohibited CIA or Defense Department involvement, so the administration established a State Department Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office (NHAO) to distribute aid.[51]

[46] Langhorne Motley, "The New Opportunity for Peace in Nicaragua: Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, April 17, 1985," *Department of State Bulletin*, June 1985, 80, 82–83.

[47] Letter from President Reagan to Senator Robert Dole, printed in the *Congressional Record*, 23 April 1985, S4622–4623. Knowledge of Saudi Arabia's secret contribution of $2 million per month to the contras also influenced this decision. See Lawrence E. Walsh, *Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters* (Washington, DC: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 1993), 424.

[48] See Anne L. Potter, *The Battle Over Nicaragua* (Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 1987), 8–9.

[49] *IC Report*, 49. On 1 May the White House also unilaterally announced sanctions against Nicaragua. See U.S. Department of State, "Economic Sanctions against Nicaragua," *Department of State Bulletin*, July 1985, 74–77.

[50] *Congressional Record*, 11 June 1985, H4093–4094.

[51] Potter, *The Battle*, 13–23. The Intelligence Authorization Act, passed later that fall, loosened restrictions on the CIA, allowing, for example, some intelligence sharing with the contras.

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Thus the White House and international developments persuaded Congress to provide nonlethal aid as a lever to encourage a political settlement, a policy to which the president committed himself and his administration. However, Congress had little control over the diplomatic approach. A December 1985 message from Oliver North to John Poindexter illustrates the problem that ensued. North reported that, pursuant to Poindexter's directions, he had assured U.S. allies in Central America that the United States "intend[ed] to pursue a victory" so they would "not be forced to seek a political accommodation with the Sandinistas."[52] Hence, the Reagan administration proclaimed support for negotiations to gain congressional support for contra aid, while assuring allies in Central America that it had no intention of negotiating. This refusal to honor its agreement with Congress eventually contributed to the collapse of the administration policy.

Resuming the Reagan Doctrine: 1986–1987

In January 1986, the administration again raised contra aid to the agenda following a National Security Council decision to attempt the next "bite"—a request for $100 million in military and other support for the contras to be administered by the CIA.[53] To satisfy congressional preferences, the White House again described the policy as a vital component of a wider diplomatic approach. As George Shultz told Congress:

> a vote for military assistance to the democratic resistance will give [the negotiations] a *better* chance to succeed, because it will give the Sandinistas an incentive to negotiate seriously. . . . Absent a credible challenge to their militarized control of Nicaragua, the Sandinistas have no incentive to negotiate a lasting political solution to the conflict in Central America.[54]

The White House also applied pressure to members of Congress. As administration officials repeated the charges that the Sandinistas were repressive, engaged in a military buildup, and subverting their neighbors, the president stated that it was difficult not to equate opposition to his proposal with support for the Sandinistas. He also accused aid opponents of succumbing to "a great disinformation campaign."[55] The partisan rhetoric peaked when White House Communica-

[52] *IC Report*, 64.

[53] Ibid.

[54] George Shultz, "Nicaragua: Will Democracy Prevail? Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 27, 1986," *Department of State Bulletin*, April 1986, 39. See also the entire hearing in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S. Policy Toward Nicaragua: Aid to Nicaraguan Resistance. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 99th Congress, 2d sess., 27 February and 4 March 1986 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986). On 7 March the president also announced that he was sending diplomat Phillip C. Habib "to achieve a diplomatic solution" to the regional crisis. (*Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 8 March 1986, 535).

[55] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 8 March 1986, 536 and 15 March 1986, 601. On statements by administration officials, see Shultz, "Nicaragua"; and Elliott Abrams, "Permanent Dictatorship in Nicarauga? Statement before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 5 March 1986," *Department of State Bulletin*, April 1986, 83.

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tions Director Patrick Buchanan wrote that "with the Contra vote, the Democratic Party will reveal whether it stands with Ronald Reagan and the resistance—or Daniel Ortega and the communists."[56]

Still, the House initially rejected the White House request. The Appropriations, Foreign Affairs, and Intelligence Committees all concurred that, while Nicaragua was a problem, military support for the contras would not solve it.[57] After an acrimonious debate, the full chamber defeated the proposal 222-210 on 20 March, with key moderates reacting to the administration's "McCarthyism" by voting against the aid. The president called the vote "a dark day for freedom" and again pledged to "come back again and again until this battle is won."[58]

Several developments led the House to reverse itself. First, the Sandinista Army conducted an attack on contra camps in Honduras on 22 March 1986. The administration rushed emergency aid to Honduras and blamed the House for encouraging the attack.[59] Second, the Senate passed Senator Richard Lugar's (R-IN) bill containing the administration proposal (S.J.Res. 283) on 27 March by a vote of 53-47.[60] Third, in April a proposal to provide limited contra aid tied to a diplomatic approach offered by moderate democrats led by Dave McCurdy was again defeated by a procedure that frustrated the moderates. These representatives insisted on another vote in June, to which Speaker Tip O'Neill agreed.[61] Fourth, the White House lobbied furiously over the few votes needed to reverse the defeat, using every available threat and inducement while also toning down its partisan rhetoric and substituting an appeal for bipartisanship.

On 25 June the House passed $100 million in military and nonlethal aid 221-209. The McCurdy proposal was defeated along with other Democratic amendments that would have eliminated contra aid entirely. After the Senate passed the House bill 53-47 in August, both houses passed H.J.Res. 783 containing the Reagan Doctrine aid on 17 October 1986. Aid, including weapons, ammunition, training, and guidance provided by the Defense Department and the CIA, resumed on 1 November 1986.[62] A euphoric President Reagan asserted

[56] Pat Buchanan, "The Contras Need Our Help," *Washington Post*, 5 March 1986.

[57] See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Report to Accompany H.J. Res. 540*, H.Rept. 99-483, parts 1-4, 99th Congress, 1st sess. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986).

[58] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 22 March 1986, 648-650.

[59] The Reagan administration probably exaggerated the incursion's significance to gain support for the contra aid program. See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, *Nicaraguan Incursion into Honduras: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs*, 99th Congress, 2d sess., 8 April 1986 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986); and *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 29 March 1986, 695-696.

[60] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 29 March 1986, 695.

[61] The McCurdy amendment proposed $100 million, but set up increments to be released on subsequent congressional votes. Republicans voted for the Hamilton bill (humanitarian aid to refugees) that included a rule preventing further amendments; it passed 361-66, so McCurdy's bill was not considered. See *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 19 April 1986, 835; and Potter, *The Battle*, 37.

[62] See Potter, *The Battle*, 41-43; *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 28 June 1986, 1447; 16 August 1986, 1876-1881; 1 November 1986, 2787.

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that the vote "signal[led] a new era of bipartisan consensus in American foreign policy. . . . We can be proud that we as a people have embraced the struggle of the freedom fighters in Nicaragua."[63] This optimism was short-lived, however. A plane carrying supplies for the contras was shot down over Nicaragua on 5 October, and an American, Eugene Hasenfus, was captured by the Sandinistas. This began revelations of secret assistance organized by the White House during the aid ban, and the "era of bipartisan consensus" hailed by the president came to an abrupt end.

Iran-Contra and the Demise of the Reagan Doctrine

While a detailed analysis of the Iran and contra affairs exceeds the scope of this article, a brief summary of the evasion of congressional restrictions and its importance for this analysis is required.[64] In 1984, at the time Congress was barring aid to the contras, the White House began a secret effort to secure alternative sources of aid. President Reagan instructed National Security Adviser McFarlane to "keep the Contras together, body and soul."[65] McFarlane's deputy, John Poindexter, testified that: "the President wanted to be sure that the Contras were supported."[66] The responsibility for this task was given to Oliver North, whose position in the NSC Staff was deputy director for political-military affairs.

What was made clear by the various investigations is that the activities of North and his colleagues stemmed directly from policy decisions made at the highest level of the White House. The congressional committees and Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh both concluded that "ultimate responsibility for the events in the Iran-Contra Affair must rest with the President," although they agreed no direct evidence proved the president gave explicit orders to circumvent Congress.[67] The joint congressional investigation described an attitude of "secrecy, deception, and disdain for the law" in the White House. Walsh's investigation identified within the administration "the mistaken view that Congress couldn't be trusted and . . . [policy] was better left to a small inside group not elected by the people . . . . a scheme that reflected a total distrust in some constitutional values."[68]

In fact, as many members of Congress argued at the time, all the actions taken by the White House and NSC Staff were consistent with President Reagan's policies and were "not an aberrational scheme carried out by a 'cabal of zealots'

[63] *IC Report*, 72.

[64] For a fuller accounting, see Theodore Draper, *A Very Thin Line: The Iran-Contra Affairs* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991); William Cohen and George Mitchell, *Men of Zeal: A Candid Inside Story of the Iran-Contra Hearings* (New York: Viking, 1988); *Report of the President's Special Review Board* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987) [hereafter, Tower Report]; *IC Report*; and Walsh, *Final Report*.

[65] *IC Hearings*, vol. 100–2, 5; 20–21.

[66] Ibid., vol. 100–8, 54.

[67] *IC Report*, 21, 149; Walsh, *Final Report*, xv, 443, 445.

[68] *IC Report*, 11; Walsh, *Final Report*, 120.

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on the National Security Council staff."[69] The president was fully engaged in the decision to solicit funds from certain countries after May 1984 and was aware of private fundraising efforts; he met and thanked donors personally, including at least seven major contributors in 1986. In fact, in May 1987, the president claimed that it was originally his idea.[70] Moreover, the diversion of funds and the private supply network were consistent with the president's general instructions. Furthermore, President Reagan repeatedly expressed a desire "to take action unilaterally to provide assistance" and was "ready to confront the Congress on the constitutional question of who controls foreign policy.[71] Hence, the president's staff responded to his commitment to the contras, his injunction to provide for them, and his willingness to challenge congressional authority in foreign policy, as both North and Poindexter argued in their trials.

The Reagan Doctrine and Nicaragua: August 1987–March 1989

In the context of this article, the significance of the revelations throughout 1987 is that they provided impetus for members of Congress to reformulate American policy toward Nicaragua. The first indication that the administration was on the retreat and that Congress was not agreeable to additional requests occurred in early 1987. At that time, members of Congress attempted to end U.S. support for the contras by cutting off the funds remaining from the 1986 authorization. This symbol of increasing congressional opposition was accompanied by an administration effort to regroup. According to National Security Decision Directive 264, various administration task forces and reviews were assembled to "engage the administration resources in a campaign of public diplomacy regarding the situation in Central America, the threat to U.S. security, and U.S. objectives for the region." Additionally, the directive proposed that "a comprehensive action plan to gain sustained congressional support for the Nicaraguan Democratic resistance will be developed."[72]

Nevertheless, in June the House voted to keep the ban on the use of the CIA's contingency fund, ensuring that any new contra aid would have to be openly debated. Also, Republican leader Bob Michel told reporters that President Reagan's 1987 request for $105 million in additional funds could not pass and that he should place a greater emphasis on negotiations.[73] Finally, Congress seized on the opportunity offered by the peace initiative authored by President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica. Proposed in December 1986 and endorsed by the

[69] Walsh, *Final Report*, 562. The Walsh report (p. 202) also quotes Reagan's statement that "administration officials were generally authorized to implement" the policy of aid to the contras. The investigations show at least three dozen officials from various parts of the executive branch participating in the scheme.

[70] *IC Report*, 77, 96; Walsh, *Final Report*, 447–448.

[71] *IC Report*, 69.

[72] National Security Decision Directive 264, "Central America, February 27, 1987," 2.

[73] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 21 February 1987, 314; 14 March 1987, 460.

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presidents of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in February, the plan required a series of steps to end insurgencies in the region and prepare for democratic elections. For opponents of contra aid, the proposal finally provided an alternative to the Reagan Doctrine: a diplomatic initiative that did not rely on the less-than-zealous administration for its implementation.

Two events in August 1987 completed the shift to congressional primacy. On 5 August 1987, House Speaker James Wright (D-TX) and President Reagan announced a peace proposal that, according to former Congressman Tom Loeffler, "broke the stalemate in Congress and . . . in the Western hemisphere."[74] Largely Speaker Wright's initiative, it called for a cease-fire in Nicaragua and a suspension of American military aid for the contras and Soviet military aid for the Sandinista government over a sixty-day period. If the Sandinistas failed to comply, the Reagan administration would request new contra aid, and Wright would support it. Second, on 7 August 1987, all five Central American presidents signed an accord at Esquipulas, Guatemala that became known as Esquipulas I. This accord was a modified version of the original Arias plan requiring region-wide cease-fires, amnesty, negotiations, and preparations for elections. Wright immediately endorsed it as a replacement for his plan; the administration tentatively embraced it as a starting point. President Arias, who spoke to Congress in September and urged the United States to "give peace a chance," persuaded members of both parties.[75]

Competing Agendas and the Primacy of Congress

As a result of these developments, the initiative shifted to Congress. The Arias plan finally offered Congress an opportunity for a diplomatic settlement that was not subject to administration obstructionism. Although the administration pledged to stand by the contras and renew requests for aid, it could do little but promise. President Reagan's description of the Esquipulas Accord as "fatally flawed" and the State Department's warning against "cosmetic gestures of compliance" by Nicaragua failed to shake Congress' commitment.[76] A majority agreed that American policy toward Nicaragua should support the regional initiative and provide only limited nonlethal aid to the contras in Honduras.

When President Reagan declared his intention to request $270 million in military and nonlethal aid for the contras, Speaker Wright suggested that some refugee and nonlethal aid might be provided. However, he noted that "I really don't believe that there's any disposition in Congress to pass military money at the time we're negotiating for peace."[77] The president's call for renewed regional

[74] Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, 347. On the Wright initiative, see Arnson, *Crossroads*, 220–223.

[75] Linda Robinson, *Intervention or Neglect: The United States and Central America Beyond the 1980s* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 31–32; Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, 957; *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 12 September 1987, 2178.

[76] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 2 September 1987, 2297–2298.

[77] Ibid., 10 October 1987, 2444.

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support for the contras on the basis that they alone had prevented the Sandinistas from attacking their neighbors was also to no avail.[78] Congressional opposition grew, so the administration reduced the request to $30 million for mostly food, medicine, and clothing. Even this reduction did not satisfy many members, who noted that the Central American peace plan was progressing and the Sandinistas had lifted the censorship of the opposition newspaper, released nearly 1,000 prisoners, and started a dialogue with the contras.[79] Eventually, Congress provided $14 million for food and established an expedited procedure for another administration aid request in February 1988.

This request also failed. In mid-January 1988, after the Sandinistas' agreement to negotiate with the contras and lift restrictions on civil liberties, President Arias asked Congress to reject the aid request. The president responded by trying to rally support for contra aid. He appeared on national television on the eve of the vote to describe Nicaragua as a "beachhead for aggression against the United States" and the "first step in a strategy to dominate the entire region of Central America and threaten Mexico and the Panama Canal." In his plea, the president suggested the Soviet Union was "willing to pay" for the "unprecedented strategic victory" possible in Nicaragua.[80] He also insisted that the Sandinistas would never permit free and fair elections without military pressure from the contras. Although the administration was again able to force the issue onto the agenda, the House rejected the $36.25 million request by 219-211 on 3 February 1988.

Six weeks later, the contras and the Sandinistas signed a cease-fire agreement on 23 March 1988 at Sapao, Nicaragua. Though staunch Reagan Doctrine advocates reacted cynically, most viewed the development as a step forward toward a regional settlement. Congress quickly passed a $17.7 million humanitarian aid package for the contras on 30 and 31 March (345-70 in the House and 87-7 in the Senate).[81] In April, in its final vote on the issue during the Reagan administration, the House rejected an administration request to allow use of the CIA's contingency fund for the contras.[82] Each time the peace process stalled during the summer and fall of 1988, the administration renewed its call for aid, but its appeals were rejected. A majority in the U.S. government was committed to the peace process. With progress in the peace talks, the White House could not

[78] See Ronald Reagan, "Central America at a Critical Juncture: Address to the OAS, 7 October 1987," *Department of State Bulletin*, December 1987, 1-4.

[79] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 5 December 1987, 2978.

[80] Ronald Reagan, "Peace and Democracy for Nicaragua: Address to the Nation, 2 February 1988," *Department of State Bulletin*, April 1988, 32-34. His statements followed the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty and ignored the reforms of Secretary Milkhail Gorbachev, progress in the regional peace process, and Gorbachev's assurance, offered at the INF Treaty signing, that he supported the Arias peace plan and would withhold aid to Nicaragua.

[81] *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 2 April 1988, 839.

[82] Philip Brenner and William LeoGrande, "Congress and Nicaragua: The Limits of Alternative Policy-making" in James Thurber, ed., *Divided Democracy: Cooperation and Conflict Between the President and Congress* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1991), 232.

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successfully portray the Sandinistas as belligerent, totalitarian rulers and could not persuade Congress of the need to reapply the Reagan Doctrine.

Two weeks after George Bush won the 1988 election, he met with Speaker Wright in Wright's office. There Bush asked Wright to work with newly designated Secretary of State James Baker to "search out the ingredients of a common policy."[83] Wright agreed, and on 24 March 1989 they announced a bipartisan agreement that ended the conflict over the contra issue and committed the United States to a policy of support for the planned elections in Nicaragua. Although President Reagan had warned that the Sandinistas would not follow through with the elections unless the contras were provided with American military assistance, Congress rejected that argument. In fact, Congress was right: elections were held; the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) candidate, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, defeated Sandinista President Daniel Ortega, who then turned power over to Chamorro and ended the Nicaragua civil war.[84]

Conclusions

This analysis of the Reagan Doctrine and Nicaragua highlights the complex interaction of the major actor sets at different stages of the policy-making process and the ways in which they affect the formulation and implementation of policy. In the process, it emphatically suggests that "the making of U.S. foreign policy is a complex process. It is also a messy process, for the variety of individuals and institutions that affect U.S. foreign policy do not stand still, but constantly interact and impact on one another."[85]

Policy in Phase I was a product of decisions taken in the NSPG and NSC. President Reagan and his advisers defined the problem and considered alternatives. Accordingly, the views of these individuals are critical to understanding the emergence of the policy initiative, as is the fact that dissenters from the dominant view were undermined or removed from their positions. Once the White House determined to pursue the paramilitary option, the assignment of responsibility was made to the appropriate executive branch agency – the CIA – whose performance was monitored by the NSC. Only then did Congress get involved in evaluating policy, well after it had been implemented. Hence, the first iteration of the policy-making process exemplifies the Presidential Leadership constellation and shows the advantages that the White House has for policy initiative and leadership.

[83] Robert A. Pastor, *Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 86.

[84] On 1988–1993, see L. Robinson, *Intervention and Neglect*; W. Robinson, *A. Faustian Bargain: U.S. Intervention in the Nicaraguan Elections and American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992); Arnson, *Crossroads*; Rodman, *More Precious than Peace*; and Pastor, *Whirlpool*.

[85] Jerel A. Rosati, *The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Fort Worth: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1993), 3.

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In Phase II neither branch dominated policy making; although the president forced Congress to return to the contra aid option each year, Congress used its powers to amend and reject presidential proposals. Coalitions tried to shape alternative policies. First, hard-liners in the administration and Congress pressed for contra aid to remove the Sandinista regime from Nicaragua. Second, moderates and pragmatists viewed contra aid as a part of a diplomatic settlement and a regional solution. Third, liberals in Congress opposed all contra aid on moral or practical grounds. Rival networks cutting across the White House, foreign policy bureaucracies, and Congress, each embracing one of these positions, struggled to make policy toward Nicaragua in line with their preferences. Problems, issues, and options were developed in numerous channels, and the role of Congress prompted hearings and the full legislative process. Neither branch dominated all stages, and as a result of ideological and programmatic differences, a stalemate occurred. Congress could not force the president to negotiate; the president could not convince Congress (except for a brief period in 1986) to support the Reagan Doctrine. Hence, the Interbranch Competition constellation is most useful for this phase.

The secret supply demonstrates that an administration determined to pursue a policy regardless of legislated limits may be able to do so. If an administration refuses to provide accurate (or even truthful) information and secretly implements a policy forbidden by legislation, Congress is limited in its ability to influence policy. However, this also suggests that Congress was so effective in its efforts to restrict or eliminate Reagan Doctrine aid to the contras that the White House found no alternative but to break the law. This is a result of the constitutional division of power. In its most constructive form, interbranch competition may temper policy and reduce excess and abuse, but it runs the risk that a stalemate may occur. To break the logjam, either branch may try to compromise with or persuade the other. In this case, after failing to persuade, and despairing of compromise, the administration instead chose to execute its policy preferences through illegal means.

By Phase III, following the Iran-contra affair, the president's influence over policy had eroded, and Congress stepped into the gap, determining policy through the legislative process and its control of the treasury. Moreover, divisions in the Reagan administration that virtually paralyzed it aided Congress; administration hard-liners did not want to negotiate with communists, and pragmatists were skeptical of the paramilitary option. Although the Reagan administration managed to force the issue to the agenda, it did not succeed in making policy. Congress controlled the policy and opted to support a negotiated solution while keeping the contras alive with some humanitarian aid. Critical to this was the emergence of a regional initiative, led by Central Americans, which offered moderates the opportunity to support a negotiated settlement that was not blocked by right-wing ideologues. Hence, the Congressional Leadership constellation most closely describes policy making in this phase.

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These three phases of policy making illuminate several key features. First, many voices can make themselves heard on a foreign policy issue. The case shows that actors from both branches were involved, and that both Congress and the executive branch were divided into different factions and perspectives. Therefore, the multitude of actors who may be involved make policy making complex and messy. In this example, all three circles of policy makers were involved. However, over the entire period the most important arena for American policy making was Capitol Hill, and the most important actor sets were those drawn from the White House and Congress.

Second, the case study reveals the critical importance of the cyclical policy process. For Nicaragua policy, several iterations of the process occurred and offered different actors an opportunity to take the lead in policy making. In several, no single actor set led at all; instead, a complicated set of interbranch relations occurred. What this suggests is a need to identify the various cycles and their stages, and to identify the role and influence of each actor set in them. Doing so helps to explain two elements of American foreign policy: how it is made (process), and why certain policies develop in the way that they do (substance).

Third, the Nicaragua case shows that each branch has instruments available with which to influence policy. The president dominated the agenda, repeatedly returning with new aid requests. Executive branch control over the implementation of the policy made it possible to block congressional objectives and to take unilateral action (whether legal or not) and force other actor sets to respond. The president and his advisers also drew regularly on White House access to the media to shape opinion, provide the presidential spin on issues and events, and pressure members of Congress. They also utilized executive branch sources of information to shape the terms of the debate. Conversely, members of Congress relied principally on the power of legislative oversight to inject Congress into the policy-making process. Members then used their control over appropriations and their legislative powers to shape the policy. The inability of the president to overcome these powers, his failure to persuade a majority of the need for the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua, and his decision to ignore his promises to pursue a negotiated settlement left him little choice: to pursue his policy objectives required the use of extra-legal or illegal measures. This, in turn, led to congressional leadership for the final year and a half of the Reagan administration. The Nicaragua case, therefore, suggests that the tools available to Congress make it very capable of affecting policy.

Fourth, the Nicaragua case suggests a sequence or progression in which various policy makers become involved in policy making. In this case, the initiative began with the White House and foreign policy bureaucracy with little or no involvement from Congress. Once the administration implemented the Reagan Doctrine, Congress took advantage of its legislative powers. Since the Reagan Doctrine depended upon the provision of aid, and that assistance depended on authorization and appropriation, Congress was "hard-wired" into the policy pro-

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cess and used that access to affect the substance of policy. This sequence is a pattern that might be looked for in other case studies. It suggests that initial executive branch leadership devolves into an interbranch relationship. Subsequent events suggest that congressional leadership may follow. This suggests that general presidential preeminence should perhaps be amended to indicate initial leadership or preeminence in recognition of this progression.

Finally, the last phase provides evidence that congressional leadership is likely to occur in at least two instances: when agreement on the need for a policy exists, but the president or executive branch has not acted (negotiations); and when an administration adopts a policy which a substantial part of Congress rejects (the paramilitary objective). In this case, it was clearly the administration's determination to pursue a course that it could not persuade Congress to support and its refusal to abide by congressional stipulations that led eventually to the forfeiture of policy leadership. It is reasonable, and evidence from other case studies suggests,[86] that had the White House proved more open to congressional concerns and preferences, Congress would have relinquished leadership to the executive branch.

Three basic views of American foreign policy making exist: the president as the dominant actor; Congress as the dominant actor; and policy codetermination, in which Congress is a formidable force in foreign policy, along with the president and the executive branch.[87] This analysis suggests that the last is most applicable. For the overall case, the constellation on the continuum that best explains the policy-making process and sheds light on policy substance is the Interbranch Competition constellation. This image predicts that policy is made through a combination of presidential, bureaucratic, and congressional actor sets. According to this image, all the actor sets are important simultaneously or at different stages of the policy-making process. The Interbranch Competition constellation predicts complex interaction among the three actor sets. Such interaction includes the development of alliances that cut across the boundaries of the two branches; compromise, conflict (and possibly stalemate), or cooperation; independent and parallel policy development (each actor set developing a policy); and the use of legal and procedural tools to influence policy. Additional use of the framework would help to determine if this is an exception or a more common occurrence for American foreign policy making. In this case, at least, the White House had a voice, but was not the only voice affecting American foreign policy.*

[86] See Scott, *Deciding to Intervene*, on policy toward Angola, Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Angola, as well as Nicaragua.

[87] See Rosati, *U.S. Foreign Policy*, 303.

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The Constitutionality of the Presidential Line-Item Veto

ROBERT J. SPITZER

On 15 June 1994, the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on the Constitution, held hearings on a constitutional theory that might be alternately labeled stunning or bizarre—that the Constitution as written in 1787 provides the president not only with the power to veto bills, but parts of bills, when they cross the chief executive's desk.

For over one-hundred years, scholars and political figures have debated the desirability of granting the president item veto powers.[1] This debate took on new life in the 1980s with President Ronald Reagan's repeated calls for such a power. That debate in turn took a new twist during the Bush presidency, when George Bush made it known in 1989 that he was actively considering the unilateral exercise of an item veto, and then letting the Congress take him to court if it objected.[2] Both the House and the Senate took up this cause as well.[3]

[1] Robert J. Spitzer, *The Presidential Veto* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1988), chap. 5; Spitzer, "Symposium on the Line-Item Veto," *Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy* 1 (2-1985).

[2] "A Bush Line-Item Veto?" *CQ Weekly Report*, 28 October 1989, 2848; Gerald Seib, "If Bush Tests Constitutionality of Line-Item Veto, Reverberations Could Transform Government," *Wall Street Journal*, 30 October 1989.

[3] This idea won partisan endorsement in the 1988 Republican Party Platform, under the section on "Controlling Federal Spending," which said: "We will use all constitutional authority to control congressional spending. This will include consideration of the inherent line-item veto power of the president." See also Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, Hearing, "Line Item Veto: The President's Constitutional Authority," U.S. Senate, 103d Cong., 2d sess., 15 June 1994 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO], 1996). On 20 November 1989, six members of the House of Representatives introduced a resolution (H.R. Res. 297) urging Bush to apply such a power. Bush announced in 1992 that he now no longer accepted the validity of this argument. See "Address To Republican Members of Congress," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 28 (23 March 1992): 512. The Senate took up the cause in 1994 when Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) introduced a resolution, S. Res. 195, calling on the president to exercise a unilateral item veto in order to create a test case for the courts. See U.S. Congress, Senate, "Remarks of Arlen Specter on S. Res. 195," 103rd Cong., 2d sess., *Congressional Record*, 24 March 1994, S3751-54. No bill was reported out of committee during the 103rd Congress, but it engendered the above-mentioned hearings.

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The likelihood that Congress will resume exploration of this theory in the near future is in all probability remote. Moreover, recent congressional efforts to enact some form of an item veto or enhanced rescission power further undercut the inherent veto argument. Why, then, devote precious space and effort to an arcane and obscure dispute? The answer is because the consequences of this debate are anything but arcane and obscure. Stated in simplest terms, constitutionalists and institutionalists should be extremely interested when an entirely new theory of the exercise of constitutional powers emerges two centuries after the document's construction. As this article will show, this exercise in constitutional interpretation cuts to the very core of how we interpret the meaning of our constitutional system. Specifically, this case addresses: the standards and methods by which we determine the meaning of our founding document; the rules of evidence applied to such judgments; and the interplay of academia and public policy. Beyond this, analysts have an obligation to future analysts and advocates, who could unearth and revive discredited theories in another age.

The recent flurry of interest in this theory does not stem merely from a single article in a newspaper. In fact, an impressive list of scholarly articles traceable back nearly thirty years have advanced this argument. Scholarly interest accelerated during the Bush years, fanned not only by Bush's interest, but also by the work of noted historian Forrest McDonald.

Setting aside the obvious fact that no president until Bush ever claimed or exercised an item veto based on executive powers enumerated in the Constitution,[4] it is nevertheless at least theoretically possible that such a power lies concealed, like an unexploded bomb, within the confines of the Constitution. Yet what are we to make of such a claim? Is it indeed, as its proponents claim, a shocking discovery akin to an archaeological discovery of a new link between modern humans and their distant ancestors? Is the debate more in the nature of an academic intellectual exercise that happened to catch the attention of the president and some in Congress? Is it a ruse, a stalking horse for other agendas? Or is it a sincere, but misguided effort to plumb the depths of the Constitution? This article will proceed by first examining the constitutional and historical case for the inherent (also sometimes called unilateral or implicit) item veto; second, it will consider the political, academic, and constitutional subtext of this effort.

[4] The unilateral item veto idea won wide attention after the publication of an article in the *Wall Street Journal* in 1987 (Steven Glazier, "Reagan Already Has Line-Item Veto," 4 December 1987), but it was met with skepticism by the Reagan administration. See David Rapp, "Does Reagan Already Have a Line-Item Veto?" *CQ Weekly Report*, 14 May 1988, 1284–85. In a 54-page memorandum prepared by Charles Cooper, head of Reagan's Office of Legal Counsel, the inherent item veto argument was rejected. See "Memorandum for the Attorney General Re: The President's Veto Power," U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, 8 July 1988. Past presidents have at times exercised considerable creativity, as when President Andrew Jackson signed a bill in 1830, but at the same time sent a message to Congress (after the House had recessed) that restricted the scope of the bill. President Tyler did something similar. See Louis Fisher, *Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 128.

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Colonial Precedents

It is well understood that colonial and early state political structures and practices had an important influence on the thinking of the Constitution's Founders. Therefore, it is reasonable to examine those experiences for any light they may shed on the meaning of the modern Constitution. Yet any such examination is constrained by two vital principles: first, interpretation of colonial experiences cannot and should not supersede the words and intentions of the Constitution's Founders, since this is the more direct, immediate, and relevant source of information for constitutional analysis; and second, while earlier practices fed into the thinking of the Constitution's Framers, the government they constructed in 1787 was different from any other that came before it, especially as to the construction of the American presidency.[5] Keeping these two cautions in mind, it is nevertheless fruitful to examine colonial structures and practices, as that is where the American system started.

Several governing structures operated to control colonial lawmaking. Ironically, the colonial governors and the British monarch were not the most important decision makers, although they took the brunt of blame for colonial frustrations as expressed, for example, in the Declaration of Independence. All laws emanating from colonial legislatures were transmitted to the Board of Trade (which operated to review colonial laws from 1696–1776), which in turn passed its recommendations for approval or disallowance on to the monarch's Privy Council. The Board's recommendations were based on entirely sensible criteria, given America's colonial status, including whether the new laws were within the proper legal domain of colonial legislatures, whether such laws encroached on royal prerogative, harmed relations between the colonies, or otherwise involved ill-advised legislative adventurism.[6] The Board's recommendations were almost always followed by the Privy Council. Even though the disallowance of colonial laws was referred to as being "disallowed by the King and Council," this actually meant that the Board's recommendations had been disapproved by the Privy Council; the monarch was almost never personally involved in Privy Council decisions.[7]

In his search for support for the argument that the modern Constitution provides for an inherent item veto, Forrest McDonald cites as precedent the actions

[5] Robert J. Spitzer, *President and Congress* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), chap. 1.

[6] The reasonableness of most of the Board's vetoes is illustrated by Dickerson's detailed account of vetoed laws, ranging from bills which might have harmed America's ability to defend itself, to settling legal differences between parliamentary law and the needs of the colonies, to laws which restricted religious freedom or otherwise persecuted Catholics or other minority religious groups. See Oliver Morton Dickerson, *American Colonial Government, 1696–1765* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962, 1st pub. 1912), chap. 5. All of this occurred under the operating principle that the "colonies did not exist primarily for their own benefit, but rather for that of the mother country which fostered and protected them." See Leonard Woods Labaree, *Royal Government in America* (New York: Frederick Ungar, 1930), 234.

[7] Dickerson, *American Colonial Government*, 227.

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of the British Board of Trade. Of the over 8,000 pieces of legislation passed to the British monarch during the colonial period, the Crown, according to McDonald, "vetoed all or part of 469 pieces of legislation in the eighty years in which the Board of Trade oversaw the colonies."[8] Speaking of the Board's actions, McDonald concludes that "the veto that they were exercising in the name of the Crown was a selective veto, a line-item veto."[9] Writing six years later, McDonald cites a selective veto exercised by Governor Francis Bernard in 1767 of the appropriations for one of two military fortifications found in a single bill passed by the Massachusetts legislature to illustrate that colonial governors exercised "what would come to be called a 'line-item' veto. . . ."[10] Gordon Crovitz[11] and Diane-Michele Krasnow[12] embrace McDonald's argument that this was an item veto as it is understood today, and use it to support the inherent item veto theory.

Yet this line of argument, indirect though it is as support for an inherent item veto in the modern Constitution, is fatally flawed because first, the actions of the Board of Trade and the Privy Council were not vetoes at all; second, the colonial governors' role was, in toto, far greater than anything contemplated or desired by the Constitution's founders; and third, the mechanics of this legislative process were very different from the lawmaking process and veto power established in 1787, in that colonial legislatures were, as a matter of British law, legal creatures of their British rulers. As Ronald Moe points out, "the term 'veto' . . . was generally inaccurate as it applied to the actions of the Board of Trade. Technically, the Board did not 'veto' an act; it recommended 'disallowance' of an act to the Privy Council."[13] As Frank Prescott and Joseph Zimmerman note in their definitive work on the New York veto, "the disallowance of colonial legislation [by the Board of Trade] was technically neither a repeal nor a veto," but was "analogous to the invalidation of laws by the United States Supreme Court."[14]

[8] Forrest McDonald, "The Framers' Conception of the Veto Power" in *Pork Barrels and Principles* (Washington, DC: National Legal Center for the Public Interest, 1988), 2–3.

[9] Ibid., 2.

[10] Forrest McDonald, *The American Presidency* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 106. McDonald's source is John F. Burns, *Controversies Between Royal Governors and their Assemblies in the North American Colonies* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969; first pub. 1923), 174, who wrote: "The one thing worthy of mention during this session was the Governor's objection to the novelty of combining in one appropriation bill two distinct items – somewhat after the manner of the more modern 'rider.' In a bill providing support for Castle William and Fort Pownal, Governor Bernard disapproved the latter on grounds of insufficiency; and the House immediately objected to the separation of parts of the same bill."

[11] Gordon Crovitz, "The Line-Item Veto: The Best Response When Congress Passes One Spending 'Bill' a Year," *Pepperdine Law Review* 18 (1990): 47.

[12] Diane-Michele Krasnow, "The Imbalance of Power and the Presidential Veto: A Case for the Item Veto," *Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy* 14 (Spring 1991): 586–87.

[13] Ronald Moe, "The Founders and Their Experience with the Executive Veto," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 17 (Spring 1987): 416. See also Louis Fisher, "The Presidential Veto: Constitutional Development" in *Pork Barrels and Politics*, 18.

[14] Frank W. Prescott and Joseph F. Zimmerman, *The Politics of the Veto of Legislation in New York State*, 2 vols. (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1980), I, 5.

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One distinctive element of the colonial legislative process was that the measures passed on to the board of Trade were not bills, but laws, once they were signed by the royal governor. Technically speaking, the action was a "disallowance," not a veto. As Oliver Morton Dickerson noted, the "royal disapproval of such a law is very different, both in form and effect, from what is usually known as a veto. . . . The royal disapproval . . . had the effect of a legislative repeal. . . ."[15]

In addition, assemblies were directed to follow Crown-designed gubernatorial guidelines regarding the style and content of colonial legislation—that is, what they could and could not enact; colonial legislatures were given some discretion, however, to redraft legislation to their liking, subject to final Crown approval. Notably, they were directed to treat different subjects as separate bills, in order to avoid the "rider" or "tacking" strategy that had been used in the British House of Commons as early as the seventeenth century to frustrate the wishes of the House of Lords or the monarch.[16] In addition, laws were to have indefinite duration (except for circumstances when a certain date was obviously needed); tax laws had to extend for at least a year; lapsed laws were not to be reenacted without permission; no taxes were to be imposed on European goods brought to America in British ships, and so on.[17] If they disobeyed, the governor could dissolve the assembly, or exercise his absolute veto. If the governor yielded to colonial wishes, he could be subject to removal and other penalties.

Further, the British sometimes required the insertion of a "suspending clause" in legislation. The purpose of such a provision was to delay implementation of a duly enacted law until royal consent could be obtained—a process that could easily take years. The concern was that a law objectionable to the Crown might not be disallowed for a period of three years or more, because of the slow and uncertain communications link stretching across the Atlantic and also because of bureaucratic delays or royal footdragging. Indeed, the average time span between law enactment in the colonies and disallowance of the 437 laws repealed by the Crown during the colonial period as examined by Elmer Beecher Russell was three years and five months. In one instance, a Virginia law that barred importation of North Carolina tobacco was disallowed in 1731—twenty-six years after enactment.[18] In the case of Massachusetts, Governor William Burnet was directed that routine laws should have a time line of at least two years.[19]

This time lag might mean that a legislature could obtain gubernatorial consent (by bribery, coercion, or persuasion) of an objectionable bill and implement the terms of the law for an extended period before royal disapproval could be transmitted. According to Leonard Labaree, this suspension procedure had the

[15] Dickerson, *American Colonial Government*, 226.

[16] Leonard Woods Labaree, *Royal Government in America* (NY: Frederick Ungar, 1930), 222.

[17] Elmer Beecher Russell, *The Review of American Colonial Legislation by the King in Council* (Buffalo, NY: William S. Hein, 1981; first pub. 1915), 505–6.

[18] Ibid., 222–23.

[19] Burns, *Controversies Between Royal Governors*, 77.

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effect of changing "the royal allowance or disallowance from an act of executive prerogative to a direct participation in the process of legislation itself. The king in council became, in such cases, a part of the colonial legislature. . . ." Using these powers, the British "were able to prescribe fairly effectively the method by which laws should be passed."[20] In short, actions taken by the Board of Trade and the Privy Council were not by definition vetoes. Only the colonial governors exercised vetoes. Even so, the sweeping powers of the governors, the Board of Trade, and the Privy Council were such that colonial legislatures were prevented from exercising legislative functions in a manner consistent with contemporary thinking about what constitutes legislative power. In fact, the rest of the British government shared, even controlled, colonial legislative power.

Two observations merit special attention. First, despite these many restrictions, colonial legislatures still found ways to wrangle concessions from the British government and its representatives.[21] Some of these were discussed during the debates at the Constitutional Convention.[22]

Second, and more important to this analysis, these colonial structural relationships bear little relation to the operation of Congress and the president under the modern Constitution. As mentioned, the actions of the Board of Trade and Privy Council were not vetoes at all. Responding to McDonald's claims to having discovered gubernatorial item vetoes, an exhaustive study of colonial practices by President Reagan's Office of Legal Counsel concluded that there were no instances when colonial governors used an item veto (the one instance cited earlier in McDonald seems to be a single exception).[23] In any case, colonial governors possessed far greater power over colonial legislatures than anything included or contemplated for the modern Constitution, including an absolute veto[24] (also including instances where the rest of the British government could direct the actions of the governors).

Just as clearly, the Founders were aware of the idea that parts of laws could be vetoed. Yet the very fact that no wording in the Constitution, or debate surrounding it, contemplated such a power for the president militates against the inherent item veto argument. Moreover, since the actions of the Board of Trade and the Privy Council were not vetoes, nothing in the colonial period can be

[20] Labaree, *Royal Government in America*, 225.

[21] Thomas Stefan Schroeder, "Original Understanding and Veto Power: Are the Framers Safe While Congress Is in Session?" *Journal of Law and Politics* 7 (Summer 1991): 769–71.

[22] Benjamin Franklin, for example, described how colonial governors sometimes insisted on bribes or other inducements to obtain gubernatorial assent: "the negative of the Governor was constantly made use of to extort money. No good law whatsoever could be passed without a private bargain with him." See Max Farrand, *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, 4 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), I, 98–99. These infringements on colonial legislatures by the British government undoubtedly contributed to the legislative-centered nature of early American governments.

[23] Cooper, "Memorandum for the Attorney General," 21–25.

[24] An absolute veto was proposed for the president at the Constitutional Convention, but it was soundly rejected.

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taken as lending support to the theory that an item veto was included in the 1787 Constitution.

Defining the Veto

Many actions that occurred before and after the writing of the Constitution have been identified as the de facto or de jure exercise of item veto powers. For example, McDonald cites the circumstance of state legislatures during the revolutionary period passing on appropriations that were "permissive, not mandatory" in that the governor/executive then could spend at his discretion.[25] Yet such an arrangement flies in the face of the modern legislative process.

What Is Law?

The keystone power of Congress is lawmaking, meaning the enactment of legally binding decisions. According to Henry Black, law "is a body of rules of action or conduct prescribed by controlling authority, and having binding legal force. . . . Law is a solemn expression of the will of the supreme power of the State."[26] Of the many purposes served by Congress, lawmaking is "first and foremost."[27] Speaking more generally about American legislatures, William Keefe and Morris Ogul observe that "The principal task of the American legislature is to make law."[28] With respect to law and appropriations, the Constitution notes in Article I, sec. 9, that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law."

Therefore, an act passed by a legislature that does not include a legal mandate—McDonald's "permissive" appropriations—does not normally carry the force of law, obviating any question of a veto, item or otherwise. If Congress grants spending discretion to the executive, the subsequent exercise of that discretion by the president is not in law an item veto, even though the decisions arising from the discretion over spending may have an item veto effect.

Impoundment

This principle becomes even more clear in the case of impoundments. McDonald and Stephen Glazier cite instances when Presidents George Washington, John

[25] McDonald, "The Framers' Conception of the Veto Power," 3.

[26] Henry C. Black, *Black's Law Dictionary* (St. Paul, MN: West Pub., 1983), 457.

[27] Alan L. Clem, *Congress: Powers, Processes, and Politics* (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1989), 7.

[28] William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, *The American Legislative Process* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1985), 13.

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Adams, and Thomas Jefferson refused to spend funds duly appropriated by Congress (and as signed into law by these respective presidents), or diverted money that had been appropriated for one purpose to another purpose. "Ceding this power not to spend funds once appropriated amounted to a grant or acknowledgment by Congress of a form of 'line-item veto,'" said Glazier, "even though that term itself was not coined until around the Civil War."[29] J. Gregory Sidak and Thomas Smith say that "The practice of impoundment . . . can be seen as a line-item veto under a different name."[30] Carl McGowan makes the same argument.[31]

Leaving aside the fact that presidential impoundment was eliminated in the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (with the practices of deferrals and rescissions substituted for it), impoundment and item veto powers are vitally different, even if their political or fiscal consequences might be the same. By definition, a veto can only be exercised on a bill before it is enacted into law, since its very purpose is to block enactment. Any action or decision that occurs subsequent to the enactment of legislation into law is not a veto, although actions such as impoundment may have an item veto effect. To indiscriminately blend these two types of powers as though they were the same is to vitiate foundation legal principles about how legislation is enacted and where institutionally-defined powers begin and end.

Krasnow argues that the elimination of impoundment has "drastically weakened" the president's power over appropriations, thus necessitating implementation of the inherent item veto because, absent impoundment, the item veto is "consistent with the Framers' intentions."[32] Krasnow's linking of impoundment and item veto extends beyond their fiscal similarities. The weakening or absence of the first, she argues, provides a constitutionally-based justification for the second.

This analysis is built on several false suppositions. First, while impoundments date back to Washington, they have never constituted a primary means of fiscal control by presidents, especially when compared to the wide array of other formal and informal fiscal-budgetary controls and powers available to presidents. Curtailing impoundment use has hardly eviscerated presidential influence over budgeting. Second, impoundment powers were regulated by Congress in 1974 precisely because presidents—although primarily Richard Nixon—were using the power with greater frequency and under circumstances that stretched far beyond traditional historical purposes. Congress imposed restraints because of presidential abuse of power, not because of newfound congressional aggrandizement or

[29] Stephen Glazier, "The Line-Item Veto: Provided in the Constitution and Traditionally Applied" in *Pork Barrels and Principles*, 12.

[30] J. Gregory Sidak and Thomas A. Smith, "Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and Kurland," *Northwestern University Law Review* 84 (Winter 1990): 447.

[31] Carl McGowan, "The President's Veto Power: An Important Instrument of Conflict in Our Constitutional System," *San Diego Law Review* 23 (July-August 1986): 810.

[32] Krasnow, "The Imbalance of Power and the Presidential Veto," 605, 612.

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arrogance.[33] Stated another way, impoundment was predicated on interbranch comity. When that comity broke down under Nixon, the practices were altered.[34] Third, the Constitution makes no provision for executive impoundment; instead, it vests the power of the purse squarely in the hands of Congress, including the powers to lay and collect taxes, deal with indebtedness and bankruptcy, impose duties, borrow and coin money. The presence or absence of impoundment bears no relationship to whether the Constitution already provides for an item veto.

This line of argument is further undercut by comparison with the fact that the regular veto may have an item veto effect. From George Washington to Bill Clinton, presidents have vetoed legislation because they objected to a single provision within the vetoed bill. Such vetoes often persuade Congress to repass the legislation with the offending provision removed.[35] Such instances as these do not mean that a regular veto is somehow also an item veto.

Finally, Crovitz argues that President Bush "has already exercised the line-item veto."[36] His evidence is several instances when Bush, in his signing statements, announced that he would refuse to enforce certain provisions of several bills. Leaving aside the legality of such declarations, no veto, item or otherwise, was applied in these instances, because there was no veto announcement or statement, and no bill return. All of the bills (and provisions thereof) in question were signed into law. The failure to enforce provisions in legislation is just that; it is not an item veto.

What the Founders Understood about the Veto

As Glazier observed, the term "item veto" did not arise until around the time of the Civil War, when President of the Confederacy Jefferson Davis was given an item veto,[37] although he never used the power; the term "item veto" does not actually appear in the Confederate Constitution. And there was no discussion of an item veto at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Yet this does not mean that the Founders were unaware of the idea. The man who presided over the convention, George Washington, offered this definitive comment on the item veto question and existing presidential powers to veto in 1793:

[33] Louis Fisher, *Presidential Spending Power* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975).

[34] James P. Pfiffner, *The President, the Budget, and Congress: Impoundment and the 1974 Budget Act* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979).

[35] To mention the earliest example of this phenomenon, President Washington's second and final veto was of a bill that included a reduction of America's already small army by two dragoon companies. In his veto message, Washington argued on behalf of retaining the two companies. Congress repassed the bill, this time with the offending provision excised. Washington signed that bill into law on his last day in office. See Spitzer, *The Presidential Veto*, 28–29.

[36] Crovitz, "The Line-Item Veto," 52.

[37] Glazier, "The Line-Item Veto."

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> You do me no more than Justice when you suppose that from motives of respect to the Legislature (and I might add from my interpretation of the Constitution) I give my Signature to many Bills with which my Judgment is at variance. In declaring this, however, I allude to no particular Act. *From the nature of this Constitution, I must approve all parts of a Bill, or reject it in toto.* To do the latter can only be Justified upon the clear and obvious ground of propriety; and I never had such confidence in my own faculty of judging as to be over tenacious of the opinions I may have imbibed in doubtful cases.[38]

President Benjamin Harrison opined similarly that "many laws contain more than one proposition . . . and the President must deal with them as thus associated."[39] President and Supreme Court Chief Justice William H. Taft noted that the president "has no power to veto parts of the bill and allow the rest to become a law. He must accept it or reject it, and his rejection of it is not final unless he can find one more than one-third of one of the Houses to sustain him in his veto."[40] These presidents certainly had no inkling of a unilateral item veto.

State Precedent?

McDonald finds some state precedents as buttressing the case for the inherent item veto, because he argues that state actions after the adoption of the federal Constitution reflected their understanding of the federal document, and because most governmental spending in the nation's first century occurred at the state rather than the federal level, suggesting that nineteenth-century state actions are roughly analogous to the federal government of this century, as this is where most governmental spending now occurs. McDonald asserts that states that revised their constitutions at the end of the eighteenth century (including Georgia, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Kentucky, and Vermont) copied wording from the federal Constitution, and that "the governors began immediately to exercise the veto in a line-item fashion."[41] McDonald provides no evidence or source for this assertion.

McDonald does assert with attribution that three northern states adopted line-item veto provisions for their constitutions before the Civil War, a startling discovery if true, since sources up until now always cite the Confederate Constitution of 1861 as the first American document to codify the power. Such a discovery might suggest a hitherto uncovered item veto trail, perhaps even leading back to 1787. The three state constitutions, with the years of alleged item veto inclusion, are New Jersey (1844), Ohio (1851), and Kansas (1859).[42] McDonald's source

[38] John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington*, 39 vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1940), XXXIII, 94. (Emphasis added.)

[39] Benjamin Harrison, *This Country of Ours* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1897), 132.

[40] William Howard Taft, *The President and His Powers* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1916), 14.

[41] McDonald, "The Framers' Conception of the Veto Power," 6.

[42] Ibid., 7, n. 5.

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is an authoritative work edited by Francis Newton Thorpe that compiles all charters and constitutions from colonial times to the date of the seven volume set's publication. Yet McDonald's discovery turns out to be fool's gold. In each of these three instances, McDonald has misread Thorpe. All three states adopted the item veto after the Civil War, not before.[43]

The Rider Problem

Much has been made of the fact that Congress has sought to circumvent presidential vetoes by attaching objectionable riders onto legislation in the hopes of winning enactment of such provisions that might not otherwise survive on their own. The practice gained attention in America in the 1840s and prompted no little acrimonious debate in Congress and elsewhere.[44]

Some have argued that the congressional penchant for attaching often nongermane riders was unanticipated by the Constitution's Founders. Charles Zinn concluded that "since the subject was not raised in the [Constitutional] Convention we may infer that the delegates did not foresee omnibus bills and legislative riders to appropriation bills."[45] William Clineburg states flatly that "There is no evidence that the invention of non-germane riders and omnibus bills was foreseen at the time the Constitution was being written and debated."[46]

Leaving aside for the moment the omnibus problem, many have seized on this point to argue that presidents might possess a unilateral item veto because the legislative linking of disparate subjects through the attachment of riders under the heading "bill" would be viewed by the Founders as an artifice for confounding an otherwise finely wrought legislative process. As early as 1965, Richard Givens used this argument to propose that presidents should simply try an item veto, and let the courts resolve the dispute.[47] Clineburg asserts flatly that presidents may veto nongermane riders.[48] Writing more recently, Schroeder adapted this

[43] Francis Newton Thorpe, ed., *The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and other Organic Laws of the States, Territories, and Colonies*, 7 vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1909).

[44] Spitzer, *The Presidential Veto*, 55–56, 124.

[45] Charles J. Zinn, *The Veto Power of the President* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1951), 34.

[46] William A. Clineburg, "The Presidential Veto Power," *South Carolina Law Review* 18 (1966): 752. Schroeder says, "The attachment of nongermane riders and amendments to bills is discussed nowhere in the records of the Constitutional Convention." See "Original Understanding and Veto Power," 767. Rotunda and Nowak concur: "At the time of the Constitutional Convention, the term 'line-item' veto did not exist because the problem of unrelated bills and riders did not then exist." See *Treatise on Constitutional Law*, 4 vols. (St. Paul, MN: West Pub., 1992), I, 757.

[47] Richard A. Givens, "The Validity of a Separate Veto of Nongermane Riders to Legislation," *Temple Law Quarterly* 39 (Fall 1965): 60–64. See rejoinder to Givens by Richard A. Riggs, "Separation of Powers: Congressional Riders and the Veto Power," *University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform* 6 (Spring 1973): 735–59.

[48] Clineburg, "The Presidential Veto Power," 753.

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argument to propose that the courts had the power and standing to strike down laws containing "measures topically or operationally unrelated to the bills carrying them into law."[49] Riggs makes the same claim.[50]

Clineburg,[51] Glazier,[52] Haswell,[53] Crovitz,[54] Sidak and Smith,[55] Krasnow,[56] Schroeder,[57] and Rotunda and Nowak[58] all rely on the argument that the Founders' lack of knowledge of the rider problem justifies an item veto to restore the more pure and simple legislative process they allegedly envisioned. These writers further assert that the rider practice has in effect vitiated the potency of the regular veto.[59] If this assumption about what the Founders knew is correct, it could be construed as support for the unilateral item veto. In fact, however, the Founders were not only aware of the rider problem, but discussed it at considerable length in the Federal Convention.

The antecedents of the rider problem trace back to the British Parliament in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As early as 1667, the House of Commons engaged in a process then referred to as "tacking." Based on the rule that the House of Lords could not amend money bills, the Commons would include in such bills nongermane riders that would not otherwise win acceptance from the Lords. The practice was used in 1692, 1698, and 1701.[60] In 1700, the House of Commons attached to a tax bill a rider annulling King William III's Irish land grants. Despite the resistance of the House of Lords, not to mention the displeasure of the king, the bill was approved.[61] As keen students of British history and politics, the Founders were fully aware of this history, as the federal debates make clear.[62]

The practice of tacking extended to the colonies as well. As discussed earlier, colonial governors were instructed not to approve any colonial legislation that included riders. Even so, many legislatures attempted to attach such riders, which

[49] Schroeder, "Original Understanding and Veto Power," 760.

[50] Riggs, "Separation of Powers," 738.

[51] Clineburg, "The Presidential Veto Power," 752–53.

[52] Glazier, "The Line-Item Veto," 10.

[53] Anthony Haswell, "Partial Veto Power—Does the President Have It Now?" *Federal Bar News and Journal* 36 (March/April 1989): 142, 144.

[54] Crovitz, "The Line-Item Veto," 43.

[55] Sidak and Smith, "Four Faces of the Item Veto," 467.

[56] Krasnow, "The Imbalance of Power and the Presidential Veto," 584, 601.

[57] Schroeder, "Original Understanding and Veto Power," 759, 784–85.

[58] Rotunda and Nowak, *Treatise on Constitutional Law*, I, 757.

[59] Judith A. Best also makes this argument. See "The Item Veto: Would the Founders Approve?" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 14 (Spring 1984): 183–88.

[60] Thomas Pitt Taswell-Langmead, *English Constitutional History* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1946), 613–14.

[61] Paul R. Q. Wolfson, "Is a Presidential Item Veto Constitutional?" *Yale Law Journal* 96 (March 1987): 841.

[62] Indeed, one convention delegate, John Rutledge, complained that the convention relied too much on British law and practice, exhibiting "a blind adherence to the British model." See Farrand, *The Records of the Federal Convention*, II. 279.

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resulted in protracted political disputes that often delayed the allocation of funding for the colonies.[63]

During the Federal Convention, Pierce Butler argued on 13 June that both houses of Congress should have equal say over money bills because a failure to do so "will lead the latter [the House] into the practice of tacking other clauses to money bills."[64] Colonel George Mason discussed a proposal by fellow Virginia delegate Edmund Randolph to mimick the British system, whereby the upper house (the Senate) would similarly be denied the ability to alter or amend money bills (as was true of the British House of Lords). Such a proposal, Mason said on 13 August, would mean that "the Senate could not correct errors of any sort, & that it would introduce into the House of Reps. the practice of tacking foreign matter to money bills."[65] (Note that Butler and Mason used the British term "tacking.")

James Madison described the essence of the problem of trying to restrict amendments by subject matter: "The words *amend or alter*, form an equal source of doubt & altercation. When an obnoxious paragraph shall be sent down from the Senate to the House of Reps it will be called an origination under the name of an amendment. The Senate may actually couch extraneous matter under that name. In these cases, the question will turn on the *degree* of connection between the matter & object of the bill and the (alteration or) amendment offered to it."[66]

Thus, the Founders were familiar with the rider problem, although it was controversial then, as it is today. Zinn, Clineburg, Schroeder, and Rotunda and Nowak are simply and demonstrably wrong in saying that the Founders were unaware of this practice.[67]

The manual prepared by Thomas Jefferson during his vice presidency under John Adams (1797–1801) to guide congressional procedures not only acknowledges but condones nongermane riders: "Amendments may be made so as totally to alter the nature of the proposition; and it is a way of getting rid of a proposition

[63] Wolfson, "Is a Presidential Item Veto Constitutional?" 843. Prescott and Zimmerman note that New York's colonial governor was forbidden by royal instruction from approving acts that included riders on appropriations bills. See *The Politics of the Veto of Legislation in New York State*, I, 2.

[64] Farrand, *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, I, 233.

[65] Ibid., II, 273. Much of the subsequent discussion on that August day dealt with the extent to which the Founders should or should not follow the British example. That discussion alone makes clear that the Founders well understood the British system. In comments offered the same day, James Wilson expressed a similar concern that "The House of Reps. will insert the other things in money bills, and by making them conditions of each other, destroy the deliberate liberty of the Senate." (II, 275).

[66] Ibid., II, 276. (Emphasis and parentheses in original.)

[67] Schroeder actually presents evidence undercutting his own argument when he reports several instances of the attachment of nongermane riders in the early years of the country's history, including the attachment of a rider "for building a light-house on Cape Henry, in the state of Virginia" added to a 1790 appropriations bill. "Original Understanding and the Veto Power," 778.

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by making it bear a sense different from what it was intended by the movers, so that they vôte against it themselves."[68]

The Bill Definition and Omnibus Problems

Critics similarly argue that aside from the possibilities and consequences of riders just discussed, early legislation was limited to single subjects.[69] Modern legislation, by contrast, is often a complex conglomeration of diverse topics housed under the single title "bill." More significantly, modern appropriations often take the form of enormous omnibus appropriations bills when, many argue, early appropriations were limited to single subjects.

While it is certainly true that modern legislation is more likely to be composed of diverse elements, such legislation constitutes a single bill as much as a bill dealing with a single subject. Contrary to the claim that "separate legislative proposals in substance contained in the same Act are separately vetoable 'bills' regardless of the format or timing of introduction. . . .",[70] a bill quite simply is "any singular, entire piece of legislation in the form in which it was approved by the two Houses [of Congress]."[71]

In addition to history and past practices, to restrict the definition of "bill" to single subjects is to raise two serious problems. One is the practical problem of deciding which items do and do not belong together. The making of law and policy follows no simple formula, and the interconnectedness of matters addressed in legislation would render chaotic any effort to meaningfully enact a one-subject-per-bill rule (a fact noted by James Madison above). Edmund Randolph directly contradicted modern critics advancing the one-subject bill definition when he described how bills might be defined as single-subject in nature. Of course, no such restriction appeared in the final Constitution, except for the provision in Art. I, sec. 7 stipulating that all revenue bills were to originate in the House:

[68] Lewis Deschler, *Constitution, Jefferson's Manual, and Rules of the House of Representatives* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1973), 229 (sec. 467). The note to this section observes that "This was the rule of Parliament, which did not require an amendment to be germane."

[69] Clineburg, "The Presidential Veto Power," 753; Russell M. Ross and Fred Schwengel, "An Item Veto for the President?" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 12 (Winter 1982): 67–68; Krasnow, "The Imbalance of Power and the Presidential Veto," 601.

[70] Haswell, "Partial Veto Power," 142.

[71] Anthony Gressman, "Observation: Is the Item Veto Constitutional?" *North Carolina Law Review* 64 (April 1986): 819. According to *Black's Law Dictionary*, a bill in legislation is "The draft of a proposed law from the time of its introduction in a legislative house through all the various stages in both houses. . . . The form of a proposed law before it is enacted into law by a vote of the legislative body." (Black, 87). Rappaport's examination of the meaning of bill in the eighteenth century in both Britain and America supports the conclusion that even then bill meant "a draft of a law containing whatever provisions the author deemed desirable." Michael B. Rappaport, "The President's Veto and the Constitution," *Northwestern University Law Review* 87 (Spring 1993): 762.

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"As to Commercial regulations which may involve revenue, the difficulty may be avoided by restraining the definition to bills for the *mere* or *sole*, purpose of raising revenue."[72]

Luther Martin's address to the Maryland state legislature on 29 November 1787, evinced a similar awareness that "bill" could have been defined narrowly in the Constitution, but was not. Speaking about possible controversies between the Senate and House, Martin predicted problems over "what are or are not revenue bills, and the more so as they are not *defined* in the constitution."[73] Randolph's and Martin's stated awareness that bills could be defined in such a way as to limit their scope or purpose disproves the assertions that "bill" necessarily meant a single subject to the Founders, and that the Founders had a very limited, naive, or narrow understanding of bill construction when compared with the behavior of the modern Congress. As with riders, the omnibus problem was controversial in the eighteenth century, as it is today; but it was both known and used.

The second problem with narrow bill definition is the principled one that any effort to impose restrictions on the definition of a bill from the outside would amount to nothing less than improper interference in the legislative process. The Constitution gives to Congress alone the power to regulate its internal affairs, including all matters pertaining to the handling of legislation, subject to constitutional guidelines and existing congressional rules; Congress always retains the option of dissecting complex, multisubject bills into smaller, distinct bills, should it decide to do so. Thus, one cannot justify a unilateral item veto on a narrow definition of "bill."

As for the use of omnibus appropriations bills, contrary to much erroneous supposition, this practice is not a modern one. Indeed, the nation's first appropriations bill, passed in 1789, was an omnibus measure that incorporated the entire budget, made up of four lump sum dollar amounts for the Department of War, the civil list, pensions for invalid individuals, and prior government expenditures. This omnibus appropriations process was used in 1790, 1791, 1792, and 1793. In 1794, appropriations were split between two bills—one for the military and the other for the rest of the government.[74]

The Presentment Clause

The Presentment clause of the Constitution (Art. I, sec. 7) provides no basis for the president to approve or disapprove a bill in anything other than the form in which it is presented. Clause 2 of this section says simply that "Every bill" passing

[72] Farrand, *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, II, 279.

[73] Ibid., III, 202.

[74] Louis Fisher, "The Item Veto—a Misconception," *Washington Post*, 23 February 1987; Fisher, "The Presidential Veto," 22.

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the House and Senate shall go to the president for final action. Yet if Clause 2 is so clear, why, critics have asked, does the next paragraph (Clause 3) repeat this same directive by saying again that "Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary . . . shall be presented to the President. . . .?" This question takes on added significance because the Framers were parsimonious and careful in their final construction of the Constitution in order to produce a stylistically cleaner and neater document. This included the excision of extraneous words and phrases.[75]

The answer is provided in the federal debates. Clause 3 "was added to avoid a situation in which Congress might seek to avoid presidential review of legislation by giving it some other name."[76] Considerable attention was focused at the convention on the concern that Congress might try to duck a veto by calling a bill something other than a bill in order to avoid presentment entirely. Such ploys had been used repeatedly by colonial legislatures to duck vetoes by the British monarch's appointed governors. As Madison said at the convention, "if the negative of the President was confined to *bills*; it would be evaded by acts under the form and name of Resolutions, votes, &c."[77] (The specific reference to "the negative," that is, the veto, arose because the veto clause was under discussion at the time.) Edmund Randolph concurred by offering a motion the next day "putting votes, Resolutions &c. on a footing with Bills."[78] There is no reason to believe that this wording means presidents can veto the constituent parts of legislation passed on for signature or veto.

Yet according to Glazier, Clause 3 authorizes an item veto because "Congress may not subvert the veto by bunching legislation into something it calls 'one' bill."[79] Such a "bunching gambit" is in effect the ducking of presentment barred by Clause 3, Glazier asserts. Crovitz makes the same argument.[80] This argument fails, first, because the proposition that a bill was meant to be a single subject only is false. Thus, presidents have no basis for subdividing that which is presented to them by Congress. Second, presentment is not ducked at all, because presidents are indeed presented with omnibus bills and bills with riders.

Beyond this, there is another important distinction justifying the separation of the two paragraphs. Clause 2 is written as a set of directions to the president, carefully explaining executive options for dealing with legislation sent to the president. Quite simply, it is the president's how-to guide for handling enrolled bills. Clause 3, however, serves a different purpose, in that it speaks not to the president, but to Congress. The whole thrust of the paragraph is to caution

[75] Max Farrand, *The Framing of the Constitution of the United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1913), 179.

[76] Robert J. Spitzer, "Presentation Clause," *Encyclopedia of the American Presidency*, 4 vols. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), III, 1193.

[77] Farrand, *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, II, 301.

[78] Ibid., 304.

[79] Glazier, "The Line-Item Veto," 11.

[80] Crovitz, "The Line-Item Veto," 45–46.

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Congress against using subterfuge of the sort used by colonial legislatures to thwart the executive's role in the legislative process laid out in the Constitution. In other words, it is a "thou shalt not" aimed at Congress (as is much of the succeeding Section 9 in Art. I).

The Veto as a Revisionary Power

The odious connotations surrounding the word "veto" prompted the Founders to use such synonyms as negative, qualified negative, revisionary power, and restraining power.[81] Aside from avoiding the stigmatized word veto, these other terms were significant for another reason. Throughout their discussion of the veto at the convention, the Founders repeatedly emphasized that the veto was not, as we think of it today, merely a negative to block or thwart action. Rather, they viewed it as a creative, positive means to revise and improve legislation by giving Congress a final opportunity to review it after the bill is returned by the president.[82]

Reflecting this view, the veto paragraph was worded this way until 10 September (the convention adjourned 17 September):

> Every bill . . . shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States, *for his revision*; if, *upon such revision*, he approve of it, he shall signify his approbation by signing it: But if, *upon such revision*, it shall appear to him improper for being passed into a law, he shall return it, together with his objections against it, to that House in which it shall have originated. . . .[83]

Similar wording is found in the New York Constitution of 1777, which reflects the fact that New York's strong gubernatorial model served as important precedent for construction of the presidency.[84] With respect to the veto power, the New York Constitution of 1777 diverged from the federal document in that it provided for the veto to be exercised by a Council of Revision, which included the governor, the judges of the state supreme court, and the chancellor of the court of chancery. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 was similarly patterned on New York, minus the Council of Revision. Neither constitution used the word veto, and both used the revision language.

[81] Vernon L. Wilkinson, "The Item Veto in the American Constitutional System," *Georgetown Law Journal* 25 (November 1936): 108, n. 11.

[82] Spitzer, *The Presidential Veto*, 18–20. This positive construct is revealed in constitutional debate. See Farrand, *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, II, 73–79, 161, 568–69; III, 133, 385. In the stipulation that the president must state his objections to vetoed bills in writing and return them to the house of origin, see Josiah H. Benton, *The Veto Power in the United States: What Is It?* (Boston: Addison C. Getchall, 1888), 35–36.

[83] Farrand, *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787*, II, 568–69. (Emphasis added.)

[84] Charles C. Thach, *The Creation of the Presidency, 1775–1789* (New York: DaCapo Press, 1969; first pub. 1923), 53–54; 176.

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Advocates of the inherent item veto have cited the revisionary language of the debates and these early constitutions to propose that the revision process amounted to "a selective veto, a line-item process"[85] on the assumption that vetoed bills were somehow rewritten by the state legislatures of New York and Massachusetts at the instruction of the governors. Krasnow cites sec. III of the New York Constitution of 1777 to support her claim that under its terms a vetoed bill "was returned to the chamber from which it originated with comments. The legislature would then enact the bill into law, incorporating the proposed revisions."[86] In other words, the governor exercised an item veto. If this were true, a similar logic might apply to the similar wording in the 1787 Constitution.

The problem with this claim is that Krasnow has misrepresented the wording of the New York Constitution. Sec. III says:

> . . . all bills which have passed the senate and assembly shall, before they become laws, be presented to the said council for their revisal and consideration; and if, upon such revision and consideration, it should appear improper to the said council . . . they return the same, together with their objections thereto in writing, to the senate or house of assembly . . . who shall enter the objection sent down by the council at large in their minutes, and proceed to reconsider the bill. But if, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the said senate or house of assembly shall, notwithstanding the said objections, agree to pass the same, it shall . . . be sent to the other branch of the legislature, where it shall also be reconsidered, and, if approved by two-thirds of the members present, shall be a law.[87]

The wording of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 is almost precisely the same.[88] Neither constitution supports Krasnow's claim. The wording simply says that the legislature shall consider the Council's objections and vote by two-thirds to override the veto.[89]

The process and discussion of revision in both state constitutions constituted a review of all bills presented for signature, with a return to the legislature of those subject to veto, just as in the federal Constitution. The revision language was not a reference to any kind of selective or item veto. If the state legislatures decided to rewrite a vetoed bill, it would then be a new bill, requiring a simple majority to pass, and again subject to a gubernatorial veto. This becomes even plainer when this wording is compared to that of subsequent constitutions (such

[85] McDonald, "The Framers' Conception of the Veto Power," 4. See also Sidak and Smith, "Four Faces of the Item Veto," 442–45.

[86] Krasnow, "The Imbalance of Power and the Presidential Veto," 590.

[87] Thorpe, *The Federal and State Constitutions*, V, 2629.

[88] Ibid., III, 1893–94.

[89] Further, Prescott and Zimmerman's analysis of New York's Council of Revision provides no support for the assertion that an item veto was exercised in New York at any time until its inclusion in the state constitution in 1874. The New York item veto was first proposed but rejected in a state constitutional convention in 1867. See *The Politics of the Veto of Legislation in New York State*, I, 143, 173. The item veto power was not added to the Massachusetts Constitution until 1918. See U.S. Congress, House, "Item Veto," 202.

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as the Confederate Constitution) that did incorporate an item veto. While the term "item veto" was not used in the eighteenth century, the concept itself was known from colonial days.

An Eviscerated Veto?

Claims have been made repeatedly that the modern veto power is somehow a shell of its once formidable self. Having been thus eviscerated by congressional riders, amendments, and omnibus bills, the veto is now but a pathetic, limp instrument in the hands of modern presidents, or so say critics. Yet none of these claims to veto impotency are based on any systematic empirical or historical analysis of actual veto use and effectiveness.

First and foremost, presidents have applied over 2,500 vetoes from 1789 to 1997. Of these, 96 percent have been upheld. When private bills are eliminated from the tally in order to consider only public bills, less than 20 percent have been overridden. Surely, a presidential batting average of over 80 percent in any area outside of direct executive command authority is no inconsiderable accomplishment. Second, the claim of progressive veto evisceration over time flies in the face of the simple fact that over time presidents have used the power more, not less often. Fewer than 60 vetoes were applied from Washington to Lincoln. Beginning with Grant, veto use grew almost exponentially.

Third, two modern presidents—Ford and Bush—relied on a veto strategy as linchpins of their dealings with Congress.[90] Reagan did so as well, but in a more symbolic, and, therefore, less risky fashion.[91] While such a strategy incorporates considerable political risks for the president, it also betokens a weapon that is, if nothing else, effective. Fourth, the mere threat of a veto has been and continues to be a vital tool for presidents, especially as a way to compel Congress to alter or remove offending provisions.[92] Fifth, as mentioned earlier, presidents from Washington to Bush have used the veto effectively to force Congress to alter or eliminate disputed provisions from bills. In short, while not a perfect tool, the veto has been effective since the days of George Washington.[93] And if the Founders had wanted the president to exercise perfect control over the legislative process, they would have vested lawmaking power in the executive rather than the legislative branch.

[90] Spitzer, *The Presidential Veto*, 85–87; Robert J. Spitzer, "Presidential Prerogative Power: The Case of the Bush Administration and Legislative Power," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 24 (March 1991): 38–42.

[91] Robert J. Spitzer, "The Disingenuous Presidency: Reagan's Veto and the 'Make-My-Day' President," *Congress & the Presidency* 21 (Spring 1994): 1–10.

[92] Ibid., 6–7.

[93] Richard A. Watson, *Presidential Vetoes and Public Policy* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993).

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CONCLUSIONS: RESCUING CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

The inherent item veto argument is predicated on a veritable parade of erroneous assumptions and assertions. As this analysis has shown, there are no applicable colonial or early state precedents for the inherent veto argument, including the actions of the Board of Trade and Privy Council. The Founders were indeed aware of the rider and omnibus phenomena in the construction of legislation; they were also aware that bill construction could be limited to single subjects, but chose not to codify such a narrow definition; the interpretation of the "revisionary" language related to veto use had nothing to do with describing an item veto; and the modern veto is hardly an eviscerated power. Setting the record straight is, by itself, an adequate purpose for this article.

To be sure, one may still argue that the president ought to be able to exercise some form of item veto. One may not argue, however, that the Constitution somehow already incorporates an item veto for the president. While it is certainly true that presidents have exercised and do exercise an array of powers that have an item veto effect (the rescission power is an obvious example), an item veto is a precisely defined instrument to which no sitting president may now legally lay claim based on a reading of the Constitution.

How, then, do we explain the strength and depth of this argument, and what are its consequences? Several explanations are possible. First, to a great extent, political science has yielded the field of constitutional law to lawyers. As a consequence, political and historical variables are too easily given short shrift, because legal analysts are trained to focus more on internal legal and logical consistency than broader political context. Intellectual gamesmanship over the Constitution seems to find singularly free rein in legal publications.[94] For example, Haswell argues that, regardless of the validity of the inherent item veto theory, it is good for the presidency to attempt such a procedure. "Win or lose, the President stands to gain by attempting a partial veto. The 'bully pulpit' of the Presidency would be illuminated by the glow of publicity arising out of the constitutional litigation which would likely ensue. . . ."[95] Yet this aconstitutional recommendation is troubling not only because it comes from a lawyer, but because it treats proper or successful exercise of executive power as directly proportionate to the amount of litigation it generates. Absent a bona fide emergency, action should be predicated *only* on a firm legal basis, which Haswell himself admits is absent in this case. Academics of all fields generate arguments, but in the case of political science good argumentation cannot be cut loose from political and historical context. Absent that context, Haswell's argument makes some sense. Yet when context is injected, the consequences of Haswell's argument become

[94] I observed this to be true in research involving interpretation of the Second Amendment. Law journals were the primary forum for defective interpretations of this part of the Bill of Rights. See Robert J. Spitzer, *The Politics of Gun Control* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1995), chap. 2.

[95] Haswell, "Partial Veto Power," 145.

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readily apparent. If it is good for the presidency to claim and exercise a constitutional power for which the justification is at best tenuous, why stop with the veto? Why not encourage the president to devote the resources of the Justice Department to the development and implementation of new theories for more expansive use of other presidential powers, and let the courts arbitrate if challenges arise? In fact, the nation has undergone just such presidential experimentation. Its consequences precipitated such crises as Watergate (constitutionally justified as a feasible use of executive authority and executive privilege) and Iran-contra (constitutionally justified as a proper use of presidential foreign policy power). The constitutional paradigm suggested by Haswell is nothing less than an application of chaos theory to the Constitution. The only "glow" arising from such suspect executive action is the brief light accompanying the Constitution's immolation.

Sidak and Smith propose a different, if parallel justification for their advocacy of the inherent item veto. At the start of their article, they note that since the courts have never ruled on this matter, it is still an open legal question: "reasonable minds differ on this constitutional question—as they do on abortion, the War Powers Resolution, affirmative action, the death penalty, and many other constitutional issues."[96] By indiscriminately blending these issues together, they attempt to reduce and thus equalize a wide mix of political and policy disputes using the "reasonable minds differ" standard. This intellectual relativism is allowable for issues like affirmative action and the death penalty, where reasonable minds do differ, but where the most important consideration is the normative inclination of the public will over the course of national policy. The item veto dispute, however, is not, insofar as it is a matter of constitutional interpretation, one to be decided at the polls. It is one to be resolved by a careful weighing of legal, historical, and political evidence; and although reasonable minds might differ, the facts in this case speak clearly about what is true. In other words, reasonable minds may differ, but reasonable people can also be wrong. When political and historical context are ignored in the analysis, the reasonable-minds-differ standard retains credibility. But when political and historical context are given their due, the shallow insincerity of the reasonable-minds standard becomes apparent.[97] Facts are facts, and some arguments are simply wrong, reasonable minds notwithstanding.

The reasonable-minds standard has an added pernicious consequence. It infers that a social-scientific weighing of evidence cannot lead to a clear conclusion as long as reasonable people (note—not reasonable arguments) stand against that conclusion. The articles cited in this article that defend the inherent item veto theory are full of waffling phrases like the reasonable-minds touchstone. All seek

[96] Sidak and Smith, "Four Faces of the Item Veto," 439.

[97] During the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on S. Res. 195 on 15 June 1994, Senator Arlen Specter repeatedly asked those testifying against the inherent item veto if they could at least agree that "reasonable people may differ" on the question, perhaps as a way of constructing some kind of consensus to justify support for the proposal. See Committee on the Judiciary, "Line Item Veto," 104, 190–95.

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to find cracks of daylight by raising reasonable-doubt questions in the prevailing wisdom; for example, "since we do not know for sure what the Founders knew, our interpretation is as valid as any other." The critical flaw is that this conclusion is supported primarily by a conscious argumentative style designed to create doubt, which of course is the basis of the adversary system in American law, rather than find the truth by amassing and weighing evidence cast in broader historical-political perspective. I do not mean to suggest that social scientists are paragons of objectivity, whereas legal scholars are amoral intellectual shills. Rather, the two disciplines involve different emphases in training, intellectual style, and objectives. Lawyers are trained to be advocates; social science training, despite its limitations and flaws, emphasizes exploration. These differences, I argue, help to explain the thirty-year pyramid-like growth of the inherent veto argument in law journals and other legal publications.

The second reason for the pervasiveness and tenacity of the inherent item veto argument is that the spread of this argument can be traced through publications not subject to the customary peer review process found in most disciplines. That is, with one exception,[98] all of the articles advancing the inherent item veto argument appeared in prominent law journals, which are governed by student-run law review boards and which do not rely on peer review. Peer review is a process subject to legitimate criticisms, including cronyism and an innate conservatism stemming from the fact that manuscript review is usually conducted by those who have already published in an area, meaning that they are likely to view new or unorthodox ideas with suspicion. Even so, an article that might pass muster for a law review because it is logically argued and deeply footnoted would be less likely to win approval from a peer-reviewed journal if the argument itself is flawed in conception. Those doing the review for social science journals are most likely to be familiar with the full range of arguments in a given field or subfield. The law students who serve on law reviews and who engage in editorial review simply do not possess and cannot be expected to possess the knowledge and expertise of those who have researched and published in a field.[99] As Christopher Shea notes, "Law reviews are unique in lacking a peer-review system."[100] I do not mean this to be a sweeping indictment of law journals, but a comment on the potential shortcomings of articles in law journals when they cross over into social science.

Third, the inherent item veto argument has obvious appeal to politicians. The reason for this appeal is not complicated. Any tactic that offers as a prize the exercise of greater authority at little or no political risk or cost represents a

[98] The exception is the *Pork Barrels and Principles* monograph, which is simply the published proceedings of a symposium sponsored by the National Tax Limitation Foundation and Citizens for America.

[99] This complaint is often and increasingly heard about law reviews. See for example Christopher Shea, "Students v. Professors," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, 2 June 1995, A33–34.

[100] Ibid., A34.

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political temptation of the first order. When that authority carries with it the mantle of constitutional legitimacy, the value of the prize increases. Several examples of such a temptation arose during the Bush administration, including adoption of an expansive interpretation of the pocket veto power and the attachment of legal import to presidential signing statements.[101]

What of possible partisan motives lurking behind scholarly work? This is a question that is unanswerable; moreover, it is irrelevant. One can assume that scholars have partisan interests. Yet scholars can and should be judged only on the quality of their written work, not on imputations of their motives. I cannot and would not hazard a guess as to the motives of those whose research is discussed here. All that interests me is whether the written work stands up to scrutiny. For the most part, it does not.

To respond to the questions posed at the start of this article, the inherent item veto theory is not a shocking new discovery. It poses a debate inspiring no little intellectual curiosity, but its central argument does not stand up to scrutiny; there is no evidence that it is a ruse or stalking horse; rather, it can be taken as a case of sincere, if misguided constitutional scholarship. It also illustrates the pitfalls of accepting without question, comparison, or scrutiny the assertions of other researchers. Its flaws assume more damaging proportions to the extent that political leaders, including a president and several members of Congress, seized on this scholarship to support a means to grab some added constitutional authority on the cheap.

Argument for argument's sake in the academic world is one common value shared by social science and the legal community. But when the barrier between the academic and the policy world is breached, the stakes are upped, and the standards applied take on a whole new level of meaning. Political science needs to reacquaint itself with the importance of law; legal scholars need to consider political and historical context when their analysis enters these realms. Governmental leaders, as well as academics, who would argue that the president should simply go ahead and attempt to use a power as suspect as the unilateral item veto are mocking both constitutional authority and the genuine majesty of the presidency.*

[101] Spitzer, "Presidential Prerogative Power."

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Arms Control and the Anglo-German Naval Race before World War I: Lessons for Today?

JOHN H. MAURER

"The whole world," Britain's Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey told the German ambassador in 1908, "was now watching the rivalry between German and English shipbuilding."[1] That Europe's two leading powers were competing head-to-head in the building of battleships was indeed a striking feature of world politics during the period 1906–1914. To the generation of statesmen and naval leaders involved, this contest appeared as nothing less than a struggle for mastery in Europe and hegemony of the world's oceans. With these high stakes at risk, it is not surprising that the Anglo-German naval rivalry is often thought of as a herald of the fierce struggle soon to be waged by the great powers during World War I.[2]

Since the naval rivalry played a major role in deepening the antagonism between Britain and Germany before 1914, an arms control agreement designed to diminish the competition in shipbuilding might have eased tensions and promoted cooperation. Considerable support for an agreement existed in both countries among decision makers who wanted to improve Anglo-German relations. The Liberal government then holding office in Britain thought substantial benefit

[1] Edward Grey to Count de Salis, 18 December 1908, in G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1930), vi, no. 110, 172–3. [Hereafter cited as BD]

[2] In Paul Kennedy's opinion, "the wartime struggle between London and Berlin was but a continuation of what had been going on for at least fifteen years before the July crisis itself." See his *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914* (Atlantic Heights, NJ: Ashfield Press, 1987), 470.

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could be derived from a slackening in the naval rivalry. Meanwhile, Germany's leaders were not blind to the potential strategic advantages that might accrue to them from arms control. Although Britain and Germany ultimately failed to achieve a negotiated solution to their naval competition, it was not for want of trying. The repeated attempts to reduce the competition—the discussions at the Hague Conference in 1907, the British efforts during the summer of 1908 to initiate talks, the protracted negotiations of 1909–1911, the Haldane mission in 1912, Winston Churchill's calls during 1912 and 1913 for a naval holiday, the German bid to promote tacit arms control in 1913, and the final attempts by both sides in the spring of 1914 to renew discussions—attest to the important role assigned to arms control in the diplomacy of Britain and Germany throughout this period.

This article examines the failure of Britain and Germany to arrest their naval rivalry by arms control negotiations. My study benefits from the analytical methods and findings of the scholarly literature examining the superpower experience with arms control.[3] This article also draws upon the theoretical insights provided by writings on the promotion of international cooperation in the realm of security affairs.[4] Of course, British and German decision makers in the decade before 1914 did not employ the idiom of modern-day arms control theory or strategic studies; nonetheless, they were alive to many of the concerns and dilemmas that confront the nuclear great powers in their attempts to negotiate mutual limitations on their arsenals.[5] By examining case studies of arms control from before the nuclear era, we can also deepen our understanding of the difficulties standing in the way of cooperation between rivals. If the naval competition between Britain and Germany, in the words of Bernard Brodie, "stands out as the stereotype of the modern arms race,"[6] it can also serve as a prototype for the failure of great powers to coordinate and restrain their weapons programs by arms control.

My anatomy of this arms control failure is organized around four major questions. What was the nature of Germany's naval challenge to Britain? What were Britain's objectives in arms control? What were Germany's motivations and aims in approaching negotiations? What major obstacles stood in the way of a formal agreement? Each of these questions will be examined in turn.

[3] See, for example, Joseph Kruzel, "From Rush-Bagot to START: The Lessons of Arms Control," *Orbis* 30 (Spring 1986): 193–216; and Albert Carnesale and Richard Haass, eds., *Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987).

[4] See, in particular, Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978): 167–214; Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," *World Politics* 40 (April 1988): 317–349; George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," *World Politics* 38 (October 1985): 118-146.

[5] See Robert Art, *The Influence of Foreign Policy on Seapower* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1973), 6.

[6] Bernard Brodie, "On the Objectives of Arms Control," *International Security* 1 (Summer 1976): 30.

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Germany's Naval Challenge

The dramatic growth in Germany's naval power between 1906 and 1914 set the stage for Anglo-German arms control negotiations. The navy laws passed by the Reichstag in 1898 and 1900 started Germany on the path of building a battle fleet against Britain, while subsequent amendments to these laws enacted in 1906, 1908, and 1912 intensified the naval rivalry.[7] This legislation committed the German government to support a long-term buildup of Germany's naval power by setting an overall strength for the navy that called for the construction of new warships, provided sailors to man these vessels, equipped the fleet with supplies of stores and weapons, developed the navy's bases, and expanded the shipbuilding capacity of German industry. Germany's naval building program possessed several attributes that made it such a serious threat to Britain's security.

In the first place, an overt political purpose loomed behind the German battle fleet. From the very first navy law in 1898, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Germany's navy secretary and the principal architect of its growing naval power, envisioned the establishment of Germany as a world power on equal footing with Britain by the building of a German battle fleet. Without resort to general war, Tirpitz wanted to engineer a major power transition in world politics by shifting the relative balance of naval forces to Germany's favor and undermining Britain's leading position at sea. It was Tirpitz's view that, by substantially increasing Germany's naval armaments, Britain's leaders could be coerced and intimidated into accepting Berlin's security demands on the European continent and ambitions for colonial expansion. Faced by the threat posed by the German battle fleet, British decision makers would shrink from contesting Germany's foreign policy aspirations during any confrontation between the two countries.[8]

Another attribute of Germany's naval threat was the ambitious scope of Tirpitz's building program, which aimed at creating a battle fleet of at least sixty modern capital ships—that is battleships and large armored cruisers or battle cruisers—under twenty years in age. Tirpitz thought that this imposing force was within Germany's resources, and he fashioned a long-range plan to increase the stability of the program and hold down its cost. The German Navy Office estimated that the completion of this program would give rough parity to Germany with regard to Britain in battle-fleet strength in the North Sea.[9]

[7] On German naval planning throughout this period, see Ivo Nikolai Lambi, *The Navy and German Power Politics, 1862–1914* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1984), 137–429.

[8] On Germany's foreign policy in this period, see the lucid presentation offered by David E. Kaiser, "Germany and the Origins of the First World War," *Journal of Modern History* 55 (September 1983): 442–474; and, Ludwig Dehio, *Germany and World Politics in the Twentieth Century*, Dieter Pevsner, trans. (New York: Knopf, 1959), 38–108.

[9] On the force level goals of Tirpitz's building programs, see the sound analysis provided by Paul Kennedy, *Strategy and Diplomacy* (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), 154–60.

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Liberal England's Dilemma

In Britain, the growth of German naval power touched off a contentious debate about defense policy. In modern strategic parlance, the German battle fleet appeared to British decision makers as a short-warning, intermediate-range weapon, designed to carry out a surprise counterforce strike against British naval forces in home waters. To British "hawks," the proper response to Germany's naval threat was clear: Britain should maintain a clear superiority over Germany in modern capital ships. The rallying cry of those intent on outbuilding Germany was the so-called two-keels-to-one standard, whereby Britain would build two capital ships for every one started by Germany. As Admiral Sir John (Jackie) Fisher, Britain's flamboyant first sea lord between 1904–1910, put it: "Germany keeps her whole fleet always concentrated within a few hours of England. We must therefore keep a fleet twice as powerful as that of Germany always concentrated within a few hours of Germany."[10] This view was frequently echoed by commentators, publicists, opposition politicians, and civil servants who were determined to prevent Germany from upsetting the balance of power in Europe.[11]

But spending enormous sums in response to Germany's naval programs posed a painful dilemma to the Liberal government that took office in late 1905. The Liberals had come to power with a view to carrying out a substantial progressive political agenda for social reform at home and the reduction of international tensions. Germany's naval expansion jeopardized both of these goals by causing a worsening in Anglo-German relations and a concomitant increase in defense expenditures, which many Liberals wanted for expanded social programs.[12] To help solve this dilemma, the leadership of the Liberal party turned to arms control negotiations with Germany.

That the Liberals should turn to arms control as a means of reducing the competition with Germany is not surprising. Many Liberals believed that Britain's security might actually be undermined by major increases in battleship-building programs. Liberal political leaders and commentators frequently argued that a two-keels-to-one standard would be provocative and stimulate the naval competition—an historical precursor to the action-reaction phenomenon. Even after undertaking a large program of construction, most Liberals thought that Britain would be in no better position relative to its competitors than before. Lloyd George, who served as chancellor of the exchequer, explained in a famous new year's day 1914 interview to the newspaper *Daily Chronicle* that "feverish efforts"

[10] Arthur J. Marder, ed. *Fear God and Dread Nought*, vol. 2: *Years of Power, 1904–1914* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1956), 103.

[11] On the conservative opposition to the Liberal government's defense policy, see the study by A. J. A. Morris, *The Scaremongers* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984).

[12] On the attitudes of the Liberal party's left wing on the naval arms competition, see Howard Weinroth, "Left-wing Opposition to Naval Armaments in Britain Before 1914," *Journal of Contemporary History* (no. 4, 1971): 93–120; and A. J. Anthony Morris, *Radicalism Against War, 1906–1914* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1972).

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on Britain's part to outbuild rivals would simply not work, because "if we went on spending and swelling [the navy's] strength we should wantonly provoke other nations."[13]

Given this belief in the action-reaction dogma, the Liberals tried to reduce the competition when they first came into office by taking unilateral steps in the spring of 1906 to cut British shipbuilding. The Liberals curtailed the building program inherited from the preceding Unionist government by cutting one battleship from the coming year's estimates and eliminating two others from the following year's program. The new Liberal government hoped that these unilateral steps would set the stage for a general reduction in naval building. Some British Liberals optimistically thought that they could open negotiations to reduce naval armaments with Germany and other leading naval powers at the upcoming Hague Peace Conference, an international gathering that had been called for the summer of 1907 to deliberate on the rules of war, the arbitration of international disputes, and disarmament. But these hopes were to be dashed when Germany simply refused to curtail its naval program. Throughout the next year, Germany continued to spurn British entreaties to talk about limitations on naval building.[14] To Grey the lesson was clear: "to make an enormous reduction of our naval expenditure when there was no certainty that it was going to have a corresponding influence on the rest of Europe, would be staking too much on a gambling chance."[15]

Since unilateral steps did not seem to work, arms control negotiations offered a more prudent approach to the problem of reducing the naval competition, while at the same time remaining faithful to the Liberal party's beliefs about the nature of international rivalries. In pursuing arms control talks with Germany, the Liberal government had at least four objectives in mind.

Retain Naval Superiority

British decision makers aimed at preserving their country's naval superiority over Germany. This goal was absolutely essential and could not be compromised, although there was some room for maneuver in defining what superiority actually meant.[16] Even Lloyd George, who firmly believed in the action-reaction dogma,

[13] John Grigg, *Lloyd George: From Peace to War, 1912–1916* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 135.

[14] This example sustains the conclusions reached by George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, "Tacit Bargaining and Arms Control," *World Politics* 39 (April 1987): 297–325.

[15] E. L. Woodward, *Great Britain and the German Navy* (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1935), 425–427.

[16] See, for example, Prime Minister H. H. Asquith's comment to Reginald McKenna, the first lord of the Admiralty, before a debate in November 1908 about the Liberal government's definition of naval superiority, that it would be for the best if their assessments of the country's naval requirements "may continue to lurk in convenient obscurity." Stephen Koss, *Asquith* (London: Allen Lane, 1976), 108.

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would not concede the requirement for a stronger navy. Lloyd George was an outspoken champion for improved relations with Germany and, as chancellor of the exchequer, often tried to restrain British naval spending. Nonetheless, he bluntly told the German Ambassador Count Paul von Wolff-Metternich in July 1908 that the Liberal government would not let down Britain's naval lead and that "every Englishman would spend his last penny to preserve their superiority at sea."[17] In effect, Britain's leaders insisted that arms control codify a substantial British naval superiority by severely curtailing the threat posed by the German battle fleet.[18]

Reduce Defense Costs

Although British decision makers fully intended to maintain their country's naval superiority over Germany, the cost of accomplishing this goal was growing increasingly larger. Britain's annual naval expenditures increased by £18,250,000—or almost 70 percent—in the seven-year period between 1907 and 1914.[19] Moreover, there appeared no end to these increases in naval spending. To a Liberal government, politically outspoken in its commitment to holding down defense outlays, this growth in naval spending was particularly vexing. The competition with Germany was the driving force behind these increases in spending. According to one commentator on naval affairs, fully half of Britain's naval expenditures in 1913 was a direct result of the rivalry with Germany.[20] Any reduction in the Anglo-German naval competition, then, promised to produce substantial savings in navy estimates. The Liberals wanted arms control to reduce the cost of Britain's naval security.

The Liberals' requirement for significant savings in naval spending meant that arms control was forced to pass a difficult test. Grey put it quite bluntly: "No understanding with Germany would be appreciated here unless it meant an arrest of the increase of naval expenditure."[21] This objective required that Ger-

[17] Lloyd George, *The War Memoirs of David Lloyd George* (London: Nicholson and Watson, 1933), i, 7–17; Metternich to Bülow, 16 July 1908 and 1 August 1908, in Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, and Friedrich Thimme, eds., *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914* (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1924–7), xxiv, no. 8217, 99–102, and no. 8219, 110–115. [Hereafter cited as *GP.*]

[18] This goal was carried over into the war and became an important plank in British war aims. According to one historian who has closely studied the formulation of British policy about Germany's disarmament during World War I, "the belief that Britain must insist upon the destruction of the Germany [sic] navy remained a tacit assumption of most British policymakers." See Lorna S. Jaffe, *The Decision to Disarm Germany* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), 22–23.

[19] H. H. Asquith, *The Genesis of the War* (London: Cassell, 1923), 107, 144.

[20] Percival Hislam, *The North Sea Problem* (London: Holden and Hardingham Adelphi, n.d. [1913?]), 103.

[21] Zara S. Steiner, *Britain and the Origins of the First World War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), 55.

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many consent to change its naval law by substantially reducing its battleship building program and the fleet's readiness levels. Of course, Britain could have attempted to negotiate a pact that left the German naval program intact, but this would have brought little financial relief. Naval superiority over Germany on those conditions would be a costly proposition, contrary to the Liberals' dogmas of peace and retrenchment. As Grey told a confidant: "an arrangement based on completion of the German naval programme would be comparatively easy, but then what a large naval expenditure we should still have to face!"[22] Thus, one of the objectives of the Liberal government's foreign policy was to find a middle path of retaining Britain's naval superiority and at the same time holding down the cost of this effort. If these two goals could not be reconciled, the Liberal government saw little concrete benefit from an arms control agreement.

Preserve Britain's Ententes

In arms control negotiations with Germany, British decision makers wanted to avoid endangering the diplomatic, colonial, and security arrangements that Britain had forged since 1903 with France and Russia. In other words, Britain wanted to avoid linkage between arms control and its entente relationships. The Foreign Office was particularly concerned that the splitting of the ententes might be the precursor to German hegemony on the European continent and the beginning of a coalition of naval powers directed against Britain. To prevent this from happening, Grey made the preservation of the ententes a precondition for an arms control agreement: "We cannot enter into a political understanding with Germany which would separate us from Russia and France, and leave us isolated while the rest of Europe would be obliged to look to Germany."[23] Throughout the discussions with Berlin about limiting the naval competition, Grey and the Foreign Office were careful of French and Russian susceptibilities; they wanted to avoid any agreement with Germany that might rupture the ententes.

Build a Domestic Political Consensus on Naval Spending

The issue of naval spending posed a serious threat to the unity of Britain's Liberal party. Its leaders were caught in a political crossfire on the issue: on the one side stood the opposition Unionists and big-navy Liberals, who advocated increased spending to defeat Germany's naval challenge; on the other, from within their own party and among their Labour party supporters, came calls for reductions

[22] Keith M. Wilson, *The Policy of the Entente* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 12.

[23] Steiner, *Britain and Origins of War*, 55.

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in naval spending and an end to the arms race with Germany. The frequent petitions and pleas from Liberal backbenchers and party supporters about "bloated" naval spending and the necessity for improving Anglo-German relations was a standing challenge to the government's naval and foreign policies. On several occasions before 1914, these issues produced sharp divisions within the cabinet, threatening to break apart the party and bring about its fall from power. Indeed, during the winter of 1913–1914, the party's leadership only narrowly avoided a split. These cabinet disputes demonstrate that the arms competition with Germany exacerbated preexisting political rifts between the left and right wings of the Liberal party. While Britain was able to bear the economic costs of the competition, the governing Liberal party found it difficult to withstand the political strains caused within it by acting against some of the principal tenets of its ideology.

The decisive battleground in selling naval estimates to the party at large was the cabinet. Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith reasoned that, if a consensus could be forged within the cabinet on the level of naval spending, the party would likely follow its leadership. As Asquith noted in his memoirs, naval estimates "presented upon the authority of a Cabinet in which the advocates of peace and economy and the enemies of militarism were known to have a predominant voice . . . could not, in principle and as a whole, be opposed by the Liberal Party."[24] In effect, the leadership of the Liberal party was trying to appease radical backbenchers and party supporters by demonstrating that the government was making every reasonable effort to show restraint in its relations with Germany.

Forging that consensus within the cabinet was not an easy task, however. Indeed, Asquith feared that the issue of naval spending might be used as a rallying cry to overturn his leadership of the party.[25] All of Asquith's consummate skills as a politician were required to find compromise positions that the cabinet could agree upon. In this struggle to create a political consensus within the Liberal party for outbuilding Germany, arms control negotiations played a critical role. One purpose of arms control, then, was to defend British building programs by putting the blame for the naval competition squarely on Germany's shoulders. Winston Churchill, as first lord of the Admiralty, realized that publicized attempts at arms control could be used to gain support from within the Liberal party for his naval building programs. In February 1912, when the British government dispatched Lord Haldane to Berlin on a special diplomatic mission to discuss naval arms control proposals, Churchill confided that his position would "be all the stronger in asking the Cabinet and the House of Commons for the necessary monies if I can go hand in hand with the Chancellor of the Exchequer [Lloyd George] and testify that we had tried our best to secure a mitigation of the naval

[24] Koss, *Asquith*, 109.

[25] For an insightful analysis of Asquith's handling of the cabinet, see Roy Jenkins, *Asquith* (London: Collins, 1986 edition), 241–2.

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rivalry and failed."[26] Arms control efforts enabled the government to reassure supporters that it remained committed to settling international disputes by negotiations and offered a justification for British naval expenditures.

Germany's Stake in Arms Control

Germany's leaders were slow to grasp the potential strategic benefits that would accrue to them from an arms control agreement with Britain. At the Hague Conference of 1907, they abruptly refused to discuss the limitation of armaments. In the summer of 1908, when the first British attempts were made to reach a bilateral agreement with Germany, they once again refused to be drawn into discussions. Lying behind the refusal of Germany's leaders to enter into arms control was their fear that these discussions would only result in Germany being frozen into a position of marked inferiority with regard to Britain. Indeed, Germany's leaders resented these British attempts to impose limits on their battle fleet.

But Germany's rude refusals to negotiate backfired, because they resulted in strengthening the hands of those in Britain calling for larger building programs and for closer security arrangements with France and Russia. Pressed by the Liberal government about arms control, German decision makers began having second thoughts in the fall of 1908 about the wisdom of rejecting British offers to open negotiations. There was a growing apprehension among some German political leaders and Foreign Office analysts that Germany's brusque refusals to negotiate were counterproductive from a strategic and political point of view. These fears appeared confirmed in the spring of 1909, when the British government, press, and public were gripped by a naval panic; and Britain's Liberal government was galvanized into ordering eight dreadnoughts in a single year—the famous "We want eight, and we won't wait" episode. This panic demonstrated to some German decision makers—including Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow and the German Foreign Office—that Germany could not afford to ignore British arms control overtures. At the very least, negotiations might help to defuse tensions in Anglo-German relations. Germany's leaders, then, needed to face the question: What potential benefits might accrue to Germany from arms control talks with Britain?

First, Germany's leaders wanted to strengthen as much as possible pro-German sentiment within Britain and, in particular, not undermine the Liberal government so that it fell from power. Germany's leaders understood that their fleet building would be a source of antagonism with Britain. They also feared that a Conservative government might increase Britain's defense efforts and convert the ententes with France and Russia into full-fledged alliances directed against

[26] Koss, *Asquith*, 148–49.

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Germany. Even the German Navy Office recognized that a Conservative government might widen the gap in battleship strength between Germany and Britain. Consequently, general agreement existed within the German government that they should work to keep the Liberals in power in order to prevent a further deterioration in Anglo-German relations. To Chancellor Bülow, his successor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, and the German Foreign Office, arms control offered one avenue to reach that goal.[27]

Second, Bethmann Hollweg and the German Foreign Office thought that arms control talks might be exploited to improve Germany's diplomatic position by disrupting Britain's ententes with France and Russia. The German Foreign Office reasoned that negotiations provided a means for extracting political concessions from Britain that would effectively detach Britain from any coalition directed against Germany. In an important memorandum on Anglo-German relations, the political director of the German Foreign Office, Wilhelm von Stumm, explicitly put forward the case for this linkage in early September 1908. "I am inclined to think," Stumm wrote, "although I appear to be stating a paradox, that the British anxiety about the development of our fleet may facilitate the conclusion of an agreement. The . . . nervousness with which all England watches the growth of our forces at sea, the heavy financial burdens imposed by the attempt to be twice as strong as ourselves . . . these considerations seem to me to show that our naval policy gives us a valuable trump card in relation to England." Stumm argued that British policy makers might see a wide-ranging political settlement with Germany as offering a solution to the strategic problem posed by the German battle fleet.[28] A policy of linkage might break the threatened encirclement of Germany by a British-led coalition.

Third, arms control could regularize and legitimize Germany's rise as the world's second largest naval power both at home and abroad. Tirpitz recognized that his task of justifying the battle fleet at home might be strengthened by an arms control agreement. In the spring of 1909, in response to Chancellor Bülow's requests for the navy's views on arms control, Tirpitz advocated a four-to-three ratio between Britain and Germany in capital-ship construction as part of an agreement. Indeed, he pushed Bülow to propose this ratio in negotiation. No doubt Tirpitz's zeal for arms control negotiations in this instance was that it would help him in achieving his goal of building a fleet of sixty large armored ships by laying down three new ships each year. Tirpitz tried this ploy again in 1911, when he and Kaiser Wilhelm argued that Germany needed a public standard of strength to justify its building programs. They thought that a three-to-two ratio with regard to Britain would serve this purpose, and they intended to write that ratio into the amendment to the navy law that was being prepared in the autumn of that year. The German navy secretary was not proposing any reduction in the German program, only an agreement that codified his own plans for fleet

[27] Lambi, *Navy and German Power Politics*, 283, 295–301.
[28] Cited in Woodward, *Britain and German Navy*, 178–179.

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expansion.[29] Tirpitz wanted to justify his own programs rather than reach a compromise settlement with Britain on ways to limit the naval competition.

Fourth, arms control provided Germany with an opportunity to restrain British naval building programs. After 1912, Tirpitz faced stiff domestic political opposition to his building program, and he saw arms control as a means to slow down British shipbuilding efforts. Faced by the prospect that Germany might fall behind in the competition, Tirpitz had an extra incentive in promoting arms control schemes. At the time of the Haldane mission in early 1912, he proposed that a three-to-two ratio should govern the overall relationship between the two fleets. Under this arms control proposal, Germany's fleet program would remain unhindered, while Britain's building would be constrained.

Obstacles in the Way of an Agreement

Although strong incentives existed for both Britain and Germany to conclude an arms control agreement, a number of serious obstacles also stood in the way. In both countries a determined opposition to arms control existed. Indeed, negotiations triggered intense intragovernmental political struggles over foreign policy and strategy in Britain and Germany. These struggles highlighted the fundamental political and strategic choices open to British and German decision makers. The conclusion of an agreement required that proponents of arms control in both countries win their bureaucratic battles.

Opposition in Britain

Despite the ascendancy of the Liberal party, there was considerable opposition to arms control in Britain. Leading the charge against arms control were the senior permanent staff of the Foreign Office and Britain's leading professional diplomats. The permanent undersecretaries, Sir Charles Hardinge and Sir Arthur Nicolson, the senior clerk Eyre Crowe, Ambassadors Sir Edward Goschen in Berlin and Sir Francis Bertie in Paris were of a like mind in seeing great danger in these negotiations. Stated simply, their view was that Britain faced a German drive for hegemony in Europe that needed to be met by strengthening the ententes with France and Russia. In their opinion, Germany's goal in presenting a naval

[29] A. von Tirpitz, *Der Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht* (Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung, 1924), 213–224. Tirpitz is not unusual in wanting to use arms control as a vehicle for supporting his own arms programs; his scheme illustrated the conclusion reached by Carnesale and Haass that "all of the [superpower] arms control agreements examined . . . were consistent with existing military force structures—that is, none required substantial changes in the nature or size of those forces." See *Superpower Arms Control*, 342–4.

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challenge to Britain was to break apart these ententes, and an arms control agreement would only play into German hands. The Foreign Office demanded that an arms control agreement result in a German surrender in the naval competition. Nicolson argued that Britain must demand from Germany "a real reduction of expenditure on armaments and an undertaking that they will not continue to contest our supremacy—in fact . . . that they will withdraw the challenge."[30]

Indeed, when the Haldane mission of February 1912 substantially improved the chances for an arms control agreement, the Foreign Office senior officials and the ambassadors in Paris and Berlin waged a desperate behind-the-scenes battle to prevent it. Nicolson wrote Bertie: "I am doing my best to get us out of the quagmire . . . into which we are plunged and into which we have been led by our unscrupulous adversaries and our singularly naive and feeble negotiators."[31] Bertie's attempts to elicit French pressure on his own government against the negotiations show the extent to which Britain's professional diplomats would go to prevent an arms control agreement.[32] With a sigh of relief, the Foreign Office greeted the collapse of negotiations in April. Goschen rejoiced that they failed and sent congratulations from Berlin to Nicolson for his role in frustrating an agreement.[33]

But the Foreign Office was not alone in standing against an accord; the Admiralty also had serious reservations. Although not as opposed as the Foreign Office to the concept of arms control negotiations with Germany, Churchill's terms for an agreement required a substantial reduction in the German building program. When Lord Haldane returned from Berlin in February 1912 with the outline of an Anglo-German agreement, Churchill was quick to point out that a proposed amendment to Germany's navy law would greatly increase British naval estimates by raising the German battle fleets' readiness. By contending that arms control would produce no savings—indeed, increased naval estimates would be required—the Admiralty greatly undermined the efforts of those pushing for an agreement. Like many of those who opposed the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) process during the debate in the United States over arms control during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the critics of an Anglo-German understanding

[30] Arthur Nicolson to Grey, 18 February 1912, Nicolson MSS, Foreign Office file 800/353, Public Records Office. Nicolson clearly feared the danger that arms control negotiations with Germany posed for the maintenance of the ententes. At a dinner party in 1911, he responded to the rather innocuous comment by a dinner companion—namely, that it was a pity Anglo-German relations could not be put on better footing—by "jumping up as if he had been stung," and stating emphatically "that as long as *he* was at the head of the F[oreign]. O[ffice]., England should never, never be friends with Germany!" Lady Victoria Wester Wemyss, *The Life and Letters of Lord Wester Wemyss* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1935), 127–128.

[31] Nicolson to Bertie, 6 April 1912, Bertie MSS, Foreign Office file 800/171, Public Records Office.

[32] John F. V. Keiger, *France and the Origins of the First World War* (New York: St. Martin's, 1983), 108–109. Also see *BD*, vi, numbers 563, 564, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, pp. 735–739, 740–745.

[33] Goschen to Nicolson, 20 April 1912, *BD*, vi, no. 579, pp. 750–1.

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on naval shipbuilding buttressed their position by arguing that the proposed agreement did not go nearly far enough in diminishing the burden and risk of the competition.[34]

Reaching Agreement on Relative Force Levels

The negotiation of an arms control agreement between Britain and Germany required that a way be found for regulating the capital-ship strengths of the two battle fleets. Perhaps the best chance to reach an agreement on this issue rested on an acceptance of a three-to-two ratio in their annual rate of new construction of capital ships. At one time or another between 1908 and 1914, each side broached this ratio to the other as forming the basis for an agreement.

In Britain, Lloyd George championed this ratio for new construction. He first suggested it to the German Ambassador Metternich in July 1908, and he argued for it again during the negotiations in the spring of 1912. Lloyd George reasoned that this ratio provided for Britain's security requirements, while a greater level of superiority would be considered a provocation by other countries and spur the naval competition.[35]

Across the North Sea, however, German decision makers rejected this ratio when Lloyd George first proposed it in 1908, because it threatened their building program, which then called for the annual construction of four capital ships. This ratio also ran counter to Tirpitz's long-range goal of starting three new large armored ships each year. Tirpitz feared that arms control might lull Germany into building at a rate of only two capital ships a year, which effectively meant the reduction of the fleet program by a third, from sixty large armored ships to forty. The German Navy Office thus viewed with suspicion a three-to-two ratio in battleship construction.[36]

Only in the winter of 1911–1912, when Tirpitz encountered considerable domestic political opposition to his proposed building program, did he change his tune and become more amenable to an understanding on the basis of a three-to-two ratio. Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg and Adolf Wermuth, the imperial treasury secretary, were determined to restrain Germany's battleship building. This opposition from within the government hurt Tirpitz's prospects for obtaining his cherished goal of starting the construction of three large ships each year. Faced with a slowdown in German construction, Tirpitz now aimed at curtailing British building. But it should be emphasized that, while Tirpitz accepted a three-to-two ratio as the basis for an agreement in early 1912, he envisioned any

[34] I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer of this article for suggesting this parallel.

[35] Michael G. Fry, *Lloyd George and Foreign Policy* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977), 169–175.

[36] V. R. Berghahn, *Germany and the Approach of War in 1914* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), 118.

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agreement as lasting for only six years, and the total capital ship strength of the German fleet would remain untouched. The pact he proposed, then, was at best a truce.

Another difficulty with the three-to-two ratio in relative capital-ship strength was that many advocates of naval preparedness in Britain considered it inadequate to safeguard their country's security. The two-to-one ratio was preferred by the opposition Unionists and by patriotic associations such as the Navy League. Some advocates of naval superiority called for an even higher standard of British naval strength.[37] Although the Admiralty's requests appear modest in comparison to these calls by extreme advocates of naval superiority, it also considered a three-to-two ratio as inadequate. In March 1912, in presenting the navy estimates to Parliament, Churchill announced that Britain's building standard was a 60 percent superiority over Germany, so long as Germany built only two new battleships each year. Moreover, if Germany started building additional capital ships as a consequence of an amendment to its navy law, Britain would outbuild these added ships at a rate of two-to-one. Thus, in any year that Germany started building three battleships, Britain would start five. By publicly committing itself to maintaining this standard of naval strength over Germany, the Admiralty complicated the negotiations going on with Berlin.[38]

These British demands for superiority infuriated many German decision makers. It was the goal of the German Navy Office to close the gap in capital-ship strength between the two fleets by an ambitious building program. This would enable the German fleet to have a chance to win a naval battle in the North Sea or, at the very least, ensure that Britain achieved nothing more than a Pyrrhic victory. While Germany's civilian leaders frequently disagreed with the navy's leadership about their building program and the conduct of arms control negotiations, they proved no more willing to concede an overwhelming British preponderance at sea than did the admirals. Bethmann Hollweg undoubtedly wanted a political understanding with Britain; he was even willing to concede to British demands for a larger battle fleet.[39] Nonetheless, he thought that British requirements for naval security were exorbitant. He made this point clear in a speech about arms control to the Reichstag: "England is convinced, and has repeatedly declared that, notwithstanding all her wishes for a limitation of armaments and for the composition of disputes by arbitral procedure, her Fleet must in all circumstances be a match for, or even superior to, any possible combination in the

[37] See, for example, Gerard Fiennes, *The Ocean Empire* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, n.d. [1911]), 14–15.

[38] Bethmann Hollweg complained that "Churchill's speech did not come up to my expectations. He really seems to be a firebrand past praying for . . . my opinion is that our labours will now have to be dropped altogether for some time." Arthur J. Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), i, 285.

[39] Bethmann Hollweg agreed to the British precondition for the opening of negotiations that naval superiority be "recognized as essential to Great Britain." See the British message to the German government, carried by Cassel to Berlin in late January 1912, in *GP*, xxxi, 98.

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world. To aim at this state of things is England's perfect right . . . but it is quite a different matter to make such a claim into the basis of an agreement which by peaceful assent is to be accepted by other Powers."[40]

Germany's leaders repeatedly pointed out that they did not call for this measure of superiority over the armies of France and Russia. Moreover, in the wake of Churchill's pronouncements on British shipbuilding policy, Tirpitz did not think that Britain would actually accept a three-to-two ratio. In his memoirs, Tirpitz stated that had Britain accepted as a first step the three-to-two ratio in fleet strength, Germany would then consider making reductions in the total number of capital ships to be built under the fleet law. He bitterly complained, however, that Britain rejected its own earlier proposal on fleet ratios, and this showed that British decision makers were not seriously interested in arms control. Instead, it was his opinion that British decision makers would not accept anything less than a two-to-one superiority of their battle fleet, and Britain's real objective was to limit Germany's construction to only one or occasionally two capital ships each year.[41] As long as Kaiser Wilhelm, Bethmann Hollweg, and Tirpitz refused to consider significant reductions in the German naval program, it was unlikely that any ratio could have been found to regulate the rivalry in shipbuilding.[42] That both sides shifted their views about the three-to-two ratio during the course of these negotiations supports Robert Jervis's contention that cooperation between potential adversaries is hindered by the fact that decision makers often reevaluate and change their bargaining proposals.[43]

Rechanneling

The Anglo-German naval rivalry in capital-ship construction was qualitative as well as quantitative.[44] Even if agreement had been reached on relative numerical limits, the issue of controlling the qualitative rivalry in capital ships would have remained, much as the 1972 interim agreement of SALT I froze the number of strategic launchers possessed by each side but failed to halt qualitative improvements like multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). There is every likelihood that the qualitative competition in capital ships would have continued, since both sides were building ever larger, more heavily gunned battleships—what the noted naval architect Sir William White called the "Cult of the

[40] Woodward, *Britain and the German Navy*, 304.

[41] Grand-Admiral [Alfred] von Tirpitz, *My Memoirs* (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1919), i, 223–4.

[42] On the difficulties of establishing unequal force ratios, see Kruzel, "Rush-Bagot to START," 210–2; and Carnesale and Haass, *Superpower Arms Control*, 330-3.

[43] Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," 328.

[44] On the distinction between quantitative and qualitative arms races, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," *Public Policy* 8 (1958): 48–50, 65–79.

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Monster Warship."[45] Britain, for example, began construction of three generations of capital ships within the ten-year period between 1904 and 1914—the so-called dreadnoughts, superdreadnoughts, and fifteen-inch gunned battleships.[46] An effective arms control regime would need to address this qualitative component of the capital-ship competition, otherwise the rivalry would only have been channeled in the direction of larger displacements and heavier guns.

Perhaps the best opportunity to put a limit on this qualitative competition in capital ships occurred in 1906–1907, the immediate aftermath of the launching of the *Dreadnought*. During that period, President Theodore Roosevelt argued for limiting the size of capital ships, suggesting that they should be limited to 15,000-tons displacement. Like the suggestions for a MIRV ban during SALT I, this would have imposed a severe restraint on qualitative improvements. But no other power was interested in this type of ban. Because it possessed a commanding lead in this new type of capital ship, Britain was not willing to trade away its advantage. More surprisingly, Germany did not support Roosevelt's initiative, even though the U.S. president wanted Germany to cosponsor the proposal. Wilhelm and Tirpitz refused, however, because they did not want to lag behind Britain in the construction of large armored ships. This was without a doubt a great lost opportunity for German diplomacy.[47]

In addition to changes in capital ship design, important changes were also taking place in other naval weapons. Destroyers grew in size and displacement and developed the capability to keep up on the high seas with capital ships. These crafts became an essential component of the battle fleet, providing a defensive screen to capital ships and possessing the offensive capability to strike with torpedoes at an opposing force. Of course, in addition to the destroyer, the submarine, mine, and torpedo were changing operational doctrines and altering strategic calculations of the naval balance. These developments posed a serious problem for arms control. While capital ships, which were the unit of count in arms control discussions, might be limited, smaller craft were more difficult to restrict. Indeed, an agreement to limit capital ships might have rechanneled the

[45] W. H. White, "The Cult of the Monster Warship," *The Nineteenth Century and After* 63 (June 1908): 903–925.

[46] On British capital-ship design in this era, see the excellent study by Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *In Defence of Naval Supremacy* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989); and Charles H. Fairbanks, "Choosing among Technologies in the Anglo-German Naval Arms Competition, 1898–1915," in William B. Cogar, ed., *Naval History* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1988), 127–42.

[47] Tirpitz apparently soon had second thoughts about the wisdom of rejecting out of hand limitations on the size and guns of capital ships, because in early 1908 he made an unofficial attempt to canvass the views of Britain's Admiralty on this issue. Britain's first sea lord, Admiral Sir John Fisher rebuffed the attempt: "Tell him [that is, Tirpitz] I'll see him d—d first!" Marder, *Fear God and Dread Nought*, 164. But Britain also became interested by 1914 in limiting increases in the size of capital ships. In a memorandum on arms control, dated 20 May 1914, Churchill argued that this issue should be on the agenda in future arms control discussions with Germany. "Even if numbers could not be touched," Churchill thought, "a limitation in the size would be a great saving, and is on every ground to be desired." See Randolph S. Churchill, *Winston S. Churchill* (London: Heinemann, 1969), vol. 3, 1978.

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competition into smaller warships. The results of the Washington Conference of 1921–1922 suggest that this type of rechanneling would have been very likely. The world's leading naval powers reached a major agreement to curtail their construction of capital ships. However, it did not end their naval rivalries, which continued in those types of warships—in particular, large cruisers—that were not limited.

The 1912 amendment to German navy law illustrates the difficulties in preventing this type of rechanneling. This amendment permitted substantial increases in the operational readiness of the German battle fleet. Instead of keeping only two squadrons or seventeen battleships ready for service without prior mobilization, the amendment increased the number of deployed battleships to twenty-five. This 50 percent increase in readiness alarmed the British Admiralty.[48] Even with an arms control agreement dealing with battleships, the naval competition might have only been rechanneled into one that emphasized operational readiness, technological innovation, and smaller combatants, thereby doing little to overcome the mutual fears about surprise attack held by decision makers on both sides of the North Sea.

Germany could also have rechanneled any savings in naval spending toward enlarging the strength of its army. Indeed, in his intergovernmental struggle with Tirpitz, Bethmann Hollweg actually encouraged this type of rechanneling: the chancellor asked the War Ministry to request increases in spending for the army. By seeking to play the army off against the navy in budgetary battles, Bethmann Hollweg sought to reduce the funds available for further naval construction. From Britain's perspective, this type of rechanneling was almost as dangerous as Germany's shipbuilding, since the German army might increase its strength relative to France.[49] Because Britain did not rely on conscription for raising its armed forces, it could deploy only a relatively small army to assist France on the continent against Germany. To match German army increases, Britain would need to resort to conscription in peacetime—an almost unthinkable political proposition for a Liberal government. Consequently, it was not in Britain's interest to see this type of rechanneling, and Grey and the permanent staff of the Foreign Office were determined to resist Germany's attempt to use an arms control pact to rechannel its resources. As Grey shrewdly (and accurately) put it, Tirpitz's proposal in early 1913 for a tacit arms control agreement was not put forward for "the love of our beautiful eyes, but the extra 50 millions required for increasing the German army."[50]

[48] Marder, *Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*, i, 272–310.

[49] On this, see the provocative article by Donald Kagan, "World War I, World War II, World War III," *Commentary* 83 (March 1987): 24–5.

[50] Richard Langhorne, "The Naval Question in Anglo-German Relations, 1912–1914," *Historical Journal* 14 (June 1971): 363.

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The German Navy's Opposition to Arms Control

Within the German government, Tirpitz and his Navy Office presented the most formidable bureaucratic obstacle to arms control. Although he was willing to use arms control negotiations to bolster his fleet programs or restrain British building, Tirpitz was fundamentally opposed to the arms reductions proposed by Britain. Indeed, Tirpitz would probably have resigned before going along with an arms reduction agreement. Given that an arms control agreement might actually have improved Germany's international political position and provided concrete operational advantages, the question needs to be asked: Why was Tirpitz so opposed to the British proposals?

One factor was that Tirpitz thought that the overall naval balance was turning against Britain. According to Tirpitz: "Every warship constructed anywhere in the world except in England was ultimately an advantage for us because it helped to adjust the balance of power at sea."[51] In the long run, Tirpitz thought that Britain could not maintain its traditional hegemony at sea in the face of this worldwide building of modern battleships, and it would be forced as a consequence to concede Germany's demand for parity in the North Sea.

A second factor was that Tirpitz thought that Germany stood a realistic chance of achieving rough parity in battle-fleet strength with Britain. Tirpitz called the building of a German battle fleet the work of a generation, and he consistently took a long-range view. Germany was building toward a fleet of sixty capital ships over a twenty-year period, and Britain would be hard-pressed to outbuild this force. By forcing the competition to these larger numbers of capital ships, the German navy's leadership thought that Britain's naval superiority would erode to the point where parity was achieved in the North Sea. Given the cost to Britain of outbuilding Germany and the likely demands on British naval strength worldwide, Tirpitz's estimations are not inconceivable, so long as the German program remained at an annual three tempo in battleship construction and a general war was avoided. Germany's naval leaders thus preferred a diplomatic deadlock in arms control in order to permit this gradual shift in the naval balance to take place.[52]

A third factor was that Tirpitz feared arms control might call into question the domestic political consensus within Germany for the building of a battle fleet. He maintained that Britain's arms control efforts aimed "at sickening us of the fleet, and at picking holes in the Navy Bill, if possible in order to wreck it." The Haldane mission, in Tirpitz's estimation, was a cunning attempt by British diplomacy to "disconcert us in the building of the fleet, and at the same time widen the split in the [German] Government."[53] He also thought that Churchill's

[51] Tirpitz, *Memoirs*, i, 178.
[52] See Downs, Rocke, and Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," 122–27.
[53] Tirpitz, *Memoirs*, i, 208, 215.

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public appeal for a naval holiday was an attempt to raise opposition within the Reichstag to German naval expansion.[54]

The opposition of Tirpitz was a serious impediment to arms control, because the intragovernmental politics of Wilhelmine Germany magnified his importance in decision making about strategy and foreign policy. The German navy secretary was a master at bureaucratic empire building and a formidable turf fighter in the domestic politics of Wilhelmine Germany. Indeed, Tirpitz was a brilliant politician, whose skills can be readily seen in the Reichstag, where his naval legislation consistently passed with solid majorities. Within the service, he was just as ruthless in crushing dissent to his battle-fleet dogma on the naval staff and in the fleet commands. Of course, in his battles with domestic political opponents and within the service, Tirpitz had the inestimable advantage of invariably possessing the support of Kaiser Wilhelm.

Trying to defeat such a skillful politician severely tested the ability of Chancellors Bülow and Bethmann Hollweg to control the government's foreign and defense policies. To overcome Tirpitz's opposition to arms control, Bethmann Hollweg was forced to use extreme measures, including the threat of resignation. He even sought to enlist British help: he instructed Stumm of the German Foreign Office to tell Lord Haldane that he should take a hard line against increases in Germany's shipbuilding during the negotiations with Tirpitz and Wilhelm.[55] The chancellor's determination to defeat Tirpitz's obstruction provided the opportunity for serious negotiations with Britain during the opening months of 1912. Bureaucratically isolated, Tirpitz could not count on obtaining his proposed naval increases. Because of Tirpitz's domestic political isolation, the negotiations surrounding the Haldane mission offered perhaps the best prospect for an arms control agreement between Britain and Germany. But this opportunity was not to last for long, and it soon vanished on account of linkage.

Linkage

The negotiations to establish ratios for the construction of new capital ships could not be divorced from the political and strategic alignments of the great powers. The fear of losing naval superiority to Germany helped drive Britain's diplomacy of strengthening the ententes with France and Russia, the alliance with Japan, and the close ties with the United States. If any of these states formed a naval alliance with Germany, Britain's naval strength might be overstretched. To British decision makers, their country's naval security was closely linked to the preservation of the diplomacy of the ententes.

[54] Berghahn, *Germany and Approach to War*, 129. Berghahn argues that since the building of the battle fleet was intended to stabilize Germany's domestic politics, Tirpitz feared that the holiday scheme might result in increased social unrest.

[55] Diary of Haldane's visit, *BD*, vi, no. 506, p. 682.

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It was this system of ententes, however, that Germany wanted to disrupt. Bethmann Hollweg and the German Foreign Office consciously linked arms control to improving Germany's position in world politics. It was their assessment that the threat posed by building a battle fleet would bring Britain to make a political and colonial agreement on Germany's terms. According to the logic of this assessment, any slackening of German building would only result in taking the pressure off Britain to negotiate seriously. Thus, there remained the fundamental question of the timing and relationship of any political and naval agreements with Britain. To Tirpitz there was no question that Britain must sign a political agreement before Germany would alter its fleet building plans. In his view: "First, 'detente' and then 'entente' in the political field, then an agreement for disarmament, but not in the reverse order, first, military weakening and then vague promises for better treatment."[56] Wilhelm agreed that the price for an arms control agreement must be a far-reaching political pact between Britain and Germany. This view of linkage played upon the worst fears of British decision makers that Germany sought to bring about a diplomatic realignment in Europe and politically isolate Britain.

Bethmann Hollweg also needed to obtain a far-reaching political settlement with Britain in order to retain the support of Kaiser Wilhelm in the struggle with Tirpitz. Wilhelm wanted what amounted to an entente with Britain in return for a reduction of Germany's shipbuilding. Linkage was forced on Bethmann Hollweg, whether he liked it or not, by Wilhelm's insistence on it and the chaotic structure of the German system of government. These arms control negotiations thus illustrate the weakness of the Prussian-German system of government that in the absence of a strong-willed chancellor like Otto von Bismarck did not provide for the effective coordination of the policies pursued by its various departments. Wilhelm became the arbiter of policy disputes, and he proved incapable of providing long-term coherence to Germany's naval and diplomatic efforts. As a result, the navy's goals were not subordinated to achieve larger political objectives. Indeed, Tirpitz used arms control to bolster the parochial bureaucratic interests of the Navy Office, which was pursuing in effect its own foreign policy. As Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg remarked: "For Tirpitz the Navy is an end in itself."[57]

Conclusion

This case highlights the importance of the overall political and strategic relationship of the participants in determining the outcome of arms control negotiations.

[56] Marder, *Dreadnought to Scapa Flow*, i, 173.

[57] Kaiser, "Germany and Origins of World War I," 457, n. 46.

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As Paul Kennedy has observed: "At the root of the naval race lay two conflicting assertions about the contemporary strategic balance and the world order."[58] These fundamental differences in the foreign policy objectives and strategic views of Britain and Germany were illustrated in their arms control negotiations, which became trials of strength between the two countries.

British decision makers wanted to remove Germany's naval threat to their security. They resented Germany's naval challenge, and the Liberal government wanted arms control to solve the twin problems of reducing Britain's vulnerability to the German battle fleet and the burden of spending on naval defense. The Liberal government's goal of substantial reductions in naval spending meant that it wanted not arms control but arms reductions. An agreement that codified planned programs was simply inadequate to meet the Liberals' demands. In effect, their call for arms reduction was not different from the goal of the Admiralty and Foreign Office that Germany withdraw its naval challenge.

On the other side of the North Sea, Germany's leaders wanted to develop a powerful battle fleet as an instrument of political coercion against Britain. Wilhelm and Tirpitz held to the view that Germany's future standing in world politics was linked to its naval building programs. In their opinion, arms control meant more than putting constraints on weapons programs: it signified placing limits on Germany's aspirations to achieve the status of a world power. British efforts to promote arms control were considered attempts to thwart Germany's political ambitions.

As a consequence, Germany's leaders failed to recognize some of the opportunities presented by the arms control talks to improve their country's overall strategic position. Tirpitz and the Navy Office in particular were not attuned to the strategic benefits that might accrue to Germany from arms control. To Tirpitz, the path to weakening Britain's position as a world power was through shipbuilding and not by using the battleships under construction in Germany as bargaining chips in arms control negotiations. Tirpitz played the role of a master builder of naval armaments and not that of a statesman who could translate Germany's growing naval power into an improved international position. Although Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg and the German Foreign Office proved more flexible in their diplomacy toward Britain, they too were not really prepared to concede very much in curtailing German building programs as part of an arms control agreement. Because Germany's leaders failed to integrate the Navy Office's shipbuilding program with the diplomatic efforts of the chancellor and the German Foreign Office, they squandered the opportunities that emerged in the arms control talks with Britain.

Since the leaders of both countries had defined their political and strategic aims in such stark terms, there was little prospect for arms control to reduce the naval competition and promote a general improvement in Anglo-German

[58] Kennedy, *Anglo-German Antagonism*, 418.

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relations. For these talks to have succeeded, both sides needed to moderate their security demands: Britain accepting less than the complete defeat of the German naval challenge; Berlin reducing its shipbuilding program and abandoning its heavy-handed attempts to demolish the British ententes with France and Russia. Mutual restraint in naval armaments programs foundered on the inability of either side to accept these more limited objectives.

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Book Reviews

The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order *by Samuel P. Huntington. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996. 367 pp. $26.00.*

No one has ever accused Samuel Huntington of intellectual timidity. So it is not surprising that his response to the widespread criticisms of his 1993 article in *Foreign Affairs* is a book-length treatment of the subject that removes the question mark after the "clash of civilizations" and elaborates its implications. His critics are not likely to be persuaded, but I cannot imagine a reader coming away without rethinking many accepted ideas.

For Huntington, much of the future of world politics and a considerable part of its past can be understood as conflict among differing civilizations and, to a lesser extent, cooperation among peoples within the same civilization. Identifying civilizations is not easy, and there is plenty of room to quarrel with Huntington's selection of nine of them, as he admits. Although there are important differences within it, a civilization shares general values, customs, ways of life, and, perhaps most importantly, religion – all the items that make up a culture: "Civilizations are the biggest 'we' within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all the other 'thems' out there" (p. 43). This leads to conflict, because people have psychological and political needs for enemies, in part to mark their own identities.

Huntington then disputes several more popular views. First, he argues that those who see the crucial division as being between "the West vs. the rest" or "rich vs. poor" both fail to see the splits within the latter groupings and overestimate the centrality of economic interests. Second, he denies that increasing transportation, communication, and economic development will lead to a world of common values and customs. Modernization does not mean Westernization. Third, he does not see the dominance of democracy leading to world peace. Not only are many cultures, especially Islam, hostile to democracy, but greater participation often overthrows Westernized elites. Finally, his view clashes with Realism, which sees nation-states as the most important units around which conflict and cooperation revolve. Interestingly enough, his rejection of a materialistic view, which looms so large in liberal thought, has much in common with constructivist scholars who stress the importance of identity and culture. But while the latter see hope for greater peace, equality, and cooperation through changing how people see the world and themselves, Huntington believes that these conceptions are so deeply rooted in individual psyches and societies that the only way to change them would be for one culture to seek world domination.

Huntington has a few words to say about each civilization, but his focus is on the West, Islam, and East Asia, especially what he calls the Sinic culture (which does not include Japan, a culture of its own). His descriptions here are more widely shared than his general argument, although of course specialists will find the treatment stereotyped. Huntington foresees an increase in the power of the East Asian civilizations and continuing conflict

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between Muslims and others, especially Westerners. He supports his much attacked claim that "Islam has bloody borders" with significant but not overwhelming data and interesting lines of argument, including discussion of the tendency for Muslims to identify most closely with either small units such as families, clans, or tribes or the entire Islamic civilization, with only relatively weak attachments to states.

The fact that Huntington clearly prefers Western values and culture does not mean that he thinks we should seek to impose them on others. Indeed, he vigorously criticizes those who think that the inherent superiority of Western society will lead others to ape it. Thus one of his policy prescriptions is that world peace can be best achieved by a form of spheres of influence arrangement under which leading states provide order within their own civilizations but do not interfere elsewhere. Thus the West should unify, welcome all regimes that share its culture (such as Croatia), stop trying to maintain multicultural states (such as Bosnia), and give up the dream of Western universalism, the pursuit of which can only turn into a nightmare. But having earlier rebutted the thesis that American material power is declining, he is now not optimistic, seeing America as suffering social decline in part because of the acceptance of multiculturalism, a claim whose familiarity gains little plausibility in the brief retelling here.

We are sure to see a large literature contesting Huntington's views. While he is clearly correct that "torn" countries that contain different civilizations are especially likely to undergo long and bloody civil wars and that "fault line wars" are likely where civilizations meet, he downplays international and civil wars within civilizations (for example, the Iran-Iraq war, the genocide in Cambodia, Burundi, and Rwanda) and loads the dice a bit by interpreting a number of questionable cases (Ethiopia, Sri Lanka) as intercivilizational conflicts and by claiming a separate civilization for each of the most important countries in East Asia (Russia, China, Japan, India, and the United States), thus meaning that any conflict in that area will be between civilizations. Furthermore, the links among identity, ethnicity, culture, and religion are not entirely clear; and the power of these factors to influence the definition of interest may be exaggerated.

The public attention *Clash of Civilizations* has received was not purchased by sacrificing scholarship. Even if Huntington overstates the importance of culture and religion, the factors he points to deserve—indeed demand—more consideration.

ROBERT JERVIS
Columbia University

Friends or Rivals? The Insider's Account of U.S.-Japan Relations *by Michael H. Armacost. New York, Columbia University Press, 1996. 271 pp. $24.95.*

Michael H. Armacost was U.S. ambassador to Japan from 1989 to 1993. In this book, Armacost, who is now president of the Brookings Institution, reflects on American-Japanese relations during those years, briefly evaluates the Clinton policy toward Japan, and makes a few predictions about the future of the relationship. Among the issues Armacost explores, often in sedulous detail, is the sharp trade imbalance between the two nations, the equally sharp imbalance between American and Japanese obligations for mutual security, U.S. pressure on Japan to help finance the Gulf War against Iraq, and the evolution of a so-called global partnership between the United States and Japan during the Bush administration. By mid-1995, Armacost concludes, the partnership had neither foundered nor triumphed altogether: while

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the relationship "remained vital to both countries" and some agreement had been achieved on trade, environmental, and Asian issues, the "psychological underpinnings" of the partnership were uncertain, and "few thoughtful Americans and Japanese could take the future of the bilateral relationship for granted" (p. 195).

Armacost could hardly be accused of appeasing the Japanese. He spoke to them bluntly about the impediments placed in the way of U.S. exports to Japan, and he attempted to subvert the Japanese bureaucracy by taking his case directly to political and business leaders he felt might sympathize with his position. The Japanese press dubbed him "Gaiatsu-san," or Mr. Foreign Pressure (p. 68). In fact, the Japanese could have done far worse. More than members of Congress who bashed Japan for peccadilloes real and imagined, Armacost understood the need for tact and subtlety. He frequently admitted the failings of U.S. economic policy, including the lack of savings and investment, and the sloppiness with which American automakers approached the Japan market. Armacost was a diplomat's diplomat, who represented his country with determination while nevertheless respecting Japanese cultural and political sensitivities. (The only slightly false note on this score is a photograph of the ambassador presenting an official letter of congratulations to the Hawaii-born sumo wrestler Akebono, whom many nationalist Japanese regard as an interloper.)

Friends or Rivals? is written with admirable clarity, not elegance. Chapter outlines show through—Armacost is an unredeemed lister of reasons and factors—and the text contains little of a personal nature. The degree of detail in the book and its narrow chronological scope reduce somewhat the impact of its conclusions. Two in particular already require amendment. First, while Armacost focuses on the trade imbalance as a source of friction between the United States and Japan, that deficit fell from $5.3 billion in mid-1995 to $3.2 billion in mid-1996, by which time China had replaced Japan as the leading contributor to the U.S. trade gap. Second, much of Armacost's argument in favor of retaining a strong U.S. security commitment to Japan is based on the perceived military threat to the region from North Korea. Pyongyang's extraordinary apology for sending a spy submarine into South Korean waters, tendered on New Year's Eve 1996, suggests that North Korea may be tired of its pariah status in East Asia and may be moving toward a rapprochement with the capitalist powers. If that happens, would a powerful U.S. military presence in and around Japan still be necessary?

One last quibble: the book's title poses too stark a choice. Nations need not be just friends or just rivals; there is ample space between these possibilities. Armacost himself offers a useful comparison between American-Japanese and American-French relations. Neither Japan nor France will tolerate subordinate status, and neither can be expected to agree with the United States on every detail of policy. Yet, Armacost writes, disagreements with the French are rarely "cause for widespread speculation about the demise of our entire relationship. With Japan, too, we should strive for agreement where our interests permit, while learning to accept occasional disagreements without assuming they automatically place the relationship as a whole in jeopardy" (p. 251). A bit of rivalry need not destroy friendship, or at least a satisfactory living arrangement.

ANDREW J. ROTTER
Colgate University

Global Competition and Industrial Growth in Taiwan and the Philippines *by Chen-Tian Kuo. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995. 267 pp. $49.95.*

Kuo's book has blown a breath of badly needed fresh air into the increasingly stale debate on the determinants of East Asian economic dynamism, mainly between the developmental

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state and neoclassical theories. Using a skillfully crafted comparative analysis, Kuo built an alternative, convincing institutional explanation for the differential industrial performance of Taiwan and the Philippines. This is no small feat since any effort to construct a new explanation of East Asian economic development has to go up and challenge the dominating developmental state theory. Kuo made such an effort and largely succeeded.

In the introduction, Kuo mounted a multipronged attack on the developmental state theory by criticizing first, its ambiguous definition of state autonomy; second, its equation of autonomous state with authoritarian state without confirming the connection; third, its neglect of the autonomous state's potential rent-seeking tendency and negative impact on economic growth; fourth, its blind eye on the state potentially intervening too strongly in the market; fifth, its inconclusive documentation for the positive relationship between centralization and efficiency; and finally, its tautological argument about the relationship between a developmental leadership and economic development. This cogent criticism set the stage for Kuo to advance his institutional perspective.

Kuo compared the textile, plywood, and electronics industries in Taiwan and the Philippines for the period from the early 1950s to the late 1980s. He selected these three industries for their importance to both economies, their rough representativeness of the industrial sectors of both countries, and their comparability in terms of labor intensity and technology. These were well chosen cases in that they allowed Kuo to successfully elaborate the varied and complex applicability of clientelism, laissez-faire perspective and state corporatism to the cases across time periods. Although Kuo's thick description of the industries' organization and performance based on extensive and detailed newspaper accounts and business association publications may tax the reader's patience, he presents a succinct and lucid classificatory summary of the key findings. (See Tables 7-2 and 7-3.)

To highlight a couple of interesting results, the institutional base of Taiwan's textile industry shifted from clientelism in the 1950s to laissez faire in the 1980s, whereas clientelism in the Philippine textile industry in the 1950s deepened in the 1970s and early 1980s. This institutional metamorphosis, according to Kuo, largely accounted for the change of Taiwan's textile industry from mild growth in the 1950s to rapid decline in the 1980s and the shift of the Philippine textile industry from mild growth in the 1950s to stagnation in the 1970s and early 1980s. These results led Kuo to develop a conceptual synthesis of the existing theories of the political economy of development (p. 208) in which the developmental state is relegated to one corner position, while intermediate organizations (for example, business associations) and firms (both of which are Kuo's institutions) are identified as major actors.

Despite Kuo's accurate and powerful punching, the developmental state model will "hang around the ring as an established heavyweight." While Kuo should be commended for launching a bold and skilled attack, other more seasoned fighters have also joined the battle. In *Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation*, Peter Evans shows that the South Korean state has only become developmental when it is embedded in social networks and cooperates with important actors in civil society. The latter point was made and documented by Kuo as well. The excellent works by Kuo and Evans have helped create a more exciting combative environment in which to challenge the received wisdom of the developmental state and further a more sophisticated research agenda on the state and its role in economic development.

XIANGMING CHEN
University of Illinois at Chicago

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Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev *by Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1996. 346 pp. $29.95.*

It is a remarkable phenomenon, this book—the product of two young historians schooled under the Soviet system, but tempered by their independent minds and their later exposure to Western scholarship. Following their graduation from Moscow State University in the early 1980s, they were among the bright and skeptical young scholars attracted to the Institute of U.S. and Canada Studies in Moscow. The task they have set themselves—for which they were singularly well equipped—is to explore and interpret the recently declassified materials from Soviet party and government archives bearing on Soviet foreign policy from 1945 to 1962.

Based upon their extensive examination of these documents and of recently published memoirs and articles, as well as their own interviews with surviving former Soviet officials, they have created a volume that will fascinate and instruct general readers in the West. This is not a systematic history, but with its emphasis upon the human factors, with the interplay of personalities in selective episodes, and with the intuitive interpretations they drop along the way, they challenge the oversimplified stereotypes that have dominated much of the Western popular literature on the subject.

Specialists who have been following the declassified Soviet documents as they have been made available by the invaluable Yale University *Annals of Communism* series and the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars may find much of the material in the book familiar, and some of the interpretations debatable. But the book is well worth reading, both for the information it has assembled and for the many suggestive insights that should spark productive discussion.

The following passage from the concluding chapter conveys the essential balance and discrimination of the authors' judgment: "There is no blade of historical analysis sharp enough to separate the pragmatism of Soviet leaders (or their idealism) from their butchery, or their bold foreign policy steps from their moral and intellectual debauchery. All these leaders reflect the shades of Soviet totalitarian darkness.

"Yet the truth is that these men did not have a master plan for global domination. The most loathsome of them were closer to a cynical realpolitik than to the idea of world revolution" (p. 282).

It is perhaps unfortunate that the authors, influenced by Western political science, fall back on the formulation "revolutionary-imperial paradigm" to characterize the amalgam of ideology, great power expansionism, realpolitik, and primitive ignorance of the outside world that entered into the complex decision-making process at the center of the Soviet power structure. As an explanatory paradigm, it does not contribute much. What is interesting, however, is the contrast between the primitive miscalculations at the top, which repeatedly, although inadvertently, evoked the mobilization of the West, and the emergence of the "new elites" below. A growing number of competent technical specialists emerged as the Soviet society became a more advanced industrial society, which in time led from Nikita Khrushchev's Twentieth Congress in 1956 to the nucleus of Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to reform the system and its foreign policy thirty years later.

MARSHALL D. SHULMAN
Columbia University

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The Art of Bargaining *by Richard Ned Lebow. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 198 pp. $24.95.*

Perhaps the greatest strength of this work is that it places the act of bargaining within the context of a larger process, which begins before the parties actually negotiate and continues after an agreement has been reached. Thus, unlike many works on bargaining, this text does not assume that negotiation represents the best solution to a problem, nor does it assume that any problem can be resolved through negotiation. Instead, Lebow devotes the first four chapters of the book to a discussion of when one should *want* to negotiate and whether achieving a negotiated solution is feasible. Moreover, in Chapters 10 and 11, Lebow moves beyond the conclusion of agreements to discuss the obstacles to their ratification. Lebow concludes the work in Chapters 12 and 13 by discussing the possibility of misperception in bargaining and how such problems might be alleviated. The author's attention to the entirety of the bargaining process is impressive, and his policy prescriptions—especially with regard to ratification strategies—are useful.

Unfortunately, some of the book's strengths are undermined by a lack of explicit theorizing about the bargaining process. For example, most of Lebow's analysis appears to flow from a rational perspective on bargaining. Periodically, however, Lebow refers to nonrational influences on decision making, such as the importance of framing issues in terms of gains or losses and the role of emotions in determining behavior. These rather different perspectives on bargaining are never synthesized, nor does Lebow indicate how they relate to one another.

This problem is particularly evident in Chapters 5–9 on the bargaining interaction itself. For example, Lebow identifies three separate bargaining strategies—coordination, rewards, and punishments. But it is not clear that the strategy of coordination is conceptually distinct from the strategy of rewards. Both of these strategies appear to consist of identifying the preferences of the opposing party and making concessions toward its preferred resolution of the dispute. A more serious problem raised by the lack of an explicit theoretical framework is Lebow's failure to account sufficiently for the strategic nature of the bargaining encounter. In particular, although Lebow briefly notes that problems of asymmetric information create pervasive incentives to bluff in bargaining situations, he does not incorporate the implications of these incentives into his analysis.

A final problem with Chapters 5–9 is Lebow's lack of attention to strategies that mix rewards and punishments. The central debate in the bargaining literature concerns the conditions under which rewards and punishments will be effective and the proper timing of threats and rewards. For example, some have argued that it is best to begin the interaction by levying threats in order to show resolve and then to offer some face-saving concessions in order to allow the opponent to back out gracefully. Conversely, other theorists have contended that it is better to begin with cooperative moves and to engage in punishment only in response to aggressive behavior by the opponent. Surprisingly, Lebow does not address this central debate and dedicates only a few short pages to strategies that mix rewards and punishments.

Despite these problems, however, Lebow's work does present several improvements over existing texts on bargaining. In particular, the chapters on deciding whether one should engage in bargaining and the chapters on ratification and implementation cover ground often left out of courses on this topic. Moreover, the wide variety of examples and illustrations that Lebow draws upon make his work relevant to any subfield of political science. Consequently, I

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think this text can and will make a worthwhile contribution to graduate or undergraduate courses on bargaining.

CHRISTOPHER GELPI
Harvard University

The New American Voter *by Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1996. 640 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $19.95.*

This book is big in every way and will be required reading for scholars and students interested in American voting behavior. Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks provide an exemplary synthesis of their sweeping research based upon National Election Study (NES) survey data covering the 1980 to 1992 presidential elections. Readers familiar with survey analysis of NES data going back to 1952 will get the most out of the book; others should consult a friendly professor or graduate student, who can also clear up questions about the book's many multivariate tables. Using the classic analysis provided by the Survey Research Center's *The American Voter* (1960) as their reference point (and, ironically, timed just before the rerelease of *Star Wars* and its sequels), the authors emphasize the continuity and stability since the 1950s in what explains voter turnout and in voters' choices in presidential elections. More important, the book illuminates changes that have occurred in the electorate and how the authors have had to change course from *The American Voter*. While many of the book's findings are familiar, some will raise eyebrows.

Continuity and stability have been provided by party identification (whether voters simply think of themselves as Republicans, Democrats, or independents) which has remained most strongly related to candidate choice outside the South and has undergone only gradual, though significant, change since the 1950s, with an increase (long well known) in the proportions of independents and with Republican identifiers closing in on Democrats nationwide. The authors can point to the same important socioeconomic and demographic factors as in the past, though there are some important new effects of gender and of the more liberal "never married" category. Further, the process of generational replacement has been a strong and predictable source of change in voter turnout, with voters in each generation differing in levels of political participation because of their experiences at the time they entered the electorate.

The book's first seven of eighteen chapters, focusing on the importance of historical context and generation change, drive home one truly profound change: the replacement of the New Deal and World War II generation by the post-New Deal generation. What has been interpreted in survey cross sections as increased voting over the life cycle has actually been higher levels of participation among the historically distinctive New Deal cohorts who became and remained engaged in politics. Any decline in civic engagement that Robert Putnam has emphasized may simply reflect the passing of a particular generation (worthy, if any, of cloning), not a failing of social and political institutions. The authors can only hope in their concluding chapter that post-New Dealers can emulate them.

The authors have replaced the metaphorical "funnel of causality" explaining presidential candidate choice with a sharper empirical model involving six causal stages or blocs that give primacy to: voters' stable social and economic characteristics; party identification and relatively exogenous (and NES-developed) "policy-related predispositions"; current policy

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preferences and perceptions of the economy and other conditions; retrospective evaluations of the incumbent president; evaluations of candidates' personal qualities; and prospective evaluations of the candidates and their parties. The second half of the book systematically examines how all these factors mattered, some in complex or subtle ways, in the 1992 presidential election (with comparisons to 1988). The economy did do in George Bush above the strong and predictable power of party identification. But was this particularly critical for independent, middle-class swing voters? While the six sets of variables are not the only ones of substantive interest (where precisely do campaign-specific factors and the media come in?) and they are not derived deductively (sorry, formal theory fans), the variations in their effects across elections must be reckoned with in any future theories that might be developed.

The book includes a number of memorable findings and discussions. The authors argue sharply for one-way causal effects, especially for the classic effect of party identification on presidential vote. There is persuasive evidence for this outside the South, but this has to be examined further for voters showing changes in partisanship that suggest that the reverse effect has been at work in the South (and with women not duplicating the path of men), among blacks, among post-New Deal voters, among religiously committed Evangelical Protestants, and among nonreligious and "other" religion voters reacting against conservative fundamentalists, thus demonstrating how religion has evolved into a new cultural dimension in politics. The jury is also still out on whether the evaluations of incumbents and candidates are unaffected by voter choice and whether "policy predispositions" are indeed largely exogenous to preferences on current policy issues. But the authors are concerned with untangling processes more complex than those depicted in the original "funnel." They address their critics on reciprocal causation head on. In allowing for rationalization, persuasion, or projection effects between candidates and voters, they reject the past use of measures based on open-ended responses ("likes" and "dislikes") and other measurement pitfalls. Thus, just as new American voters have evolved from the old ones, so have the admirable books that have studied them.

ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO
Columbia University

What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters *by Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter. New Haven, Yale University Press. 1996. 397 pp. $38.50.*

The public's low level of political knowledge has been documented regularly for many decades, but few of the analyses have moved beyond simple lists of facts and the percentages of Americans who know them. In Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter's *What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters*, we now have a comprehensive examination of the public's knowledge about politics based on a number of studies, including a national survey that was designed specifically to investigate political information. Delli Carpini and Keeter not only describe and explain the public's command of the facts, but relate their findings to competing theories of democracy and to the political power of various class, racial, gender, and social groups as well. The result is a major contribution to our understanding of how the American public thinks about politics.

Delli Carpini and Keeter demonstrate that political knowledge plays a critical role in our system. They show that those who know more—older white males with good educations

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and high incomes—are better able to get what they want from government because they participate more and their behavior serves their self-interests more effectively than those who know less—women, the young, nonwhites, and those with poor educations and low incomes.

In the past, some observers have argued that these disparities in knowledge would be mitigated if political knowledge were multidimensional. That is, if people were issue specialists who did not know much about politics in general, but who knew a great deal about a few issues of relevance to them, then the overall differences in knowledge between groups would matter less. African Americans, for instance, might know a great deal about race-related policies or women might know about gender-related policies. Delli Carpini and Keeter persuasively show that this is not the case. They do find some evidence for "partially distinct" dimensions (p. 143), but they also find that the dimensions are highly correlated and that describing political knowledge as a single characteristic is not much of an exaggeration. In short, those who suffer disadvantages in one area of knowledge are also likely to suffer disadvantages in all other areas. The authors conclude that this finding "suggests that the pluralist model of democracy, at least as it applies to information about politics, is wrong" (p. 152).

Despite the breadth of Delli Carpini and Keeter's investigation, they have certainly not given us the last word on the subject. Their work raises a number of questions. Perhaps most perplexing to those of us who teach political science: why does college education increase political knowledge almost equally among students of all majors—from political science to biochemistry? If students were given a test of scientific literacy, we would surely expect physics and chemistry majors to score far higher than political science majors, so why do political science majors just slightly outscore students in unrelated disciplines in a test of political knowledge? Are we failing to teach our students?

Delli Carpini and Keeter's study answers many of our questions and raises many new ones. Overall, it should have a substantial impact on our discipline and go a long way toward establishing knowledge as a central explanatory variable in a wide range of behavioral investigations.

ERIC R. A. N. SMITH
University of California, Santa Barbara

Inequality by Design: Cracking the Bell Curve Myth *by Claude S. Fischer, Michael Hout, Martin Sanchez Jankowski, Samuel R. Lucas, Ann Swidler, and Kim Voss. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1996. 318 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper, $14.95.*

Social scientists concur that rising inequality is a central feature of the modern economy. There is less agreement on how to best explain increasing inequality and intense debate over how public policy should respond to it. Perhaps the most divisive (and arguably most distracting) entry into this debate is Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray's *The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life*. Accordingly, differences between the economic haves and have-nots mainly reflect differences in level of intelligence. The latter Herrnstein and Murray understand as substantially heritable and clearly differentiated by race, with blacks and Latinos falling short compared to whites and to Asians. They see the class structure as increasingly divided between a highly paid intelligent elite and a poorly paid less intelligent mass.

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With this argument, Herrnstein and Murray fired a loud and widely heard round in behalf of a deservedly ignominious tradition of research on the putative natural bases of social inequality. Many believe that sociology is at its best when debunking conventional wisdom, perhaps especially so when it rebuts simplistic ideas cloaked in the heavy armor of modern social science. Fischer, Hout, Jankowski, Lucas, Swidler, and Voss do exactly this in their convincing dismissal of *The Bell Curve*. *Inequality by Design* shows that each core element of Herrnstein and Murray's argument is false: intelligence is not a singular construct; as measured, intelligence is far more a product of schooling content and of family of origin material resources than it is of genes; measured IQ plays a trivial role in the overall extent of inequality and how individuals are allocated to positions of privilege and disprivilege; and blacks and Latinos perform less well on measures of IQ precisely because they have been socially channeled into disadvantaged and stigmatized statuses, not the other way around.

Fischer and his fellow Berkeley sociologists reanalyze the same data (the National Longitudinal Study of Youth) and IQ measures (the Armed Forces Qualifying Test) used by Herrnstein and Murray. They find measured IQ is a small component accounting for "at best, only 10 percent of the variation in earnings" (p. 14). In short, IQ "is of such minor importance that American income inequality would hardly change if everyone had the same AFQT score" (p. 15). They show, more importantly, that IQ provides little leverage in accounting for group differences in the risk of falling into poverty. For example, gender and marital status greatly affect the chances of falling into poverty. However, men and women, and the married and the unmarried differ hardly at all in measured IQ.

The latter results speak directly to Fischer's and colleagues' alternative to the IQ hypothesis: namely, who succeeds and who fails and how much inequality exists reflect systematic social conditions and policies far more than they do individual or group differences in ability. Thus, the disproportionate vulnerability of single females, especially single parent females, to poverty stems from the weak childcare provisions in U.S. social policy relative to that characteristic of other Western industrial nations.

Much of the public attention devoted to *The Bell Curve* stemmed from its claims of race differences in IQ. Mainly in Chapter 8, Fischer and colleagues provide a concise and eviscerating refutation of this claim. They trace how systematic discrimination imposed on blacks and Latinos deep economic disadvantages as well as segregated and unequal living conditions, and a stigmatized caste-like status. They show with strong cross cultural data that any group facing such conditions, whether it be the Irish in Great Britain or the Koreans in Japan, performs poorly on standardized tests of intelligence. It is not the case that race leads to lower (measured) IQ and, therefore, to lesser attainments in life; but rather "Groups score unequally on tests because they are unequal in society" (p. 172).

My only quarrels with the book are twofold. First, although highly readable, the book is still directed at an academic audience. Second, there are a few occasions where plausible alternative ideas more congenial to Herrnstein and Murray are given short shrift. For instance, the idea that tracking in schools serves any useful purpose or may bear any connection to demonstrated aptitude is not seriously addressed.

These quarrels aside, *Inequality by Design* is a weighty book that deserves the widest possible audience. It is an unequivocal must read for any serious analyst of U.S. social and public policy issues. Fischer and his fellow Berkeley sociologists have performed a great service in this scholarly, persuasive, and at times passionate book. Economic inequality is neither the natural nor the simple product of heritable differences in cognitive ability. A

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sharply worsening divide between the haves and the have-nots has nothing to do with changes in IQ. Instead, how we collectively choose to organize social life and our policy responses to changing economic and technological environments largely determine who has access to the "good life" and who does not.

LAWRENCE BOBO
Harvard University

State Autonomy or Class Dominance? Case Studies on Policy Making in America *by G. William Domhoff. New York, Aldine De Gruyter, 1996. 296 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $24.95.*

A key feature distinguishing the social science debates of a generation ago from today's is the frequency with which they were framed as irreducible paradigm conflicts; now one hears calls for convergence and multidimensionality. On the whole, this shift represents an advance from either-or arguments that close off scholarly discourse. Unfortunately, this book is encumbered with the belligerent rhetoric of a disappearing time.

This latest work by G. William Domhoff aims to reassert the superiority of his "class dominance" theory in explaining policy making in America. His "counterattack" (p. 3) targets Theda Skocpol and her band of "state autonomy" theorists. Domhoff's counterattack has four prongs—three substantive and one methodological.

He believes that each substantive spearhead, outfitted with evidence from the Progressive or New Deal eras, vindicates his class-dominance perspective. First, "the immediate, direct, and continuous role of large plantation owners in effecting federal policy through the Democratic party and Congress" refutes claims that the state had any "considerable degree of independence from social classes and interest groups" (p. 3). Second, the state's "independent experts" during both periods were neither as independent nor influential vis-à-vis the "corporate rich" as state autonomists have claimed. Third, the wealthy's financing of elections severely restricts "the legislative responsiveness of political parties to voters" (p, 4).

Domhoff's methodological counterattack proceeds within the other three. It leans on John H. Goldthorpe's critique that state autonomists' reliance on secondary sources is not secondary analysis, in the strict sense, but what Peter Berger might call "second-order interpretations." This is a pivotal issue for historical sociology, but it receives no adequate hearing here. Domhoff assails Skocpol for her culling of existing historical evidence mainly to win our admiration for his more time-consuming collection of original data.

Although I value the state autonomy school's accomplishments, I am also aware of its theoretical deficits and exaggeration of its originality. Unhappily, the book's introduction provides a caricature, not a theoretically comprehensive appraisal. Anyone who is familiar with state autonomy theory will be put off by Domhoff's one-dimensional stereotype.

Domhoff then explicates the essentials of class dominance theory. Unless you are already committed, there is little new in Chapter 2 that will persuade you that this approach embodies a theoretically comprehensive and empirically open way to sort data. More's the pity, because the rest of the book raises empirical questions that deserve more study. Chapters 3 through

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7 are the book's empirical core and its greatest accomplishment. Chapter 3 presents evidence that the Department of Agriculture in the 1930s was not the unlikely bastion of state autonomy that some have argued. Chapter 4 holds that contrary to Skocpol and Finegold, the National Recovery Administration (NRA) failed because of class-based opposition, not insufficient state capacities. Chapter 5 offers new evidence that the "Rockefeller network" helped shape social security and thus raises doubt about the independence of the state's experts. Chapter 6 critiques Gregory Hooks's thesis that the growth of the military establishment in World War II reflects a growth in state autonomy.

Chapter 7 reviews Skocpol's *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers* (1992) and criticizes her for broadening her theoretical framework (rechristened the "polity centered approach"). In this generation of multidimensional theorizing it is astounding to see a scholar reviled for adding significant elements to her theoretical net. Certainly no one can accuse Domhoff of the same transgression. The chapter also contends that the cases Skocpol analyzes turn out to be "irrelevant . . . in terms of understanding the main features of the welfare state" (p. 249).

These five chapters encourage productive debates and new research about the Progressive Era, New Deal, and the evolution of the American welfare state and military establishment. But has Domhoff refuted the state-centered accounts he set out to undermine? I am not a specialist on any of these topics, but I remain unconvinced. His one-dimensional, rigid framework actually sabotages the cogency of his data and arguments. Moreover, in today's climate of expanding corporate power and growing inequality, citizens' sensibilities desperately need a jab. But this requires a scalpel not the anvil Domhoff wields.

The book's heavyhandedness becomes clearest in the final chapter. Domhoff speculates about the great success of *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers* despite his and others' critical reviews. It has won at least five major scholarly awards. After musing whether she may have traded on trendy feminist and generational appeals, he concludes, "Skocpol's main achievement . . . is to make pluralism respectable once again by overstating the altruism and success of maternalist women activists in the Progressive Era" (p. 257). So here we have it: the final absurdity of the post-World War II age, which began with McCarthyites pursuing hidden communist messages in the social sciences. It concludes with a class-dominance theorist unmasking closet pluralists. I'm saddened.

EDWARD W. LEHMAN
New York University

Ashes to Ashes: America's Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public Health, and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris *by Richard Kluger. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1996. 807 pp. $35.00.*

As the title suggests, this book represents a massive undertaking to document the rise of tobacco companies in America and the subsequent consequences for public health. Richard Kluger clearly argues that corporate America, in this case the tobacco companies, must be forced to assume responsibility and liability for the negative consequences associated with their products. Agree or not, readers would be hard pressed to find a better written and more fascinating analysis of this issue.

The history of tobacco companies includes pure entrepreneurial spirit, risk-taking, ingenuity, and lots of competition. From the creation of snuff to the invention of a low-tar filtered

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cigarette, the fathers of the modern tobacco companies constantly adapted their product to shape and respond to consumer taste. In a capitalist society, we normally do not take issue with such economically motivated behavior.

However, in this case, Richard Kluger argues that the result of such ingenuity is a major business built around a product that causes the death of its user. As early as 1928 the scientific community began hinting at the connection between smoking and cancer, and by the early 1950s there was sufficient evidence to point to a causal link to lung cancer. He asserts that the corporate structure and management style of the tobacco companies can explain why they strenuously denied the threat that cigarettes posed to public health. When warned of the dangers of cigarettes and offered the possibility of developing a safer cigarette, the tobacco companies reluctantly responded by adding filters to cigarettes and reducing the tar content of cigarettes, neither of which adequately addressed the fundamental connection between cigarette smoking and cancer.

Richard Kluger is a bit more forgiving of the federal government, which clearly failed to act as a strong advocate for the general public's health. In the face of overwhelming medical evidence, the federal government did little more than require warning labels on cigarette packages and ban smoking on public transportation. He claims that government's failure to act stemmed from the financial and political clout of the tobacco industry. On this point, he could have provided more detail on how the tobacco lobby built its power base in Congress and on the connection between the tobacco lobby's campaign contributions and public policy on cigarettes.

One important flaw in this otherwise excellent book is its clear antitobacco sentiments. Richard Kluger does make the case that the tobacco companies purposely manufactured a product that was both addictive and lethal. However, his constant use of strong judgmental language about the tobacco industry weakens his argument. The fact remains that Americans have been duly warned of the dangers of smoking for more than thirty years, and many still choose to ignore the danger. To condemn an industry for seeking to profit in a free economic system evades the broader issue of how much a private industry can be held accountable for the public's behavior. It might have strengthened his case against the tobacco industry by pointing out parallels to other types of industries, such as alcohol, that can hurt individual consumers.

In sum, Richard Kluger has produced a book that is strikingly thorough and persuasive. It will undoubtedly prove to be a very important contribution to the ongoing debate about the role of corporate America in public life, the role of government as guardian of public safety, and the public's willingness to assume responsibility for individual behavior.

WENDY J. SCHILLER
Brown University

The New Struggle for Democracy in Africa *by John A. Wiseman. Brookfield, VT, Avebury, 1996. 200 pp. $59.95.*

In this short, well written book, John Wiseman examines the recent wave of democratization that has transformed African politics since the late 1980s. He offers an informed and intelligent summary of the causes and circumstances that generated the demise of the single-party authoritarianism that had characterized the postcolonial period.

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Wiseman is relatively optimistic about the consolidation of democracy in the continent; he suggests that a massive reversion to authoritarianism is unlikely. Such "demo-optimism" derives from his minimalist notion of democracy, which he identifies with Robert Dahl's celebrated concept of polyarchy. Not surprisingly, Wiseman's understanding of African democracy is profoundly shaped by the extent to which electoral processes are free, competitive, and fair. In his eyes, the fact that elections have taken place throughout the continent and that incumbent leaders and regimes have been replaced by democratizing coalitions and figures indicates that democracy has implanted itself in Africa.

Wiseman, however, emphasizes that while elections are critical to that implantation, they are not the only factor contributing to it. The very forces and mechanisms that precipitated the fall of authoritarianism are themselves important obstacles to its potential return. The resurrection of civil society with its multiple civic associations, the collapse of the single-party ideology, the end of the cold war, and the reality that the masses are no longer prepared to put up with political tyranny, contribute all to minimize the threat of redictatorialization. As Wiseman puts it: "the nature of recent change itself precludes, to greater or lesser extent, the possibility of a simple return to the status quo ante: there is, in an important sense, no going back" (p. 160).

Wiseman's optimism, however, is not Panglossian; he knows that the new African democracies are resting on precarious material foundations and that the specter of military coups is haunting civilian regimes. He goes as far as to state that without "at least moderate economic improvement the sustainment of democratic rule will be exceptionally difficult" (p. 163). If this is indeed the case, Wiseman's faith in the democratic future of the continent seems misplaced, for Africa's economies are full of vicissitudes and have bleak prospects for growth. Moreover, as Wiseman himself acknowledges, the catastrophes of Burundi, Rwanda, and Somalia, as well as the persisting rule of autocrats in Zaire and Togo and the coups in Nigeria and the Gambia are all clear reminders that celebrating the implantation of democracy in Africa may be premature and illusory. Ultimately, Wiseman's demo-optimism gives way to an analysis rooted in the uncertainty and fluidity of politics in general, and African politics in particular.

Drawing on chaos theory and the significance of luck and accidents in shaping history, Wiseman emphasizes the role played by patterns of personal rule in the democratization process. Without neglecting structural constraints, he shows how the making and outcomes of national conferences and referendums were dependent on the maneuvers, whims, and decisions of particular political leaders. Moreover, Wiseman points out how policies and choices had unintended consequences. For instance, he describes how Benin's national conference, which began as a diversionary tactic engineered by the dictator Mathieu Kerekou, turned into a sovereign assembly that emasculated the dictator's own powers and prepared the way for his electoral demise.

Even if its demo-optimism rests on thin ground, Wiseman's *The New Struggle for Democracy in Africa* offers an intelligent analytical framework that explains well the structural parameters and the chaotic fluidity of African democratization. The volume is a welcome addition to the growing literature on the subject. It should appeal to all students of African politics and democratization scholars.

ROBERT FATTON, JR.
University of Virginia

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Serious Money: Fundraising and Contributing in Presidential Nomination Campaigns
by Clifford W. Brown, Lynda Powell, and Clyde Wilcox. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995. 184 pp. Cloth, $54.95; paper, $19.95.

This book examines the characteristics and motives of individual contributors to presidential campaigns, as well as the methods used by candidates to solicit funds. The book is based on a survey of contributors done by the authors in 1988 and a follow-up survey done in 1992. There is also some comparison to the results of a survey from 1972. The title may connote large soft money contributions to the parties, but the subject is individual contributions. Such contributions are limited to a $1,000 maximum, but dominate financing in the primaries.

The authors survey individuals that gave between $201 and $1000 in 1988, because the Federal Election Commission (FEC) requires disclosure of the names of those persons. The authors motivate their focus on this "serious money" through an unfortunate misunderstanding of the effects of inflation on matching funds. Contributions under $250 are matched by the federal government, while larger contributions are partially matched, perhaps up to a limit. The matching formula is never described in detail, despite the entire chapter on "The Regulatory Environment." The authors argue that inflation erodes the value of the federal match (true) and lowers the cost of a $1,000 donation to the contributor (true). They conclude that inflation should lead to more reliance on large contributions (false).

The relative value to the candidate or cost to the contributor of a small contribution versus a large contribution is unchanged by inflation, regardless of the matching formula. It is true that the real difference between a small and large contribution will shrink with inflation and that this may induce previous small contributors to become large contributors. However, this same effect of inflation may induce previous noncontributors to become small contributors. Assuming that there are many more noncontributors than contributors (again, the authors do not provide such basic information), over time inflation may actually lead to a larger increase in both the number and total value of small versus large contributions.

A second motivating factor for this book is absence of much theory or data on individual contributors. A reasonable starting point is to examine just who these individuals are and how they differ from voters in general. However, the authors do not make an attempt to judge the representativeness of their respondents. The authors implicitly assume that individuals choose randomly whether to respond to their surveys. This is an egregious error, and it puts the value of the entire enterprise in doubt.

The authors do compare the mean characteristics of respondents in 1988 to their survey respondents in 1972; these mean characteristics appear stable. We may infer from this that the characteristics of people who respond to surveys are stable over this time; but we learn nothing about the representativeness of the 1988 sample, since we do not know anything about the representativeness of the 1972 sample. The mean characteristics of the 1988 contributors are also compared to self-identified contributors in the 1988 National Election Studies (NES) survey. The contributors in the authors' survey have higher incomes and are more educated, white, and male than the NES contributors. However, the authors point out that the NES contributors include people who have given to any political race, not just the presidential races. Finally, the authors do not compare the 1988 and 1992 surveys. The 1988 survey had 1,246 respondents; these individuals were resurveyed in 1992, producing 583 responses. The authors might at least have examined the representativeness of the 1992 respondents compared to the 1988 pool. The failure to do at least this is incomprehensible.

JEFFREY MILYO
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Climbing the Hill: Gender Conflict in Congress *by Karen Foerstel and Herbert N. Foerstel. Westport, CT, Praeger, 1996. 224 pp. $39.95.*

Christie Whitman: A Political Biography for the People *by Sandy McClure. New York, Prometheus Books, 1996. 282 pp. $39.95.*

Sandy McClure's biography of Christine Todd Whitman offers an easy read of the background, the remarkable rise to power, and the first two years of Whitman's stewardship as New Jersey's first female governor. McClure emphasizes narrative rather than political analysis; and in a lively, easy to follow, and generally accurate way she tells the story of the governor's social background and the development of her political career. McClure covered Whitman's gubernatorial campaign for the *Trentonian* and obviously has much admiration for this hard-working, determined woman whose pledge to cut the state income tax has had tremendous political ramifications well beyond New Jersey's borders. At times the reporter's admiration for her subject seems to have kept her from taking a more penetrating and critical look at the consequences of Whitman's political stands as well as at her somewhat dubious political actions, such as her participation in the maneuvers involved in the sale of protected watershed lands and other acts involving questions of ethics. Whitman emerges from the pages as a strong woman of considerable intelligence, unbounded energy, and a deeply ingrained commitment to public service. McClure admires her especially for her determination to live up to her campaign promises and credits her, arguably somewhat too generously, with New Jersey's economic recovery—a recovery not unique to the state. For readers interested in the life and accomplishments of New Jersey's first woman governor, McClure's book offers a lively, informative introduction. For those seeking a deeper understanding not only of Christy Whitman but of the impact her term(s) of governor will have on the state, the jury, of course, is still out.

Climbing the Hill, a more scholarly book, analyzes the history of women's attempts (their successes and failures) to get elected to the U.S. Congress and their struggle, once they have been elected, to gain influence and perhaps leadership positions in this "male club called Congress" (p. 25). The book consists of five chapters, the first offering a retrospective and the last a prognosis. Of the remaining three chapters only two (Chapters 2 and 3) actually deal with women representatives; Chapter 4 deals with their staffs.

Chapter 1 is essentially an historical overview of women's all but complete absence from the ranks of representatives during the nation's first two centuries, except for a few so-called tokens, mostly women who filled the seats left vacant by their deceased spouses. The chapter focuses on the very few women who were able to serve more than one term and pays particular homage to Jeannette Rankin, Montana's representative who served in Congress for twenty-seven years. The chapter is a series of brief biographies of some of the more outstanding of these pioneers and their achievements. Several of the women have been the subject of earlier full-length biographies, and others are sufficiently well known, so that not much new insight can be gained from the chapter, except perhaps to be reminded once more how very recent it is that Congress had more than a handful of women in its ranks. The "slow but steady increase in the number of women in Congress" (p. 47) received a jolt in 1992, the so-called Year of the Woman, when seemingly record numbers of women were elected. Actually what seemed like record numbers amounted to just eleven new representatives out of 112 women who had been running! Though several of the newcomers failed to win reelection in the 1994 Republican landslide, six actually managed to get reelected. The

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authors correctly point out that the "legacy of this holdover from the Year of the Woman should not be underestimated" (p. 58).

Chapter 2 relates how the women elected in 1992 and 1994 fared once they were inside the halls of Congress. This chapter, much like the next ones, seeks to cover too many different topics, not all of them equally relevant, and thereby fails to cover some in the required depths. For example, the authors include fund-raising problems, women's reluctance to run for office, women running against women versus women running against men, to cite but some topics. Each of these probably deserves a chapter in its own right or minimally a direct and detailed analysis rather than the numerous illustrative anecdotes of individual contests, which are the authors' preferred way of dealing with the problem. While the anecdotes (often gleaned from personal interviews) make for interesting reading, the danger is that their vividness threatens to overwhelm the points or principles they are meant to illustrate. For example, more space is allocated to the 1992 acerbic Democratic primary contests between Robert Abrams, Geraldine Ferraro, and Elizabeth Holtzman, a contest probably very familiar to most readers, than to an analysis of the forces that prompted the electoral changes in 1992 and in 1994 and of the women involved in them.

Chapter 3 focuses on what happens to women once they are elected and the difficulties they experience getting the kinds of committee assignments that would permit them to influence and eventually help shape the legislative agenda. This chapter too features an abundance of different topics, some of which distract from the main theme that deals with the reasons for women's absence from congressional leadership positions. The authors hold that women's slow ascension to power has to be explained in large part by "the male-dominated culture of Congress" (p. 95). There is no doubt that this male culture contributes much to women's relative lack of power. In addition many structural factors, such as the seniority system, as well as rules and practices designed for the benefit of the "male club called Congress" will for some time to come pose formidable obstacles to women's aspirations to legislative leadership. Nor should we overlook the capacity of some powerful, well-financed lobbies to thwart the enactment of legislation said to be more important to women than men, such as a ban on assault weapons. All of this contributes to women's relative lack of legislative clout. Consequently, as the authors show, strategic support groups, such as the Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues, are crucial for increasing women's legislative effectiveness.

Chapter 4 deals with the important tasks performed by the staff, and the last chapter summarizes the previously elaborated potentials and perils to women's chances of acquiring equal power. Readers not immersed in the scholarly study of Congress but interested in finding out what role women have played in the nation's legislative life and what role they might play in the future will find this a valuable source—encouraging and sobering at the same time.

Roberta S. Siegel
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Reversing Course: Carter's Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure of Reform
by David Skidmore. Nashville, Vanderbilt University Press, 1996. 234 pp. $29.95.

When and why states adjust their external strategies to changes in their international or domestic environments is the central question in foreign-policy analysis. In *Reversing Course*,

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David Skidmore offers a work that fits squarely into the mainstream of such research. He asks why the Carter administration tried to shed some major cold-war shibboleths as part of a broad strategy of foreign-policy reform and why the effort was unsuccessful. His book speaks directly to two key literatures in the field: hegemonic decline and adaptation, and the domestic sources of-foreign policy. Scholars and lay readers who are interested in American foreign policy, the substance or process of international change, or the history of the cold war may find it useful.

Jimmy Carter took office in 1977 determined to end what he saw as a long-standing U.S. obsession with communism, a preoccupatiion that had obscured for many Americans a sharp relative decline in their country's international standing as compared with the early post-World War II era. Carter initially proposed withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea, restricting covert CIA actions, reducing U.S. foreign military sales and aid, shifting security burdens fairly substantially away from the United States, and normalizing political relations with Cuba, Vietnam, and other pro-Soviet states. Each of these initiatives, however, was reversed well before Carter was defeated for reelection in 1980. In Skidmore's interpretation, the impediments to a successful strategy of foreign-policy reform were overwhelmingly internal: "Public skepticism and elite opposition to reform raised the political costs of policy change to intolerable levels, prompting the administration to retreat from its initial liberal internationalist orientation" (p. xvi).

Skidmore's theoretical explanation of this case focuses on the internal effects of a state's hegemonic position. Power-based models of foreign-policy change predict that as a state's external power potential changes, so should its policies. Not surprisingly, Skidmore finds such models inadequate, as they ignore leaders' need to legitimate major policy changes to key domestic factions and, perhaps, to the public at large. He argues that American hegemony during much of the twentieth century made domestic legitimation of an adjustment policy unusually difficult. As a state's power potential grows, domestic institutions and structures that serve to define and implement an expansive foreign policy tend to proliferate and become internally powerful. Over time, these entities also tend to rigidify. It is not easy, it seems, to unmake the ideology, bureaucratic single-mindedness, and foreign-policy coalitions of a highly interventionist state. When combined with the general weakness of the U.S. executive—its structural constraints in the face of opposed legislative, private, and bureaucratic factions—it is little wonder that Carter's ambitious challenge to cold-war orthodoxies foundered at home.

Students of foreign policy can learn some useful things from this book. While much political science literature suggests that domestic legitimation is a key requirement of stable, successful policy, few case studies have documented this proposition in the foreign-policy area. It is useful to show in some detail, and in a substantively important case, that justifying major changes in direction will be harder the stronger the domestic opposition, and that an interventionist state is likely to induce such opposition. These propositions can be seen as part of the larger discussion in international relations and comparative politics called "the second-image reversed." The terminology, taken from seminal works by Kenneth Waltz and Peter Gourevitch, suggests that the international sources of domestic structure, institutions, and beliefs may be just as important as the internal sources of external policy. Working out and clarifying both sets of relationships is one of the major items on the agenda for students of both comparative and international politics, and may over time help soften the boundaries between these subfields.

At the same time, the propositions in this book are not especially powerful or counterintuitive. It is not surprising that domestic factions favoring intervention and hawkish policies

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would become empowered in an interventionist state, or that a president with few ties to these factions would have a weak hand in dealing with them. Stable policy, as Robert Putnam showed over a decade ago, requires that domestic and international incentives be mutually reinforcing. They manifestly were not for Jimmy Carter. This book would have spoken more broadly to international politics as a whole if it had discussed external and domestic-political risks more generally. As Alan Lamborn has argued, leaders will prefer to avoid political rather than external risks if the two cannot be disentangled. In the case of Carter's foreign policy, they could not be disentangled, since each of his early initiatives threatened some key cold-war constituency. Thus, unless an initiative succeeded in producing a less conflictual environment or fewer burdens for the United States fairly quickly—which few of the proposed changes could do—the inherently severe political risks made it highly likely that Carter's external experimentation would end. This book usefully illustrates these propositions, but does little to advance our understanding of the underlying phenomena.

JOSEPH LEPGOLD
Georgetown University

Boomerang: Clinton's Health Security Effort and the Turn Against Government in U.S. Politics *by Theda Skocpol. New York, Norton, 1996. 258 pp. $27.50.*

In this short and very readable book, Theda Skocpol attempts to explain the failure of Bill Clinton's health care reform effort by looking at the "partisan and institutional forces shaping—and rapidly transforming—U.S. politics today" (p. 18).

The opening chapter reviews how health care reform gained national importance in November 1991 in the Pennsylvania Senate election and describes the proliferation of reform proposals that followed. It traces candidate Bill Clinton's attempt to find a proposal that was a middle ground between the incremental market reforms proposed by George Bush and a single-payer system advocated by some on the left, which included universal coverage with cost controls and minimized tax increases. After considering a play-or-pay approach, Clinton at last settled on a vaguely scripted plan of managed competition.

In the second chapter the author describes the work of the task force that designed the health security proposal. She counters critics who suggest that the decision to use a large intraadministration task force was responsible for the ultimate demise of the proposal by reviewing the potential problems with other organizational approaches such as a bipartisan commission. This chapter also describes the decision process regarding key provisions of the reform proposal. These decisions on the generosity of the standard benefit package, the size of health alliances, employer contributions, and regulatory cost controls, became critical in the debate over the proposal.

The next several chapters of the book review what the author sees as the major explanations for the demise of the Health Security Act. "Democrats in Disarray" argues that the debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement forced health care reform off the president's agenda at a time that presidential attention was crucial. The interest group organizations that were sympathetic to the proposal were fragmented and gave it only half-hearted support. Furthermore, the Democrats in Congress failed to unite around one approach to reform.

The author argues that the Clinton administration failed in its strategy of marketing the reform plan to the American people. The administration was deliberately vague about the

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how-to of the complex reform plan, choosing instead to emphasize such goals of the plan as guaranteed coverage. This "left Americans open to alternative descriptions purveyed by Health Security's fiercest opponents" (p. 132).

"Mobilization Against Government" details the efforts of those opponents. The author argues that "Health Security gave antigovernment conservatives exactly the target they were looking for—a proposed federal initiative that could be portrayed as threatening to the American middle class" (p. 172). The Democratic effort at reform thus boomeranged, becoming a focal point for the mobilization of conservative opposition.

In the concluding chapter of this book the author considers the possibilities for health care reform and other "social protections" when antigovernment sentiments are ascendant. "If progressives are to achieve any sort of inclusive policy changes in America's future, it will be because new rationales for the role of government, and new majority political alliances, have been achieved first" (p. 186).

This book is an important addition to the growing literature on the history of U.S. health care policy. While many will disagree with the author's point of view, Skocpol's comprehensive analysis is valuable and instructive.

ANNE LENHARD REISINGER
Columbia University

Foreign Policy and Regionalism in the Americas *edited by Gordon Mace and Jean-Philippe Therien. Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996. 251 pp. Paper, $19.95.*

Many of the landmarks that policy makers have used in the past forty years to explain world politics or economics have become obsolete with the end of the cold war. The Berlin Wall was dismantled, and the East-West divide disappeared. To some, the nation-state itself declined in importance as compared to civilizations and multinational corporations. Today, some scholars believe that the world is dividing into three geographical regions—Europe, Asia, and the Americas.

The European Union has been studied in great depth. The emerging power of East Asia is capturing the world's attention. The Americas, as a region, has not been studied as intensely, and that is one reason the edited volume by Mace and Therien is to be welcomed. Another reason is that the book approaches the subject from a non–U.S. perspective. Of the fourteen authors, four, including the editors, are Canadian; and eight are from Latin America. The contributors approach the subject of regionalism in the Americas from the perspective of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and the United States.

The editors posit that two visions of regionalism have been evident since the early nineteenth century. Simon Bolivar's vision was of a united Latin America, and James Monroe's was of a hemisphere with the United States as its pivot. Many Latin Americans have repeated the Bolivarian vision like a mantra and have established a number of experiments in regional integration; none were very successful. The Monrovian vision became the premise of the Rio Pact and the Organization of American States.

A new regionalism emerged in the late 1980s, and this has been serious because it was a product of changes in the world—notably the end of the cold war and the globalization of the economy—and transformations that occurred in most of the countries of Latin America

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and the Caribbean. As a result of the debt crisis of 1982, governments in Latin America were compelled to reexamine their economic model and dispense with the dirigiste import-substitution-industrialization strategy in favor of an export-favored, market-oriented strategy. In several of the major countries in South America, notably, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, this economic transformation occurred simultaneously with a political transition toward a democratic model.

By the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century, almost all of the hemisphere's countries were governed by civilians who had won free elections, and they were ready to cooperate and expand trade with each other. When Mexico, which had long tried to veto any serious cooperative relationships with the United States, decided in the spring of 1990 to follow Canada's example and propose a free-trade agreement with the United States, almost every government in the region welcomed it and wanted to join. Before the North American Free Trade Agreement came into effect on 1 January 1994, Mercosur—the free trade agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay—was generating more trade, and other subregional integration agreements were given a boost.

Some of the authors, notably Juan Gabriel Tokatlian and Arlene Tickner, explore the meaning of regionalism and integration, but regretably not deeply enough to be able to draw some conclusions about the magnitude and the pace of integration. The Mexico chapter by Guadalupe Gonzalez and Jorge Chabat is particularly strong in identifying the reasons for the dramatic turn-about in the country's policy from one of distancing itself from the United States to one of embracing the colossus to its north.

In all, the volume represents an important contribution to an increasingly important subject—the Americas as a distinctive region that is trying to deepen and widen its integration even while facing the example of the European Union and the dynamism of East Asia.

ROBERT A. PASTOR
Emory University and The Carter Center

Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1994 *by Melvin Small. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 200 pp. Cloth, $38.95; paper, $13.95.*

The field of international relations has been long dominated by the Realist paradigm, a central tenet of which holds that international behavior is dictated solely by the exigencies of the international system. Realism has been challenged specifically on these grounds by those arguing that our explanations must take domestic political factors into account. Attacks on this score have multiplied in recent years with the development of a number of theoretical arguments associating domestic factors with foreign policy behavior and with a growing body of empirical evidence supporting these arguments. While even the most strident realist recognizes that domestic politics affect foreign policy behavior to some extent, they argue that incorporating such factors into our theoretical structure does not add sufficient explanatory power to justify the complexity. The question is whether it is necessary to include domestic political factors in order for our theories to provide adequate explanations for international behavior.

One would be hard pressed to read Melvin Small's book and conclude that domestic politics can be safely ignored in our explanations of foreign policy. His historical survey

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covers the United States from the time of the Constitution and examines a large number of cases in which domestic politics affected foreign policy. The coverage of cases is quite good and includes instances of low politics (economic policy) as well as the more visible cases of major international conflict. Even though the treatment of each specific case is a bit superficial (as one would expect in a comprehensive survey), the range of policies considered and the sheer number of cases addressed is convincing evidence that domestic politics is an important determinant of foreign policy, at least in the United States.

While the book is generally organized as a chronological survey, Small makes a concerted effort to show that there are many similarities in the way domestic factors have influenced foreign policy throughout the history of the United States. For example, one of his recurring themes is that the multiethnic character of the American public is often felt in foreign policy making. While most readers will be familiar with contemporary cases, such as the Jewish lobby's advocacy of policies favorable to Israel, many will not be aware that there is a long history of such behavior in American politics. Small shows that such phenomena can be seen throughout American history, dating at least from the efforts of Irish-Americans to support the French in the Napoleonic era and their support of Jefferson's presidential bid because of his perceived Anglophobia.

This relates to what is perhaps the strongest aspect of this book. Small's analysis suggests that there are a few general forms of domestic influence on foreign policy, implying that a parsimonious theory incorporating these factors would be possible. In addition to exploring the effect of ethnic groups mentioned above, Small analyzes the struggle between the executive and the legislature over control of foreign policy, the struggle between different departments within the executive branch, the effects of electoral politics on presidential (and candidate) positions, and the impact of competing economic interests on foreign policy. In each case, Small shows that similar patterns of behavior have recurred throughout American history. Although he does not produce a general theory that would incorporate domestic politics into an explanation of foreign behavior, the analysis contained in this book does offer many suggestions regarding what such a theory should contain.

The most significant weakness of the book is that it implies (and often comes close to stating explicitly) that domestic influences on foreign policy are peculiar to the American democratic experience. The goal of general theory is better served by acknowledging, and showing, that the general patterns observed in the United States can be seen elsewhere. All leaders are answerable to some electorate; all countries see competitions between bureaucracies charged with tending to different aspects of foreign policy; and all see domestic groups with competing interests having differences of opinion over foreign policy. Furthermore, viewing the United States as unique feeds the long tradition of political thought holding that democracies are disadvantaged in foreign policy, because they are open to domestic influences. Small does address this point, however, in pointing out the most spectacular failures in American foreign policy have usually occurred when decision makers attempted to subvert democratic principles and conduct policy in the manner of the "Metternichs and Bismarcks."

Over all, this is a very good book. It is an engaging and convincing survey, and it is written for readers at all levels of expertise. I suspect that it will be quite useful for many courses on American foreign policy in both history and political science.

T. CLIFTON MORGAN
Rice University

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Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars *by Dan Reiter. Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1996. 232 pp. $35.00.*

This lucid book offers a learning theory loosely derived from social psychology and organization theory that predicts when small states will choose either neutrality or alliance with a great power. Reiter's learning theory is based on three propositions: "lessons are drawn infrequently; they are most often taken from high-impact, politically significant events; and when drawn, lessons reflect the desire to repeat past successes and avoid past failures" (p. 3).

The argument is straightforward and simple: for small powers, the choice of alliance or neutrality is determined by the lesson they learned from the last world war. If the small power experienced success, it continues to follow the policy; if it experienced failure, it switches to the other policy option—either alliance or neutrality. Success and failure are defined in the following ways: if the small power chose neutrality in the last world war and was not invaded, the experience is considered a success. Otherwise, the policy was a failure. If the small power was allied, the experience is considered a success if it was on the winning side and was not invaded; or if it acquired more population in the postwar territorial settlement than it lost in the war. Otherwise, it was a failure.

Reiter tests his learning theory against a realist alternative in the form of Stephen Walt's balance-of-threat theory. The empirical results are impressive: Reiter's theory correctly predicts 114 out of 127 cases (90 percent correct predictions) drawn from periodic observations of the alliance choices of small powers in the years following World Wars I and II. Further, Reiter's "evidence offers no support" for the hypothesis that a small power is more likely to prefer alliance with a great power than no alliance with a great power if it perceives that a systemic war in its region is imminent, "showing that small powers tend to follow logic opposite to balance of threat theory and to pass the buck when facing a threat rather than balance against or bandwagon with it" (p. 98). On the basis of its clarity, elegance, and predictive power, Reiter's learning theory is an unqualified success that must be taken seriously and addressed by anyone studying the alliance behavior of small powers. That said, the book is not without flaws, of course.

Careful scrutiny reveals that the logic, key concepts, and propositions of Reiter's theory are quite slippery. Who decides whether a policy is deemed a success or failure? Are policies ever partially successful? Does it make sense to say that states, like individuals, learn lessons? If so, do states draw only a single lesson from their experiences in world wars? Why do small states only have two choices, alliance or neutrality? Why would small states ignore the context of their current environment and instead base such a crucial decision on the assumption that nothing has changed since the last world war? Why are not wars other than systemic ones considered formative events? For example, was not the Vietnam War a high-impact, significant event for both the United States and Vietnam? Why do small states but not great powers all learn in the same way?

Reiter's choice of realism as a competing theory is also questionable. Realism is primarily a theory about great-power behavior; many of its key propositions do not apply to small powers. By focusing exclusively on weak states, Reiter essentially stacks the deck against realism in favor of his formative-events model of learning. Even so, the logic of his theory is not inconsistent with Kenneth Waltz's claim that states learn by emulating the successful practices of others.

The book's most serious flaw, however, is that Reiter has already published all the theoretical and quantitative empirical material in a single article. The simplicity of the argu-

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ment works nicely in a journal-length essay but lacks the theoretical richness required for a truly satisfying book.

In conclusion, Reiter is a talented theorist who makes a solid contribution to the sparse but growing literature on weak states. The book will be of considerable interest to academics studying small-power behavior or to anyone who is deeply interested in learning theory and alliances. But the reader should remember that Reiter's learning theory only applies to small powers. The book does not offer a general theory of alliances but rather a powerful hypothesis that accurately predicts when small states will choose alliance or neutrality.

RANDALL L. SCHWELLER
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Carter and Arms Sales: Implementing the Carter Administration's Arms Transfer Restraint Policy *by Joanna Spear. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995. 246 pp. $59.95.*

This is a well-crafted study of President Jimmy Carter's "failed" arms restraint policy. Although in the end it does not challenge existing explanations of why the policy failed, it provides a fresh and insightful perspective on the bitter controversies surrounding U.S. arms transfer initiatives during the Carter administration.

It is hard to think of any other U.S. policies constructed more on myths and idealism than those concerning conventional arms controls (CAT). Joanna Spear provides a poignant view of how these myths and ideals collide with and are shattered by the demands of domestic and international politics. Using implementation "theory" as an organizing device, Spear sets out to explain why Carter's Presidential Directive 13 (PD-13), outlining his arms restraint policy, ultimately was ineffective. In Spear's view, the cause can be found in the implementation process—the actions taken to achieve foreign policy goals. This is, she argues, a process so important to policy outcomes it merits a shift in focus from decision making alone to the implementation of foreign decisions—a field of study virtually ignored by foreign policy analysts. Her book is a testament to this argument, adding a wealth of detail to what is already known about Carter's arms transfer and restraint policies.

The book's narrative is structured around three key "implementing arenas": the governmental arena (the arms transfer bureaucracy), the domestic political arena (Congress and the U.S. defense industries), and the international arena (the arms transfer market). She also posits seven conditions for successful policy implementation: clear and consistent objectives; adequate causal theory; structuring of the implementation process to enhance the compliance of implementing agents and targets; committed and skillful implementing officials; support of interest groups and (legislative and executive) sovereigns; a stable socioeconomic climate; the degree of autonomy of the target. These are not fully analyzed, however, until the final chapter; and most of the book is devoted to a description of the ways in which the colorful cast of characters in the three arenas formed alliances and did battle with each other over PD-13.

The final chapter, however, is less successful than the rest of the book. It attempts to explain why PD-13 failed in terms of the seven conditions, but sheds little new light on the question. Implementation "theory," when used by Spear as an analytic framework to separate the different parts of the implementation process, yields a rich description of how the policy failed. As an explanation of why PD-13 failed, it is less successful. The seven conditions

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for effective implementation highlight circumstances that may increase the likelihood of a policy's success or failure, but no firm causal connections are established here. Some of these conditions may be necessary, but none prove sufficient to explain why PD-13 failed. The implementation "theory" may be a useful heuristic device, but it is not theory.

In the end, the conventional cold war explanation remains the most powerful. It was, as Spear herself chronicles, the administration's overriding concern with the Soviet Union rather than the implementation process itself that doomed Carter's arms restraint policy. In 1978, the CAT talks broke down when Zbigniew Brzezinski opposed them as a threat to his policy of balancing the Soviet Union with the China card. Similarly, PD-13 hopelessly foundered in 1980 after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the initiation of the Carter Doctrine. In both cases, arms transfers were perceived as an important tool with which to challenge the Soviet Union and protect U.S. strategic interests. When conflicting policy objectives collided, the cold war took precedence—a clear example of the primacy of foreign policy over conventional arms control concerns in a threatening international environment. Spear may be right when she concludes: "a future government prepared to invest political capital and which recognized the need to sustain a restraint effort might be able to make more progress (than the Carter Administration) in instituting arms transfer controls" (p. 195). But without a benign external environment, it will still be difficult.

The final chapter aside, this is an informative, well balanced book that vividly conveys the complexity of the domestic and international environment in which arms transfers become a litmus test for many other issues. Spear's research is very impressive. In addition to covering the vast secondary literature on public policy, arms transfers, and arms control, she has scoured the available documentary record and conducted interviews with many of the major and minor players in the Carter foreign policy establishment. Students of public policy in general and the arms trade in particular will find this a valuable scholarly resource and an enjoyable read.

STEPHANIE G. NEUMAN
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The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles *by Pavel K. Baev. Newbury Park, CA, Sage Publications, 1996. 204 pp. Cloth, $75.00; paper, $27.95.*

In his analysis of Russia's post-cold war army, Pavel K. Baev has provided a remarkably cogent analysis of the relationship between political and military transformation. He depicts the Russian army's struggle to achieve an unprecedented level of professionalism while engaged in political turf battles and extensive conflict management operations across the entire former Soviet Union. While the central theme of this work is the army's impact on Russia's political evolution, the closing chapters reveal that the direction of impact is in fact the other way around. Indeed, the nation's broken economy, bureaucratic scrambles for scarce resources, and a critical shortage of professional military manpower and modern equipment have led to an irreversible degradation of the army's preparedness. Nevertheless the army finds itself increasingly embroiled in open-ended, quasi-domestic military operations to support ill-conceived political aims. In response, the army's leadership has entered into the political fray in an effort to meet the daily needs of soldiers who in some instances lack even the basic necessities of life. Such short-term considerations have necessarily diverted

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attention and resources from the broader goal of creating a professional, fully-manned and equipped fighting force capable of meeting the strategic and operational demands of the next century. The author paints a bleak picture of the army's short-to-medium-term future as long as it remains unable to control its fiscal and political destiny.

The author has limited his analysis to the political and military role of the Russian land forces and has chosen not to treat reform efforts in the navy or air force, or issues of nuclear disarmament, or the problems attending defense industry conversion. Clearly, these topics would furnish the author with material for future volumes. Instead, Baev provides an excellent description of the military's attempt to control conflicts in the Near Abroad, including the war in Chechnya, as well as Russia's contributions to UN peacekeeping efforts in the Balkans. He highlights the seeming paradox of Russia's willingness to adhere to international codes of conduct as it engages in prestige-enhancing, UN-sanctioned peacekeeping operations abroad, while demonstrating little concern for collateral civilian damage and human rights violations as it participates in domestic conflict management. Indeed, the author points to Russia's military involvement in Chechnya as the "catalyst for all the degradation processes that had been developing in the military" (p. xi). With great insight, the author highlights the differences between Western and Russian notions of peacekeeping: the former prefer minimal force, the latter envision conflict management as a trip wire backed by overwhelming firepower. The cold war may be over, but Baev is particularly sensitive to these conceptual differences that remain between the former adversaries. And he points out that disagreement over peacekeeping operations could jeopardize further progress on strategic issues such as nuclear weapons treaties.

The author's analysis ends prior to the June 1996 Russian elections. Nevertheless, he foresees a bright political future for Alexandr Lebed and other politicians with strong links to the military. Baev notes that Lebed's emergence as a powerful opposition figure represents growing political aspirations among military (and former military) leaders. While the narrative occasionally gets mired in the fine details of bureaucratic infighting, the author's analysis is prescient given Russia's current need for a strong hand at the political helm.

Baev's analysis is particularly insightful with regard to the impact (both direct and indirect) of the Russian army's woes on European security. The author pays particular attention to the difficulties surrounding NATO enlargement, the Partnership for Peace initiative, and the prospect for a lasting peace in Bosnia. While much of the popular press is engaged in post-cold war wishful thinking, Baev provides a nuanced, realistic, and refreshingly informed analysis of the contradictions and dilemmas that face the Russian military as that nation struggles to reshape its civilian and military institutions and policies.

Though lacking an overall theoretical focus, *The Russian Army in a Time of Troubles* is founded upon the author's access to many of the primary military and political actors playing central roles in this unfolding drama. For students and specialists who struggle to stay abreast of current developments in the Russian civil-military realm, this book with its extensive bibliography provides an excellent starting point. The author's copious and informative footnoting likewise provides much information of great benefit to those who wish to pursue this topic further. Overall, this book provides valuable insight into the dynamic interplay between the political and military figures and institutions currently shaping Russia's future.

LAURA V. SWARTZ
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After the USSR: Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States *by Anatoly M. Khazanov. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995. 311 pp. $24.95.*

From his perspective as a cultural anthropologist, Anatoly Khazanov analyzes the break-up of the Soviet Union and the confusion of the post-totalitarian states in terms of competing ethnic nationalisms that seriously threaten the emergence of a stable and democratic society. The first three chapters review the Soviet, perestroika, and post-Soviet nationalities' policies, none of which resolved the underlying ethnic conflicts. Instead, they were responsible for breeding even more virulent forms. As a result, he argues, the break-up of the USSR turned most of its successors "not into nation states but rather into states with nationalistic ideologies" paving the way for authoritarianism and "leaving too little room for the development of civil society" (p. 63). What has emerged in his eyes is a variety of post-totalitarian models in which nationalism has become the reigning ideology.

Khazanov identifies five major problems spawned by the sharpening of interethnic tensions: ethnic competition in the economic, political, and linguistic spheres; territorial disputes and conflicts; ethnic minorities living outside their constituent states; dispersed and exiled nationalities; and refugees from ethnic conflicts. In this section his style is informal, almost breezy; and he clearly enjoys polemicizing those who view things differently.

The final five chapters are composed of case studies on Central Asia, Kazhakhstan, Yakutia, and the Meskhetian Turks, with a postscript on Chechnya. In many ways this is the most informative part, alternating masses of empirical detail with shrewd observations on the enormous complexity of contemporary ethnic identities and rivalries. Locating Central Asia "on the path to the third world," he attributes much of the responsibility for declining living standards, environmental disasters, and authoritarian structures to the policies of colonial exploitation by the Russian center during the Soviet period. Of three possible scenarios for future development in the region—a dictatorship by former communist leaders of the region, a dictatorship by Muslim fundamentalists, and an autocratic or semi-autocratic regime of moderate reformists—he identifies the first as already having taken place in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tadjikistan. He dismisses the second as the least likely, and offers some hope for the third and "most desirable," which shows signs of taking hold in Kazakhstan and to a lesser extent in Krygyzstan.

Whatever the form of politics, Khazanov is not optimistic about the chances to resolve the deep structural problems that beset the entire region. Indeed, throughout the second half of the book his leitmotif is the extreme fragility of internal peace throughout the Commonwealth of Independent States. He documents in great detail the massive internal migration, the ethnic pogroms, the rising tensions, and the cynical political manipulation of popular anxieties and fears by authoritarian leaders. The picture is so strongly drawn that one is left wondering why the conflicts have remained localized, at least until now. The author does not fail to mention the competition for economic resources as a factor in sharpening ethnic tensions, but tends to underestimate or at least underplay their importance in turning tensions into overt conflict.

Khazanov concludes by predicting that if the successor states persist in the Soviet style nationality policies, then the ethnic minorities, perceiving the disadvantages of their status will also embrace full fledged nationalism. There is plenty of room to dispute some of Khazanov's views, but what lends the book its particular power is the combination of the author's vast experience in the field, his omnivorous reading of the press and periodical

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literature, and his judicious use of theoretical insights. Those who challenge him must match him in these areas as well.

ALFRED J. RIEBER
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Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949 *by Carolyn Woods Eisenberg. New York, Cambridge Unversity Press, 1996. 522 pp. $59.95.*

Perhaps now that the postwar Germanies have been united there can be a more dispassionate consideration of the partition of Germany. Though there is a considerable literature on United States policy regarding Germany during the war and in the immediate postwar period, most of it has focused on the implementation of a punitive military occupation authorized by Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 1067, on the denazification of Germany (or lack thereof) and the democratization or Americanization of West Germany. Literature on the cold war also gives Germany and the perennial German question a central place, but generally from the perspective of establishing responsibility for the cold war in United States-Soviet relations.

Drawing the Line falls somewhat between these two; it comprehensively analyzes the American role in the division of Germany, a task not adequately undertaken in previous studies. According to Eisenberg, the United States deliberately set about to partition Germany, not the Soviets as it is generally supposed in most accounts, a policy she thinks unwise and with tragic consequences for the forty years Europe and Germany were divided. This is not an entirely novel idea, but Eisenberg persuasively supports her argument that JCS 1067, in spite of its language, was not a reincarnated Morgenthau plan and that military occupation was intended to be brief and not "prejudice whatever ultimate policies may be later determined upon" (p. 47). These and other arguments upon which she builds her case are backed up by extensive research in printed and archival sources, though these are overwhelmingly American in origin. Her claim that research in Russian archives will not alter her depiction of American policy may be true, but it may nuance her views.

Eisenberg's main conclusion is that the State Department is fundamentally responsible for the division of Germany. The public was led to believe a punitive policy was put into effect, as Franklin Roosevelt had wanted. Policy makers like Henry Stimson, John McCloy, and William Clayton, however, wanted to restore Germany within a multilateral trading system, something that could not be accomplished in cooperation with the Russians over reparations and keep Germany economically unified. Eisenberg defends the Soviets; they were opportunistic and not driven to communize their zone. Conditions in the East remained flexible into 1946, and compromise might have been possible then and later. The United States reluctantly opted for partition, but saw that as the only way to integrate the wealthiest and most populous part of Germany into a restored European economy. The United States, joined by Britain, continually took the initiative, responding not to the threat of revolution but to Russian pressure to return to the Potsdam agreements. The Berlin blockade gave the United States, which rejected United Nations mediation, a tool for bringing the French around to support reconstruction, gaining influence within Germany, and uniting the west while depicting the Russians as the villains.

Why did the United State prefer partition? Some, like George F. Kennan, feared Soviet aggression. But Eisenberg finds no conspiring cold warriors, only a Washington determined

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to achieve a prosperous Europe. Since Washington had never explained its policy shift to its citizens, it was presented after mid-1947 as containment rather than German reconstruction. Alternatives were not explored. That the Russians might feel robbed of the world war victory and threatened was not considered. A "divided Germany was not simply a symbol but also a stimulus to East-West confrontation" (p. 460). The consequence? East Germany was abandoned, Europe split, and Europe militarized. This is a thorough, beautifully written study; it is unlikely to be superseded.

LOYD E. LEE
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Roosevelt's Warrior: Harold L. Ickes and the New Deal *by Jeanne Nienaber Clarke. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 414 pp. $39.95*

FDR remarked cryptically, after interviewing Harold L. Ickes in early 1933 for the job of secretary of the interior, "I liked the cut of his jib" (p. 29). Ickes, however, was not Roosevelt's first choice. Two western U.S. senators—Hiram Johnson of California and Bronson Cutting of New Mexico—had turned down the job offer before Roosevelt settled on Ickes, a former Bull Moose Progressive. Ickes, who had frequently dabbled in Chicago reform politics, was a political unknown in 1933, when he took over the Interior Department, one of the less prestigious and more scandal-prone departments in the executive branch.

Over the next thirteen years, Ickes—the longest serving secretary of the interior—guarded the nation's natural resources like a pit bull. According to biographer Jeanne Nienaber Clarke, "During Ickes tenure forty-seven new park areas were added to the national park system, ranging from the Olympic National Park in Washington State to Cape Hatteras National Seashore in North Carolina" (p. 113).

For several years, Ickes simultaneously held down three major jobs—interior secretary, director of the giant Public Works Administration (PWA), and the Oil Administration, which was established to manage chaotic overproduction and price-cutting in this vital industry. Ickes became, in a sense, the first "super Cabinet officer." Habitually, Ickes put in a six-day work week, and on Sunday he would handle special correspondence and dictate his secret diary—arguably one of the best insider sources on the Roosevelt years.

With the possible exception of Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt's closest confidant for many years, no one was more devoted to FDR and the New Deal program than the feisty Interior secretary. Ickes thrived on being Roosevelt's top point-man in attacking political opponents. Indeed, whenever Roosevelt wanted any heavy political lifting done, Ickes was invariably his first choice.

Ickes temper was notorious, and it often led to bitter disputes with Cabinet colleagues, especially Secretary of Commerce Harry Hopkins and Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace. Ickes, Clarke recounts, spent his entire thirteen years at the Interior trying to wrest the powerful Forestry Service from the Department of Agriculture to Interior, but he never succeeded.

Although "Honest Harold's" public record seemed above reproach, Ickes's private life was not exactly exemplary. A heavily edited version of his memoirs was published in 1943, titled *The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon*, but Clarke reports that this book could be described as light reading compared to his secret diaries.

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In his dealings with his domineering first wife and step-children, Ickes's diary "reveals a side of himself which on occasion was distinctly at odds with his public persona" (p. 330). According to Clarke's unflattering portrayal, Ickes, after his wife's death in a car accident in 1935, "cheated his three step-children out of their share of their mother's inheritance" (p. 375). One of his stepchildren, Wilmarth, committed suicide a year later. Earlier, during World War I, Ickes, while working for the YMCA in Paris, apparently had an extended affair with his wife's adopted daughter, Frances, who was then serving with the Red Cross in France.

On balance, however, Clarke gives Ickes the highest marks for his departmental stewardship and his advisory role to President Roosevelt. In Clarke's words, "Harold Ickes earned himself the reputation of being the boldest and most outspoken Interior secretary in the history of the department" (preface xiii).

The legacy of Harold Ickes still remains with us. Even the Ickes political tradition continues. His son from his second marriage, Harold McEwen Ickes, served as a top-level White House staff member and adviser to President Bill Clinton.

JAMES W. DAVIS
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The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State *by Barnett R. Rubin. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995. 190 pp. $25.00.*

"The Northwest Frontier of India" was one of the most evocative of phrases during the British Raj. It conjured up images of fierce, bearded tribesmen, Kipling's Kim playing the Great Game, the "savage wars of peace," and young Winston Churchill discovering—or at least proclaiming—that it was quite exhilarating to be shot at and missed. It was an image begging for exploitation by romantic novelists and Hollywood. Reality, as always, was more complicated. The British, alarmed by the remorseless advance of Czarist Russia, saw the frontier and the medley of transfrontier tribesmen known as the Kingdom of Afghanistan as a crucial component in the Indian Empire's security system. After a disastrous war in 1839–1841, however, the Raj's security managers settled for a buffer state. Fearing the Russians were about to change the status quo, the British fought a second war in 1885–1886 with only marginally greater success; and thereafter, maintaining Afghan "neutrality" became one of the fundamentals of British security policy in the subcontinent. The Indian Army was left to treat the frontier and its tribesmen as a live-fire version of the National Training Center. When the Raj passed into history, Pakistan, inheritor of so many Indian Army traditions, became the warden of the frontier; and Britain's successor, the United States, was left to ponder issues of South Asian security. Afghanistan muddled along as it had for most of the twentieth century until the Soviet Empire made the mistake the British had twice made, by trying to impose its own version of an acceptable local order. Barnett Rubin analyzed what happened next in his 1995 *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*. This second volume carries the account and analysis forward virtually to yesterday. Together these books make for enlightening and very depressing reading.

Historians, pondering the roots of Germany's pre-1914 behavior, have debated whether domestic pressures of external realities drove policy. In the case of Afghanistan, as Rubin

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points out, no such debate is necessary. From the moment competing Great Powers drew near its vague borders, Afghanistan became both pawn in and product of their rivalry: "Foreign aid enable a fractious dynasty to maintain its precarious rule over territory demarcated by Britain and Russia" (p. 142). When the United States in uneasy conjunction with Pakistan became the other part of the equation, foreign aid remained the weapon of choice until the coup of 1978 and the 1979 Soviet intervention led to massive American "covert" aid (the most open such aid since the days of foreign "volunteers" in the Spanish Civil War) to anti-Soviet Afghans of all persuasions. By the time the Soviets, their empire crumbling, withdrew, a veritable witches brew had been concocted in a land always turbulent and now armed to the teeth—not to mention sown with millions of mines. The competing agendas of the Soviets, the Reagan administration, Pakistani generals, Saudi aid donors, and various Afghan groups had produced a situation that only outside pressure could have resolved. But the Soviet empire was gone, and the Americans had lost interest. The whole sorry business was handed over to the UN and the fighting raged on. As this review is written, the Taliban fundamentalists have taken Kabul and ordered women swathed in bombazine, while their opponents attempt to muster a counterattack.

Sir William Kaye's two-volume history of the 1839–1841 British debacle in Afghanistan is a Victorian classic; Rubin has produced a twentieth century sequel. One hopes it is read more attentively by policy makers than ever Kaye's was.

RAYMOND CALLAHAN
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The Arab Middle East and the United States: Inter-Arab Rivalry and Superpower Diplomacy *by Burton I. Kaufman. New York, Twayne Publishers, 1996. 291 pp. Cloth, $26.95; paper, $16.95.*

Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East *by Fred Halliday. London and New York, I.B. Tauris, 1996. 255 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper, $18.95.*

These two books examine the relations between the Western powers and Arab/Muslim states. While Burton Kaufman focuses specifically on American foreign policy toward the Arab Middle East, Fred Halliday examines some of the complex religious, sociopolitical, and economic issues that have influenced the relationship between the world of Islam and the West. Both authors arrive at a similar conclusion: neither Islam nor the West can be viewed as a uniform, monolithic, and homogenous bloc. Diversity, not uniformity, characterizes the two blocs' power structures and political life. The authors criticize some voices in the West who tend to treat the Arab or Muslim world as a coherent coalition rather than as a collection of particular societies and political systems. In particular, the authors highlight the deep cleavages and rivalries that divide the Arabs and Muslims and hinder any quest for Arab or Islamic unity. For example, Halliday, a British academic, argues that the term unitary or timeless "Islam" has little analytical value. He calls instead for examining the sociopolitical realities of Muslim societies and the various uses to which Islamic symbols and doctrines are put.

Halliday contends that although the clash of civilizations hypothesis has recently gained currency in the West, it is ahistorical. This myth, asserts Halliday, is paradoxically propagated by a strange combination of rival political camps: Western right-wing politicians and ob-

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servers, who seek to turn the Muslim world into another enemy, and some Islamist militants, who resent the West's influence and advocate a confrontation with it. Halliday devotes considerable time and space to exposing and debunking the rhetoric of the Islamic movements for being deliberately provocative, for being dismissive of the concept of ethnic and national distinctions as alien, and for affirming the unchanging nature of Islam. Those Islamists, argues the author, play into the hands of some elements in the West, who believe that the Green menace has replaced the Red menace as the new enemy. Halliday indirectly implies that the rhetoric and action of the militant Islamists are mainly responsible for the rise of the current anti-Islamism in the West. His account leaves the reader with the impression that if the Islamic activists were to behave, anti-Islamism would vanish.

One of Halliday's central arguments is that security concerns and strategic calculations, not history or culture, explain the contemporary roots of anti-Islamism in the West. These include the militancy of the Islamic revolution in Iran, the fear of terrorism and the acquisition of nonconventional weapons by Muslim states and movements, the issue of Muslim immigration to Western European countries, the threat to Western access to Gulf oil, and Israel's security. Halliday implicitly takes issue with many scholars on Islam—John Esposito, Yvonne Haddad, Edward Said, and John Voll—who argue that anti-Islamism in the West is deeply rooted in historical perceptions, prejudices, and power relations. Halliday refutes the notion that the West needs an external enemy, be it communism or Islamism: capitalism is an open system that thrives on open markets, frontiers, and exchanges.

Two chapters in Halliday's collection of essays deserve special attention and merit. The first, "The Iranian Revolution in Comparative Perspective," provides a critical account of the causes of the 1979 social upheaval that toppled the shah's monarchy. Halliday compares the Iranian revolution to other urban-based populist movements in other Third World countries that had undergone rapid and uneven socioeconomic transformation. In the case of Iran, the author notes that although the clergy directed the revolutionary struggle throughout, other social forces played a decisive role. Halliday argues that the Iranian revolution had an Islamic ideological character, yet the image of an Islamic revolution is too simple: "thus the Iranian revolution has more in common with revolutions in other societies than the specifically religious dimensions will permit" (p. 73). Furthermore, the author notes that success of the Iranian revolution owed much to the paradoxical unity of traditional and modern forces.

Halliday's chapter on Islam and human rights raises thought-provoking questions about the issue of relativism and universalism in the debate between Third World states and the industrialized West. He argues that the Islamic response to the human rights debate is a form of "cultural relativism." He asserts further that the attempt by some Islamists to construct an "Islamic" position on human rights is doomed, since respect for human rights can only be guaranteed by the secularized derivation of natural law that underpins the Franco-American discourse present in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In this context, Halliday takes an absolutist and universalist position on the relationship between religion and human rights: no derivation from any religion may be possible when it comes to human rights.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with Halliday's arguments, one has to come to terms with them. Although most of the chapters in *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation* have been published before, they have been revised and updated. What links the various essays together is the denial of the common assumption that the Middle East is a unique case, different from the rest of the world and incomprehensible to outsiders. Halliday's intellectual commitment to comprehending the region within the larger context of the study of other cultures and societies sheds much light on complex regional dynamics, especially the role and function of Islam in the political process. One fears, however, that Halliday's global and universal approach, if stretched too far, might obscure and conceal critical specificities and particulari-

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ties that are important and relevant to the overall understanding of Middle Eastern/Islamic societies.

Unlike Halliday's, Kaufman's *The Arab Middle East and the United States* provides a general introduction and chronological survey of U.S. foreign relations with the Arab world from the end of World War II until the 1991 Gulf War and its aftermath. Kaufman advances three hypotheses. First, the author argues that the United States erred in treating "the Arab world" as a uniform and coherent entity. Time and again, U.S. decision makers, asserts Kaufman, overlooked the deep divisions and cleavages among the Arab states, thus failing to formulate effective policies. The weight of evidence shows, however, that far from dealing with the Arab world as a monolithic bloc, U.S. officials invested many resources attempting to contain the forces of pan-Arab nationalism as led by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The United States proposed and contributed to the establishment of several regional defense pacts—the 1954 Baghdad Pact, the 1957 Eisenhower Doctrine, and an alliance of Islamic states in the 1960s—to frustrate Nasser's efforts at Arab unity. The United States was not only aware of the centrifugal tendencies in the Arab world but also exploited them to keep the pan-nationalists off balance.

Second, Kaufman notes that American foreign policy was handicapped by cold war considerations: U.S. policy makers' obsession with Soviet communism blinded them to the real local dynamics affecting Middle Eastern societies and politics. In fact, Washington's concern with the cold war was one of the major reasons behind U.S. officials' mistrust and fear of the Arab nationalists as represented by Nasser. In U.S. eyes, Arab unity was equated with communism. Nevertheless, Kaufman's second hypothesis makes sense, and it is widely accepted in the literature. Finally, although Kaufman argues that oil has played an important role in U.S.–Arab relations, he cautions the reader against overstating the power and significance of the oil factor in Washington's strategy. Ironically, Kaufman's own research shows clearly that the West's dependence on Arab Gulf oil has been a constant variable in how the United States has responded to developments in the regional system, be it the fear of Soviet expansionism, Arabism, the Islamic revolution in Iran, or Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Thus Kaufman's assertion that the United States' special relationship with Israel occupies a higher place than oil on Washington's foreign policy agenda is not convincing. It is worth remembering that the U.S.–Israeli relationship did not become intimate until the late 1960s. Even now, the Washington-Jerusalem axis is much more complex and ambiguous than some analysts would like us to believe. This fact was explicitly demonstrated during the 1991 Gulf War. U.S. officials were extremely worried lest their alliance with Israel undermine the viability of the Arab coalition against Iraq. Hence the Bush administration exerted tremendous pressure on the Israeli government to refrain from responding to Iraq's missile attacks.

To disagree with Kaufman's arguments is not to belittle them. On the contrary, the author has written one of the few comprehensive accounts of U.S. diplomatic history with the Arab world. This book is beautifully written and well researched, though it is based primarily on secondary sources. More importantly, *The Arab Middle East* makes an excellent text book for undergraduates in a variety of courses.

FAWAZ A. GERGES
Sarah Lawrence College

Inside the Kremlin During the Yom Kippur War *by Victor Israelyan. University Park, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. 238 pp. $29.95.*

Victor Israelyan, a career diplomat and member of a special Soviet Foreign Ministry taskforce that was told to prepare memoranda for the Politburo during the 1973 Yom Kippur War,

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was in a unique position to observe Soviet decision making at the time. This book, based on papers in his files and on his and others' reminiscences, provides invaluable insight into Soviet decision making throughout the 1973 Middle East War.

The narrative begins on 4 October 1973, when the author was informed by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko that war in the Middle East would begin on 6 October. (Israelyan readily admits that he cannot solve the mystery of when exactly the Soviet Union was informed of the Egyptian and Syrian decisions to go to war or by what channels.) He goes on to describe Politburo meetings at which the Soviet leadership dealt with the changing military situation of its clients, Egypt and Syria, as well as with U.S.–Soviet crisis management.

One central focus of the book is the almost frantic effort to arrange as quickly as possible a cease-fire that would be acceptable to the Arabs. Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev had apparently concluded that the earlier the cease-fire could be arranged, the less damage there would potentially be to U.S.–Soviet relations only a year after the beginning of détente.

In one of the most revealing sections of the book, Israelyan details how the letter proposing joint action to save the Egyptian Third Army, but also threatening unilateral Soviet intervention, came to be sent to Washington. According to Israelyan, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat appealed both to the United States and the USSR to send observers to the Egyptian side of the front; however, in his conversations with the Soviet ambassador in Eygpt, Sadat added that if there were no superpower cooperation, the USSR should act separately. By the same token, Brezhnev presumed that the wording "under appropriate auspices" contained in the UN Security Council cease-fire resolution gave the United States and the USSR a unique role to play. Hence, the proposal for joint intervention coupled with the threat of unilateral Soviet action. In Israelyan's view, the Kremlin thought it was answering Sadat's appeal and ". . . in urging Washington to act jointly in acccordance with the ideas shared by the superpower leaders, the Kremlin [thought it] was fostering detente" (p. 170).

Inside the Kremlin during the Yom Kippur War describes a Soviet leadership that was attempting to pursue contradictory objectives: continuation of the then-newly established détente with the United States and the ideologically driven dictate of supporting the Arab cause in the name of championing the national liberation movement. It also makes clear that the Politburo clearly misperceived how its policies would be interpreted in the West. Israelyan details the surprise of the leadership when, in response to Brezhnev's letter, the United States put its forces in Europe on DEFCON III alert and how the Soviet leadership, perhaps recognizing that it had miscalculated, ultimately decided not to respond.

In the final analysis, Israelyan's book will be invaluable to scholars of the Middle East, the Soviet Union, and the cold war. It is a revealing picture of the dynamics of East-West relations at the time and of Soviet ties to the Arabs. Israelyan's account underscores how, despite détente, each side actually took extreme measures (the threat of intervention and the DEFCON alert) to protect its interests in the region. This excellent book goes a long way toward filling a huge gap in the literature on the 1973 war—a first hand Soviet perspective.

CAROL R. SAIVETZ
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Wars, Internal Conflicts, and Political Order: A Jewish Democracy in the Middle East *by Gad Barzilai. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1996. 301 pp. Paper, $23.95.*

In *Wars, Internal Conflicts, and Political Order*, Gad Barzilai examines the political debates in Israel over the use of military force and the effect of such operations on domestic consensus.

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In doing so, he draws us into two central but generally neglected issues: the relationship between international conflict and the character of society, and how and whether the protracted conflict altered the character of Israel's domestic political system. On such matters of relative silence, Barzilai's voice is quite welcome and refreshing, and will be of considerable interest to scholars of Israel, comparative politics, and international relations.

Barzilai begins with a survey of the general literature on the relationship between war-making and statemaking with specific attention to war's effects on democratic principles. Given the conventional understanding that war tends to accentuate the least democratic features of society because of the creed that dissent must be sacrificed on the altar of national security, there is every reason to expect a protracted and high-threat environment to undermine democratic principles and possibilities.

To address the issue of the effect of military operations on consensus, Barzilai explores two central factors. The first concerns the Israeli political parties' programmatic objectives, estimation of the goals and aims of the Arab states, and understanding of how the use of force might further their own party's objectives and send the right message to the Arab states. The second is the powerful pull toward consensus that exists on matters of national security, a pull that is further magnetized by the political manipulations and interventions of state elites in order to silence opposition to their military policies. There is almost a rhythmic quality as different party positions before the military operation are quickly elided by the twin fears of war and the political consequences of being portrayed as a security dissident. But the magnet of consensus has weakened with each subsequent war.

This approach drives a dry but highly informative historical narrative. Barzilai opens his historical discussion with the 1956 Suez War. He notes that in the immediate period prior to Israel's attack there was a heated debate over the proper use of force and whether and when a preemptive strike that died once operations began was warranted. There was little dissent during the 1967 war because the looming existential and military threat created a near total consensus.

The War of Attrition whittled away the previous norms that enabled the political elite to control public information and to shield itself from public accountability, leading to a "democratization of national security." The vaunted national security consensus was further eroded by the Yom Kippur War and then shattered by the 1982 Lebanon War. Political parties that once felt the need to subordinate their dissent because of a national security consensus no longer felt the same restraints, partly because political elites no longer held the same authority on security issues. Today the handling of national security nearly has become a public free-for-all.

But what of the long-term effect of the use of military force on Israeli society and democracy? Barzilai equivocates between saying something broader about the relationship between military operations and democracy and limiting his analysis to the issue of public debate over national security. Such equivocation relates to three general problems for attempting to determine the impact of war on consensus. First, Barzilai focuses almost exclusively on party politics to the relative neglect of extraparliamentary protest. Second, he excludes minority populations from his analysis, which is indefensible when examining how security imperatives affect democratic principles and questions of consensus. Third, because he does not adequately control for competing variables such as the political economy, he is unable to demonstrate convincingly the effect of military operations on consensus.

These problems notwithstanding, *Wars, Internal Conflicts, and Political Order* represents a welcome contribution to our understanding of Israeli national security policy and its

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relationship to the domestic polity, and the connection between warmaking and statemaking in modern societies.

MICHAEL BARNETT
University of Wisconsin—Madison

Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: Legacy and Politics *by Ilan Peleg. Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1995. 191 pp. $34.95.*

When the Palestinian uprising against Israeli rule broke out in December 1987, its most pressing demand was for a sovereign state. Israel's resistance to the notion, however, channeled the debate over Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip toward a discussion of human rights. The U.S. State Department and international rights groups wrote numerous reports stating that Israel's repression of the Palestinian Intifada was excessively brutal. Criticism mounted, and the Israeli state found itself trapped between the desire to repress Palestinian claims while simultaneously maintaining its image as a democracy deserving of massive U.S. financial support. The dilemma eventually forced Israel toward political negotiations.

Peleg's book does a good job of summarizing the different positions on key human rights debates, including those dealing with the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Israel's deportation of Palestinians, excessive use of lethal force, home demolition policy, and reliance on imprisonment without trial. The section on military justice is particularly useful. Tens of thousands of Palestinians have passed through Israeli military courts since 1988, and most were badly treated. In many cases, for example, detainees were tortured and forced to sign dictated confessions. Peleg's analysis of Israel's land-expropriation policies is also well done, and his summary of the methods used by the Likud government to launch an unprecedented grab for Palestinian land in the 1980s is excellent.

This book does not, however, offer much that is new. Peleg's empirical data, based largely on published human rights reports, includes no fieldwork or innovative archival work. Peleg does not offer a new or authoritative legal perspective, satisfying himself merely with qualified support for international legal criticisms of Israeli policy. The book makes no theoretical contribution and offers little in the way of comparative breadth or historical depth. Completed in early 1994, it does not address the new political system set up by the Palestinian authority in portions of the West Bank and Gaza.

The book's greatest drawback is its lack of political analysis. What impact did criticism have on Israeli policies? How did the human rights debate constrain Israel's political options? What was the relative effect of domestic and international actors? How did Palestinians use human rights campaigns to further their political goals? What impact did the debate have on Israeli society? The reader will search in vain for answers to these and other questions. Peleg's main contribution, beyond providing a good synthesis of existing debates, is his argument that the Likud government's settlement policy was a major cause of human rights abuse. Yet the chapter on Jewish settlers, while valuable in and of itself, is poorly integrated with the rest of the book, and the argument remains unsubstantiated.

Peleg's conclusions are hardly surprising. Israel has systematically violated Palestinian rights, but has not been as brutal as other, unspecified occupations. To a large extent, Israel's

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abuse of Palestinians flows directly from its military rule over a large, disempowered population: ". . . one is . . . bound to recognize that the condition of occupation itself leads to serious violations of human rights" (p. 122). The concluding chapter, which discusses the human rights implications of different political solutions, is cursory and disappointing.

This book is appropriate for instructors seeking to introduce students to a complex legal debate or as a human rights supplement to an undergraduate course on Palestinian-Israeli politics. For those with prior expertise, the book provides a useful bibliography and guidance on technical issues. For those looking for a study linking politics and human rights, however, the search continues.

JAMES RON
University of California at Berkeley

Secret War in the Middle East: The Covert Struggle for Syria, 1949–1961 *by Andrew Rathmell. New York, I.B. Publishers, 1995. 246 pp. $59.50.*

As British and U.S. archival materials from the 1950s have become declassified over the past ten years, there has been a spate of recent publications that has examined what is definitely the most complex era in the post–World War II Middle East. There were a number of countervailing historical forces at work during this period, such as the decolonization process and Arab state-building in its wake, the rise of Arab nationalism, the formalization of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the beginning of the Arab cold war, and the imposition upon all of this of the superpower cold war. No country in the Middle East better reflected the intermixing of these historical forces than Syria; indeed, Patrick Seale's title to his landmark 1965 book, *The Struggle for Syria*, accurately describes how Syria became the focal point of a domestic, regional, and international tug-of-war for power and influence. In this environment, intrigue and covert operations, or at least the perception of such, seemed to be the defining characteristic. This reviewer's book, *Syria and the United States: Eisenhower's Cold War in the Middle East* (1992), armed with declassified materials not available to Seale, took up where *The Struggle for Syria* left off. Two books have come out in the past year that similarly examine this topic: Andrew Rathmell's work and Bonnie Saunders's *The United States and Arab Nationalism: The Syrian Case, 1953–1960.* Expecting these books to expand upon the foundation built by Seale and Leach, they are, unfortunately, somewhat disappointing, but for different reasons. Saunders' book is much too simplistic, attempting to explain this complex period in ninety-seven pages (including endnotes). Her work should be seen as more of an introductory survey to the subject better fitted as a chapter within a textbook, and as such has some merit, but as a work of serious scholarship it is severely lacking.

Rathmell's work, on the other hand, is the most thoroughly researched book yet to be published on this topic, employing a wide variety of Western and Middle Eastern sources. The book is intended to take a scholarly approach to a subject that has traditionally been sensationalized by other authors in the past, most notably by former intelligence officers who consistently embellished the level of intrigue actually present. Rathmell is quite correct in making it clear that there is certainly less than meets the eye with regard to the plethora of conspiracies attributed to the period, and, in fact, those that did exist were consistently engineered more at the domestic and regional levels than at the international level involving the superpowers and/or European powers, whose influence and efforts, with some notable exceptions, were more often than not tangential.

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Although laudable, the nature of the book is self-limiting. At most the researcher is left with circumstantial evidence upon which to make speculative conclusions. While certainly more objective and well-researched than the works by those intelligence officers and some journalists, the book still cannot, because of the unavailability of "smoking-gun" documents, offer any significant concrete assertions that go beyond what other scholarly works have offered.

In addition, the book itself is a hard read. This reviewer, by virtue of the aforementioned work, is well-versed in the events and personalities of the period, yet still found it very difficult to keep track of what was going on—that is, in part, a reflection of the complexity of the subject. But as is the case with many dissertations-turned-books, the text resembles a litany of documents strung together, devoid of adequate context or a cogent story. The subheadings seem to have been arbitrarily inserted after the fact rather than having been the result of a well-thought out strategic plan intended to take the reader along a definable path. Having obviously been intensely immersed in the documents, the author needed to step back and make sure he did not lose sight of the forest from the trees; unfortunately, this was not done. As a result, the work tends to be encyclopedic in nature rather than analytical and/or interpretive. Because of the depth of research, however, this book is definitely useful and highly recommended as a reference tool for others taking up the challenge of examining Syria in the 1950s.

DAVID W. LESCH
Trinity University, San Antonio, Texas

Military Rebellion in Argentina: Between Coups and Consolidation *by Deborah L. Norden. Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1996. 242 pp. Cloth, $45.00; paper, $17.50.*

The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1962–1973: From Frondizi's Fall to the Peronist Restoration *by Robert A. Potash. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1996. 547 pp. $55.00.*

Deborah Norden's book breaks away from the standard dichotomy between military subordination and coup d'etat to expose the reader to an important middle ground: the military rebellion. Threatening or utilizing violence for purposes of bettering the institution rather than seizing state power, military rebels have a place in history and should be objects of study, particularly during times when a full-scale military assault on civilian government seems less likely. Insurrections are important because they can still do political harm to incumbents, and can delay or complicate the quest for democratic consolidation. To understand events such as these, which often pit one part of the armed forces against another, it is of no value to treat the military as a unitary actor. Thus, Norden takes us deep inside the Argentine army to unveil the tensions, contradictions, and divisions that gave rise to the uprisings of 1987–1990.

While vertically-ordered, ideological, political, and service-oriented cleavages within the military have already been the object of study by others, the author calls our attention to horizontal splits that pitted older managers against younger warriors. Though both groups served a purpose within the profession, they differed sharply over what constituted professional conduct. For the managers, soldiers were to demonstrate discipline and obedience to superiors at all times if the organization was to survive. For the warriors, principled defiance

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was needed to reverse governmental human rights policies that in their eyes were harming the institution. By identifying this split and by exposing the underlying resentment felt by combatants toward their commanders for having cooperated with the Raúl Alfonsín government, Norden sheds light on why the rebellions took place and who participated in them.

She then proceeds to trace the emergence and evolution of the rebellions through three phases: reaction, consolidation and diversification. She provides valuable details about the rebels known as the *carapintadas*. These rebels succeeded so long as they rallied in defense of the broad interests of the military institution. But once these motivations gave way to personal and ideological ones, the cause was lost. In analyzing the phased development of the rebellions, Norden's terminology seems sensible, but it also raises concerns. If indeed the rebels had consolidated their position by the time of the villa Martelli uprising of December 1988, as she claims, it is curious that they could not enforce compliance of an agreement they thought they had with the government. Moreover, the author is probably too charitable in defining the third phase of the movement as one of diversification; disintegration would be more fitting. While rebel leaders were reaching out to civilians, they were simultaneously burning bridges with soldiers—a fact that caused their isolation and their demise.

Her more general reflections on the foundations of chronic interventionism as found in Chapter Seven are quite interesting and pertinent to Argentine history, yet less relevant to the principle drama of this book. References to the military's mythical self-image as national saviors and guardians or as irreplaceable defenders of national security may help us understand past coups, but they do not explain these contemporary rebellions. By the author's own admission, the failures of the Proceso dictatorship and defeat in war had already compelled the armed forces to trade in messianic visions for more modest, professional ones. Norden's point that legal penalties have not been severe enough to dissuade military intervention in Argentina is probably accurate. But it begs the point that these insurrections were aroused precisely because harsh punishment had been inflicted on human rights abusers, and more was on the way. Finally, the politicization of promotions may have contributed to the rebellions, but scant evidence is provided to support this assertion.

Norden's book is insightful, well written, and a much needed antidote to the countless studies that have been singularly preoccupied with the military's seizure of state power. By focusing on professionally motivated military rebellions, instead of politically motivated coups, she reveals an important though often overlooked dimension to the complex relations between civilians and soldiers. Her book should be appreciated by those who study the armed forces in politics, as well as those who are fascinated by enigmatic Argentina.

Robert Potash's trilogy on the Argentine armed forces is now complete with the publication of the third in a series of works on the subject. This latest effort picks up where his second volume left off, with the ouster of Argentine President Arturo Frondizi (1958–1962) and his replacement by the caretaker regime of Jose Guido. It takes us through the rise and fall of democratically elected President Arturo Illia (1962–66), the military governments of Juan Ongania (1966–70), Roberto Marcelo Levingston (1970–71), and Alejandro A. Lanusse (1971–73), and the transition to elections in 1973. Like the other two books in the trilogy, this one is marked by impeccable scholarship, a penchant for detail, and a sophisticated understanding of the Argentine political scene. Potash takes us where others have not because of his incredible access to the military and political figures who were part of the drama he portrays. They have provided him with eyewitness accounts, memos, and other documentation that give us a window into events that would otherwise have remained permanently obscured.

Students of Argentine history know the general contours; Potash fills in the details, of course, as he sees them. The sheer volume of information presented is staggering, and difficult

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to keep stored in one's memory banks. There is much that is new here. For example, if we are to believe Potash's sources as well as his interpretations, then Guido turns out to be a more empathetic figure than we had imagined. Rather than being a weak servant of military masters, Guido had a backbone and dedicated himself to the restoration of constitutional government. He did so by helping tip the balance toward military legalists in their armed struggle with hardliners for control over the army.

We also learn about the running feud between the leading legalist at the time, Army Commander General Juan C. Ongania and Army Secretary Benjamin Rattenbach. The irony here is that despite his avowed commitment to the restoration of lawful, democratic rule, Ongania would not submit himself to the authority of his political superior, Rattenbach, foreshadowing his interventionist role three years hence. We also learn that Ongania's infamous 1964 West Point address, which declared the military's allegiance to the constitution but not to those in power, was not drafted by him but by members of his general staff, most notably General Osiris Villegas.

Potash's book can be faulted on several grounds. First, there is some imbalance in the presentation. For example, nearly twice as much coverage is granted to General Levingston's administration than to Arturo Illia's. Why should that be, given the fact that Illia served three years to Levingston's nine months, and given the fact that Levingston was after all a relatively minor figure in Argentine presidential history? Second, in its great effort to present to us all the facts of this historical period, it fails to parcel out those that are critically important from those that are less so. To understand Argentina, do we really need to know every decision made and every path taken, irrespective of their implications for the future? The author certainly shows us the main avenues of political action, but often spends too much time taking us down the cul de sacs as well.

And third, while the author does an adequate job of assessing some of the specific events, he does not do the same for the entire period under study. What are the general patterns observed? What hypotheses about Argentine civil-military relations have been confirmed? What ones refuted? Taken together, what implications do these events have for the future of this nation? And what comparisons can be made with other South American countries? All of these questions remain unanswered. It is as if the author expects the facts to speak for themselves, which of course they seldom do. Especially in light of the author's vast experience as a long time observer of the Argentine scene, an effort should have been made to sum up and give meaning to all of his findings.

Having said that, it is certainly true that we are more informed about Argentina than we were before the publication of Robert Potash's latest book. It offers us a unique window into military politics that only someone with this author's access and knowledge can. It is a work that should find its way onto the bookshelves of all those who want to know more about Argentina's past.

DAVID PION-BERLIN
University of California, Riverside

Authoritarianism in Latin America Since Independence *edited by Will Fowler. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1996. 166 pp.* $55.00.

Latin America's susceptibility to authoritarian government and the fragility of Latin American democracies have long preoccupied students of Latin America. Explanations by historians

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and social scientists have often focused on the heritage of Spanish administrative centralism, on the power vacuum following independence and the departure of the monarchy, on the continuing strength of institutions such as the military and the Catholic Church, and on Spanish national character. Occasionally indigenous *caciquismo* (power of tribal chiefs) is given partial responsibility. Unfortunately, *Authoritarianism in Latin America Since Independence* only rarely engages in this debate and makes little contribution toward an understanding of Latin American governmental patterns. Rather it is a collection of specific case studies focusing on particular circumstances of authoritarianism. The studies were originally presented at a symposium at the University of Liverpool in March 1994.

The most intriguing and significant contribution is that of the editor, Will Fowler. His study is entitled, "The Repeated Rise of General Antonio López de Santa Anna in the So-Called Age of Chaos: Mexico, 1821-55." Based on extensive secondary sources, opinions of contemporaries, and especially on the statements and actions of Santa Anna's most loyal and persistent supporter, General José María Tornel y Mendívil, Fowler goes far in explaining the persistent political appeal of the much-maligned Santa Anna to the Mexican people. Among his conclusions are the following: Santa Anna successfully convinced his followers that he was above party politics, that his first commitment was to the formation of the Mexican nation. His personal dynamism and charisma placed him above all other figures on the Mexican political stage. Most factions and parties believed that they could use him for their own benefit. Santa Anna generously rewarded his loyal supporters, and he was an accomplished negotiator and deal maker. Fowler's study illuminates a perplexing and neglected period in Mexican history.

Paul Garner's short essay on Porfirio Díaz takes advantage of recent historiography to attempt to account for Díaz's longevity as dictator of Mexico. His emphasis is on Díaz's personal loyalty to supporters and skill in finding ways of avoiding direct confrontations. He successfully reviews the changing historiographical interpretations of Díaz, but his neglect of the social and political problems that led to Díaz's downfall leads to a questionable conclusion. Garner believes "that had Díaz died in office before the revolution, he would have been remembered as a national hero rather than as a common criminal" (p.41). Essays on Carlos Ibañez del Campo of Chile and Fulgencio Batista of Cuba provide considerable detail on the regimes they headed or dominated, but add little to our understanding of what their careers had to do with authoritarianism in Latin America. Peter Lambert's study of the Alfredo Stroessner regime in Paraguay provides the conventional explanation of his longevity in office: Stroessner was successful in welding into one the interests of the Colorado party, the military, and the state, and in eliminating potential violent opposition through a sweeping policy of preventive arrests. The final two essays, on the military and politics in Honduras in the 1970s and on housing policies of the Augusto Pinochet regime in Chile, make only marginal contributions to the concept of authoritarianism.

As a whole, the book is somewhat disappointing, but the case studies do advance our understanding of authoritarian practices in Latin America. The appended bibliography on authoritarianism, which goes beyond works cited in the case studies, is also helpful.

CHARLES L. STANSIFER
University of Kansas

Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict, and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers *by Alan P. Dobson. New York, Routledge, 1995. 199 pp. Paper, $17.95.*

The author of this historical survey is a senior lecturer in politics at University College, Swansea. Alan Dobson's other publications have concerned Anglo-American relations since

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World War II, particularly those related to aviation and economics. It is not surprising that this book's treatment of the years since 1951 is more valuable than the coverage of the first half of the twentieth century. Even Dobson's bibliography on the early period is thin; he includes some economic analysis of Kathleen Burk, P. J. Cain, and A. G. Hopkins; some of the naval and strategic themes of Paul Kennedy; and the political interpretations of Christopher Hitchins and Donald Watt. But many subtleties in their work were missed, and much good new work on the pre- and post-World War I periods has been ignored. If the book's coverage of the earlier period had been up to the standard of the post-1951 period, then the survey would have been improved. The economic emphasis of recent historiography should also have illuminated this survey more than it does. While the establishment and demise of the Bretton Woods "system" are included, and while the postwar pressures on sterling and devaluations of the pound and dollar are chronicled, the book gives too little consideration to Anglo-American finance overriding the more competitive elements of commercial capitalism and exploitation of natural resources worldwide. Readers need to be reminded that more foreign investment in the United States still emanates from London than any other city in the world. One of the themes Dobson handles best in the book is the remarkable sharing of nuclear technology and intelligence that has characterized Anglo-American relations since World War II.

Dobson calls the years from 1951–1961 "conservatively special" and shows how Anglo-American relations were largely shaped by the cold war and Britain's economic ills, and how British officialdom deferred to their American counterparts on Far Eastern questions no more willingly than U.S. officials did to the British on Middle Eastern matters. Despite the cold war, London had to scale down its overseas military commitments and thereby lost some of its clout with Washington. Dobson labels the period fiom 1961–1979 "years of transition," given the high costs associated with Vietnam.

ROGER ADELSON
Arizona State University

Hard Bargain: How FDR Twisted Churchill's Arm, Evaded the Law, and Changed the Role of the American Presidency *by Robert Shogan. New York, Scribner, 1995. 320 pp. $24.00.*

The subtitle of this history of the famous destroyer-bases deal prior to American entry into World War II lays out the author's argument. On 3 September 1940, Labor Day, Franklin D. Roosevelt told Congress of the terms of the deal with Great Britain. He treated it as a fait accompli, citing his attorney general's opinion regarding the law. Mutterings were heard in the expected quarters, but the firestorm that even FDR expected never appeared. When it came time to pass appropriations to implement the agreement, Congress did just that.

Why? Perhaps it was FDR's cleverness. Perhaps it was the distraction of the up-coming presidential election. Perhaps it was Winston Churchill's elan and persuasiveness. But most likely it was just plain common sense in Congress and among the public. The German bombing campaigns on the continent and over Britain had driven home the arrival of the air age; the security provided by distance and the Atlantic Ocean had eroded. The swap of forty obsolete destroyers for a number of military base leases on British possessions in the western hemisphere was a good deal for America in every sense of the phrase. American security was

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enhanced, Britain's ability to resist a common threat was strengthened, and by besting their long-standing rival and former colonial master, Americans could don a self-satisfied smile.

But what about the president's torturous avoidance of the law and of Congress by using an executive agreement, the legality of which depended to a degree on the placement of a comma? By every calculus and calculation, a declaration of war would not have passed Congress in summer 1940. A premature public debate would almost certainly have brought the wrong answer—wrong as far as Roosevelt was concerned, wrong as far as Britain was concerned, wrong as far as history is concerned.

Opponents of presidential action in foreign policy have always complained that the White House exceeded its authority. Given the American political system, the alternative to presidential leadership lies at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue—Capitol Hill. (That alternative would be elevated during the anti-Vietnam War debates into an accepted truth.) But arguments that the destroyer-bases deal led inevitably to the Imperial Presidency ignore the way Congress plays the game. Since sheer practicality places the making of foreign policy primarily with the executive branch, Congress is able to sit back and play dog-in-the-manger—carping, criticizing, and playing to the voters. Congress reflects public perceptions far more accurately and with a crude broadness that goes beyond any opinion poll or pundit. Yet, for the crucial stages of America's "neutrality," whether before Pearl Harbor or, for that matter, before the mid-1960s "intervention" in Indochina, Congress felt no overwhelming public pressure to restrain presidential actions or change U.S. foreign policy.

Shogan quotes the book of Psalms—"Put not your trust in princes." That is always good advice but begs the question. Where should trust be placed? The Psalmist meant God, but that too begs the question. In the American democratic republic, the alternatives are Congress and the courts. No one in Congress introduced legislation to nullify the destroyer-bases deal. No one filed charges against the president or his cabinet for violating the law. Public opinion—created and expressed in polls, print, and radio—supported the arrangement, as did the bulk of White House mail, to Roosevelt's surprise. One hundred seventy-five years earlier, James Madison had argued that the prince, in this case the president, could be restrained only by politics—not by law. Perhaps the reason FDR could manipulate the politics and even dissemble and lie is that the "people" did not disagree. That's how politics works.

A clear indicator of public concern for the nation's security came shortly after the destroyer-bases deal when, on 16 September 1940, Roosevelt signed into law the first peacetime draft in American history, a law that passed Congress with solid margins.

To picture the destroyer-bases deal as what "changed the role of the American presidency" is a gross and silly exaggeration. But, that transparent salesmanship aside, this is a solid, well-researched study of an important episode.

WARREN F. KIMBALL
Rutgers University

The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79, *by Ben Kiernan. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1996. 478 pp. $35.00.*

This work reports on what must surely be the most bizarre political science experiment of the century. The gruesome events it recounts seem to belong only in a Friday night horror movie.

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Ben Kiernan, an Australian academic specialist on Cambodia, researched his book for two decades. He is now at Yale University as director of the Cambodian Genocide Program, a quasi-legal investigation, funded largely by the U.S. government, to gather evidence of the Khmer Rouge crimes against humanity.

His book is in three parts following a brief introductory chapter on the formation and wartime years of the Khmer Rouge: "Wiping the Slate Clean" contains three chapters on "cleansing" Cambodia's cities, countryside, and frontiers; "Writing on the Slate" describes the installation of what is termed an indentured agrarian state; and "The Slate Crumbles" is four chapters on the convolutions of power holding, foreign policy, and the final destruction of Khmer Rouge rule by Vietnamese invaders. There are photographs, maps, a select bibliography, and a whopping 2,991 footnotes.

The operative question to be answered here is this: What was the nature of the regime known as the Khmer Rouge which briefly ruled Cambodia in the late 1970s and did its level best to expunge the existing culture at a cost of the lives of perhaps 20 percent of eight million persons?

Were government and politics in Phnom Penh simply sheer madness, as seemed to be the evaluation by foreign ministries, including the U.S. State department? Or were they, as apologists abroad professed to discern, a rational construct in governance characterized by a brave new social vision? At this late date, with our increased knowledge, madness vs. utopianism no longer satisfies. But the question remains. Starkly it stands there: What was the existential nature of the Khmer Rouge during those five years in power.

Kiernan skirts the question, apparently because he sees his research as an exercise in racist historical chronology rather than as political science conceptualization. He seems chiefly interested in savaging Pol Pot's political science experiment—and well it deserves—not in seeking to explain it. He answers the question *what* and *how*? But not *why*? It is the book's chief weakness.

To the first explanation—ideological madness—we have since added an apologist addendum, namely that the Khmer Rouge were driven to madness by U.S. B-52 bombing. The second thesis—it was a utopian dream—continues to be espoused by some: eliminate modern Cambodia and return it to the glory days of Angkor. A third major thesis now exists, what might be called the nominal explanation. It argues that what prevailed in Cambodia during those years was anarchy—using the simple dictionary definition—absence of government. The place was run, if that be the word, by teenage barbarians with AK-47 rifles. There is evidence in the Kiernan work to support all three explanations, but not enough to convince us of any one. Kiernan suggests that the Khmer Rouge were driven by ideological impulses which might be Marxist or fascist or of some indigenous totalitarian meaning, and by racism (which may explain killing minorities but not Cambodians).

Perhaps to delineate and analyze the existential nature of the Khmer Rouge is an academic Mission Impossible. As with the other major unbelievable acts of inhumanity—Hitler and six million Jews; Stalin and ten million kulaks; Mao and fifteen million landlords—we can search but we will never find an answer to the question, Why? The best we can do is to treat these as cautionary warnings. They, and Cambodia under Pol Pot, are a rebuke to all of us in this century for allowing collectivist politics to corrupt us into indifference to man's inhumanity to man and for accepting the notion there need be no fixed limit to political action so long as it is pursued in the name of social perfection.

DOUGLAS PIKE
University of California, Berkeley

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The Politics of German Child Welfare from the Empire to the Federal Republic *by Edward Ross Dickinson. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1996. 365 pp. $45.00.*

In Dickinson's analysis, the phrase "politics of" can be read in three ways, all of which shed considerable light on the ways in which Germans have responded to what seemed to many of them to be one of the most problematic aspects of social modernization.

Much of the book treats struggles among political actors (and others, including clergymen, medical doctors, and social workers) over the proper treatment of young people who were deemed to be at risk either of dying prematurely or becoming delinquent. Entering dramatically into public consciousness in the 1890s, the dangers of mortality and especially of (im)morality among young Germans continued to resonate in public discourse throughout the succeeding decades of war, political upheaval, and reconstruction. Dickinson frequently deals with debates such as the following: Under what circumstances should (potentially) wayward youth be subjected to "correctional education," and to what extent should emphasis be placed on more benignly pedagogical strategies of the sort advocated by the proponents of public legal guardianship and *Jugendpflege* (youth care)? Such questions were never settled definitively one way or the other, but over the long run educational strategies based on genuine concern for the welfare of young people clearly gained the upper hand.

Dickinson also analyzes the ongoing contest for control over the welfare process itself, focusing on arguments with regard to the proper loci of authority and responsibility for either protecting or correcting young people. What were deemed to be the appropriate functions of, on the one hand, charitable agencies that operated under the aegis of the Protestant Inner Mission and the Catholic Caritas Association and, on the other, of public institutions such as municipal youth bureaus? And what about the respective spheres of men and women? Much of the volume offers answers to these and related questions, demonstrating the clear tendency toward the growth of the public sector while at the same time also making clear that religious and other associations continued to play a vital role. Indeed, the book effectively concludes with the Child Welfare Act of 1961, which legislated a compromise between statism and confessionalism that secured for supporters of the latter far-reaching powers of participation in the welfare process.

Finally, the author assesses the interrelations between welfare policy and the basic nature of the various political regimes under which Germans lived during the period under consideration. In this regard, his central question pertains to the ways in which a secular trend toward secular approaches that placed increased emphasis on assistance and education instead of punishment did or did not pave the way for heightened authoritarianism within the public sphere more generally. To put the matter bluntly, was there a "fascist logic" in the "progressive" agenda of social engineers that predisposed them to serve first as spokespersons for imperialism and then as willing accomplices of the National Socialists?

Dickinson answers this question by saying "yes, but. . . ." Drawing on the work of Detlev Peukert and Jacques Donzelot, he argues that there was certainly a potential continuity between the medicalization of deviancy and the killing of deviants. His study "does not, however, confirm the equation of 'social discipline' with fascism, much less mass murder" (p. 292). By taking 1961 instead of 1945 as his end point, he places his ultimate emphasis not on authoritarian continuities between the Empire and the Third Reich but instead on democratic continuities between the Empire, the Weimar Republic, and the Federal Republic. In so doing, he makes a signal contribution to our understanding of the rich complexity of

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social politics in a country whose history pre-1945 is still too frequently viewed as a *Sonderweg* into the abyss.

ANDREW LEES
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SDP: The Birth, Life, and Death of the Social Democratic Party *by Ivor Crewe and Anthony King. New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. 611 pp. $47.00.*

Everything that close students of British politics will want to know about Britain's short-lived Social Democratic party of the 1980s is almost certain to be found in this definitive study. Written with great skill by two eminent British political scientists, its insightful analysis draws on personal observation of participants along with bountiful documentary sources, election data, and interviews. The research is massive and thorough. Most of the book is a narrative account of SDP history, but five of twenty-three chapters describe the structure and composition of what was meant to be a new kind of party. Included too are many graphs, tables, cartoons, and photographs.

One might wonder about devoting so much talent and effort to the study of a political party whose failure became clear after only six years. To be sure, the authors did not know that it would fail when they began their study in 1981 during the party's first and most promising year. Even as a failure, however, the SDP commands attention. After its well publicized launch by four prominent former Labour ministers—Roy Jenkins, Shirley Williams, Bill Rodgers, and David Owen—the SDP included twenty-eight MPs who broke from Labour and one from the Conservatives. In an alliance with the old Liberal party, it quickly became a significant component of a genuinely threatening alternative to the then unpopular Conservative government as well as to the Labour party. Public opinion polls both in 1981–1982 and again in 1985–1986 showed the alliance in the same electoral range as Labour and the Conservatives. By-election and local council successes were also encouraging. General elections, while disappointing in parliamentary seats, did reflect widespread popular support. Polling just over a quarter of the national vote in 1983, the alliance did better than any British third party for sixty years. As late as the general election of 1987, not long before the SDP disintegrated, the alliance polled 22.5 per cent of the national vote. But nothing like those shares was produced for the alliance in the 650-member House of Commons. Only twenty-three (a mere six of them from the SDP) were elected in 1983, and only twenty-two (five from the SDP) in 1987. These numbers were not much higher than the twenty seats that a merged party of Liberals and Social Democrats, now called the Liberal Democrats, won in 1992 with 18 percent of the national vote (close to the figure achieved in a good year by the old pre-SDP Liberals).

Because the Liberals and the SDP would have won many more seats in general elections using proportional representation, which both these parties zealously advocated, it is understandable that Ivor Crewe and Anthony King treat Britain's first-past-the-post election system as an important explanation of the SDP's failure, even of why the SDP was fated in a sense to fail. Not only do they cite well known difficulties of turning nationally dispersed votes into constituency pluralities and of countering the wasted votes argument, but they also stress that these obstacles give the two major parties time to change leaders, policies, and tactics

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to meet a new third-party threat. Notably, the Labour party, which seemed to be moving farther left in 1981—irreversibly so in the minds of the prospective SDP leaders—responded after its poor showing in the 1983 election by steadily moderating so much that in the 1990s it became once again a credible alternative to the Conservatives. How this significant change was accomplished, despite Labour's socialist traditions and trade-union power, is an intriguing subject, but different from that addressed in this impressively detailed and highly perceptive study of the SDP's own experience.

LEON D. EPSTEIN
University of Wisconsin–Madison

Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR *by Mary Fulbrook. New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. 307 pp. $29.95.*

Origins of a Spontaneous Revolution: East Germany, 1989 *by Karl-Dieter Opp, Peter Voss, and Christiane Gern. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1995. 280 pp. $45.00.*

As professor of modern German history at University College, London, Mary Fulbrook had long been contemplating a book about the German Democratic Republic (GDR) when the East German regime collapsed, throwing open mountains of archival material previously inaccessible to Western researchers. Here was an unexpected windfall providing the wherewithal for a detailed study in contemporary history—German, European, and international. Rather than tackling the admittedly daunting task of writing a full-fledged history of the GDR, Fulbrook chose a different tack. Her book, she tells us, "is intended as a sober and to some extent provisional contribution to the analysis of the inner life and workings—the domestic anatomy—of the East German dictatorship" (v.). The results of the author's anatomical exertions are often illuminating but not, alas, uniformly felicitous.

On the positive side, Fulbrook's broadly interpretative approach demonstrates real sophistication in analyzing patterns of domination, complicity, and dissent over the four decades of the GDR's existence as a separate German state. The point of this discussion is to refute what the author regards as simplistic and/or erroneous explanations of the survival and long time apparent stability of the East German regime, viz., either that it rested solely on Soviet bayonets or else relied upon inbred German obedience to authority. Obviously, the levers of party-state control and the character of popular reaction to it were much more complex. Fulbrook's analysis of the Stasi (the secret police) as the "nerve system and brain center" (p. 53) of the GDR is particularly incisive, and her discussion of the churches as instruments of domination (before some of them later become source springs of opposition) is right on target. So also is her nuanced treatment of the coexistence of outward sociopolitical conformity with popular discontent and personal disaffection. On the other hand, Fulbrook's claim that the regime's implosion in 1989 was due primarily to reformist impulses from a newly self-assertive society is surely contrived. East Germany's Communist elite lost the "will to rule" not because its ranking members were too old and sclerotic to act against reformist dynamics from below, but rather because at the crucial juncture they were deprived of the requisite Soviet support. In the final analysis, *pace* Fulbrook, for all its "achievements" and despite some recent manifestations of GDR-"nostalgia," East Germany exited history as it had entered it, as a basically artificial and highly illegitimate creature of Soviet power. The author's case to the

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contrary is scarcely enhanced by the pretentious and condescending tone of her concluding discussion, "The Peculiarities of the East German Dictatorship" (chapter 10). Amidst evocations of George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Max Weber, readers are lectured that no, the GDR was not the Third Reich but, yes, the East German regime was repressive. *Cui bono*? A final judgment on the East German dictatorship must await a full history of the GDR 1949–1989 to which Fulbrook's anatomy constitutes at best only a prologue.

The second volume under review can be disposed of with greater dispatch. Based primarily upon survey research data (1,300 citizens of Leipzig were the respondents), the authors, three German sociologists attached to the University of Leipzig, conclude that the spontaneous revolutionary events of 1989 are best explained in terms of the rational-actor model (or rather what they chose to term a "soft" version of that theory). In the course of the authors' often vacuous theoretical ruminations, they have the temerity to challenge (and even presume to correct) some of the responses of their sample. That aside, the findings of the Leipzig survey *are* interesting. The problem is that this study presents them in a padded discussion that is as pompous as it is far ranging (for one egregious example, see "Preferences and Constraints: A General Theory of Human Behavior," pp. 31–32). Purged of the padding, the authors would have had a reputable, meaty article for a scholarly journal. But as a book this is pretty much a nonstarter. To add injury to insult, the price of the volume constitutes exceptionally bad value for money, and this will remain the case even after the book has been remaindered—no doubt, very soon.

MELVIN CROAN
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Gandhi's Peace Army: The Shanti Sena and Unarmed Peacekeeping *by Thomas Weber. Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1996. 320 pp. $49.95.*

Why has Mahatma Gandhi's method of nonviolent action fizzled in India since his death? This challenging study by Thomas Weber, an experienced analyst of Gandhian theory and practice, argues that the effectiveness of Gandhi's method of *satyagraha* (truth force) was subsequently undermined by basic differences between the two leading heirs to the Mahatma's legacy, Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash (J. P.) Narayan.

As an Australian scholar of peace studies and conflict resolution, Weber has made original contributions to scholarship on Gandhi, including a forthcoming volume on the salt march. Those who follow his work have come to expect unusual clarity and precision of analysis, and this volume does not disappoint. Its examination of peacekeeping and peacebuilding (following the theoretical formulation of these concepts by Johan Galtung) focuses on the leadership of Bhave and Narayan and the organization of the Shanti Sena or peace army that they formed.

Weber is not the first to discuss any of these subjects, but never before have they been given this theoretical treatment, which examines in such depth the fundamental contradiction between Vinoba's conception of peacebuilding and J. P.'s strategy of peacekeeping. Bhave serves as Gandhi's "spiritual heir," and J. P. is a political tactician. Each is faithful in his way to one side of Gandhi's example, but in postindependent India the two allegiances eventually diverge.

The argument gains force from a scrupulous use of texts and documents combined with ample interviews from Gandhian activists, who explain both the aims of the Shanti Sena and

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reasons for its failure. The persuasive elaboration of the contrasting aspects of Vinoba's and J. P.'s philosophies is unprecedented. Jawaharlal Nehru is sometimes included in this circle of Gandhians, but his statism distances him ideologically from them. J. P. Narayan did struggle valiantly with the tensions in Gandhi's creed, but he ultimately asserted the primacy of politics and thus excluded Vinoba's vision. J. P.'s wing of the peace movement urged "aggressive nonviolent action to fight exploitation, injustice and oppression" (p. 156). Vinoba's "nonviolent revolution" insisted on "social reconstruction through individual integrity rather than the other way around." Weber contends that "Vinoba's gentle/gentler/gentlest form of nonviolent action is the only one that is completely consistent with Gandhi's spiritual ideal" (p. 177) of peacebuilding, and inconsistent with J. P.'s militant direct action. J. P.'s call for "Total Revolution" against Indira Gandhi's regime proved him at odds with both her and Vinoba.

One activist claimed, "We want the establishment of a real participatory democracy in the place of the present representative one" (p. 168). The Gandhian movement as a whole did have a distinct vision of participatory democracy, and this should have been unifying. The fact that its two gifted leaders, self-sacrificing men of undoubted integrity and indomitable spirit, both championing Gandhi's message, should have allowed differences over methods to have undercut their effectiveness only underscores, with deepest irony, Gandhi's emphasis on determining the right means of action.

Weber reports that despite the demise of their movement, "Gandhians *are* generally optimistic about their future as a force to be reckoned with," convinced that "their message is one for the ages" and that ultimately "with a continuation of grass-roots work success is assured" (p. 169). Of course, such a long-term vision eventually may be vindicated, but at present this optimism appears unwarranted. Whether from Vinoba's or J. P.'s perspective, the half-century since Gandhi's assassination seems to have produced an environment hostile to the further development of *satyagraha*. In contemporary India, the present virulent mixture of religion and politics resists both peacekeeping and peacebuilding, domestic or international, of the kinds that Gandhi advocated. Perhaps this valuable and compelling volume does not intend such a grim conclusion or bleak forecast, but pessimism not optimism for a peace movement in India seems to follow from its persuasive argument.

DENNIS DALTON
Barnard College

Building a Democratic Political Order: Reshaping American Liberalism in the 1930s and 1940s *by David Plotke. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 388 pp. $49.95.*

What constitutes and accounts for basic political change? In *Building a Democratic Political Order*, David Plotke addresses these fundamental issues by way of a close analysis of American politics in the 1930s and 1940s. An associate professor of political science at the New School for Social Research, he conceptualizes a "political order" as a "durable mode of organizing and exercising political power at the national level with distinct institutions, policies, and discourses" (p. 2). He argues that the "Democratic" political order, created in the 1930s and renewed in the 1940s "defined new relations among the Democratic Party, the state, and political interest groups and social movements, notably the labor movement" (p. 2). The order was based on a progressive liberalism that enhanced political participation and improved social security.

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In his account Plotke takes issue with neo-Marxian economic institutionalists, neo-Weberian political institutionalists, and economic rational choice theorists. He argues that political action built the new order, which was "a political project of progressive liberals, who, in alliance with new mass political forces, constructed a regime centered on an expanded state, a renovated party, and vigorous popular movements" (p. 7). These political actors worked from a liberal framework, but mixed democratic and progressive themes. Many progressive liberals were based in the Democratic party, but they also included reformers in the state and leaders of reform organizations. Building a new political order meant building the state, which in turn, according to Plotke, partly accounted for the order's eventual demise.

The bulk of the book seeks to explain, extend, and explore Plotke's concepts and to substantiate his claims. He structures American political history around the edifice of realignment constructed by V. O. Key and Walter Dean Burnham, but places political action at its center. Plotke also carefully demarcates progressive liberalism from socialism, populism, and the conservative Republicanism that the Democratic order replaced. In doing so, he pays close attention to the discourse of political leaders. To show that progressive liberals were the main builders of the order, Plotke reprises his justly influential article on the origins of the Wagner Act. His analysis of American politics in the middle 1930s is buttressed by an analysis of politics at the end of the 1940s, which included the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act and consolidated the Democratic order.

Plotke's treatment of this crucial period in American politics is impressive. *Building a Democratic Political Order* breaks great conceptual ground, and anyone working in this area in the future will have to confront his interpretation of New Deal politics. His argumentation is always sensible and grounded in extensive archival research. In addressing alternative arguments, Plotke is never polemical, as the New Deal has been the site of some ugly academic conflicts. All the same, his well documented and thoughtful work has placed in the shade those who claim that the New Deal was fashioned mainly by economic elites or social protest.

That said, the book is not flawless. Plotke attaches the New Deal and the Democratic political order too tightly to the Wagner Act and policy toward organized labor. Others may plausibly see the New Deal as having different centers—its attempts at various fundamental economic reforms or its radical social policy. And it may be reading history backwards to claim, as Plotke does, that the reforms left standing at the end of the 1940s were the ones that were most central to the 1930s. He notably overlooks the domestic politics of the late 1930s, when the New Deal became more focused on social policy, and of wartime, when much of what was radical in New Deal policy was demolished. What is more, the book's conceptual frameworks overshadow its causal arguments, which are sometimes difficult to support. An examination of one political order in one country provides little comparative leverage, and Plotke's episodic approach is unfair to institutional alternatives. Economic and political institutions are largely invariant in any polity at any given point in time, and thus analyzing episodes of change biases his inquiry toward action. He might have thought more about the institutional limits on the techniques and materials the Democratic bloc could employ on its political projects.

My criticisms, though, are tiny for a book so large in intellectual scope and spirit. *Building a Democratic Political Order* is essential reading for serious students of American politics. I look forward to the forthcoming sequel, which promises to address the breakdown of the political order.

EDWIN AMENTA
New York University

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What Employers Want: Job Prospects for Less-Educated Workers *by Harry J. Holzer, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1996. 182 pp. $32.50.*

In the fall of 1996, welfare reform legislation was passed that will bring about fundamental changes in opportunities in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Recipients will be required to be working within two years of going on aid, and families will face a lifetime limit in participation of five years. There is a concern that this population is not job ready in the sense that they have little recent attachment to the labor force, and have low education and skill levels. At the same time, the market for unskilled labor in the United States has changed dramatically in the past two decades, such that wage opportunities are falling substantially for low educated workers relative to those with higher education levels. In terms of understanding the forces at work in shaping the market for low skilled workers, the analysis of the employer or demand side of the market has not been as well developed as the employee or supply side of the market. This book begins to fill that gap, and it does so very well.

Holzer's book is based on a survey of over 3,000 employers in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles. The employers were chosen to be representative of those firms hiring workers with relatively low education levels, with an emphasis toward minority workers living in the central city. The book is very well organized and each chapter considers a different aspect of the employer's behavior and decision-making process. The result is a book that is very easy to read and is accessible to social scientists with a wide variety of backgrounds.

The findings can be split into two parts. The first part of the book documents the characteristics of employers and the positions available for low educated workers. One chapter contains detailed information on where jobs are located (central city versus suburban areas), what occupations and industries are represented, and what skills are used in these jobs (consumer contact, computer use, arithmetic). Holzer than goes on to report statistics on what criteria employers use to fill these jobs (such as appearance, recent job experience) and what methods they use to find applicants (word of mouth, newspaper).

The second part of the book considers the characteristics of the persons who fill the available positions. For example, Holzer examines what the race/gender composition of the recently hired workers is and how that varies with employer location, industry, and occupation groups. This is followed by an analysis of the wages paid in different jobs. This material, while informative, is not consistent with the motivation for the book. It is well known that the characteristics of workers as well as the wages paid to them is determined by both labor demand as well as labor supply. Given the interest in uncovering the issues relevant to employers, I find this discussion to be somewhat misplaced. In addition, in contrast to the results in the first part of the book, these issues have already been examined in previous research.

While a reference to welfare reform was used to begin this review, the study presents the very unusual opportunity to get inside the decision making that goes on at firms hiring low educated workers, something of much broader interest. The book concludes with an excellent discussion of the results in the context of several relevant policy areas such as the importance of job training and education, mobility, job creation, and welfare reform. Any researcher interested in these areas would benefit greatly from reading this relevant and innovative study.

HILARY WILLIAMSON HOYNES
University of California, Berkeley

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Rethinking Abortion: Equal Choice, the Constitution, and Reproductive Politics *by Mark A. Graber. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1996. 244 pp. $29.95.*

Mark Graber is admirably clear about both his argument and his purposes; as to the latter, he acknowledges that his book ". . . is a flagrant attempt to shame affluent Americans into supporting legal abortion" (p. 147). The argument is also clear: judges and advocates should frame their claims about abortion in terms of "equal choice," that is, fair and equitable enforcement of abortion law. Graber calls for equal treatment under the law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Advocates on all sides of the abortion question lie, he charges, unrealistically inflating the importance of every court decision. Anti-abortion activists promise that government can ultimately stop women from terminating unwanted pregnancies. Supporters of abortion rights warn that every proposed legislative restriction jeopardizes all women's access to abortion. In reality, however, middle and upper class women had access to abortions prior to *Roe v. Wade* and could find safe abortions after virtually any Supreme Court decision, constitutional amendment, or legislative restriction. The politics of polemics and hyperbole, however, mobilize social protest, interest group contributions, and electoral participation.

Legal theorists, debating what privacy rights might lurk in constitutional penumbras, don't help clarify the real politics of abortion law. They neglect the ways states and localities implemented abortion restrictions in the past and would likely do so in the future. Implicitly, they project a vision of a state far more powerful—and far more consistent—than even a cursory reading of history supports.

The abortion debate is fundamentally about public policy. Wise and workable policies will not come from sophisticated constitutional interpretation or "rights" asserted as moral trumps, Graber argues, but from recognizing the way laws are implemented as policies. Although the vast majority of states severely restricted legal abortion before *Roe*, local police and prosecutors did not support and rarely enforced these laws, allowing physicians wide discretion in performing abortions. More affluent women could generally find a physician willing to perform or arrange a safe abortion, creating what Graber describes as an illegal but broadly tolerated "gray market"; abortionists were prosecuted only when the victim of a badly botched job pressed charges. Poor women and women of minority backgrounds, of course, were less likely to find their way around legal restrictions and more likely to wind up with amateur abortionists of varying skills in various settings.

Roe v. Wade ended the gray market, bringing law in line with practice for wealthy women and providing poor women with similar access to safe and legal abortions. Legal restrictions really threaten access only for these poor women, Graber argues, and this should be acknowledged explicitly by those engaged in the policy debate. "Privacy" is less powerful than equal choice, he claims, a standard that calls for judges to invalidate laws that would not be enforced equally and would have a disproportionate impact on poor women.

This is a smart argument, made sharply and succinctly, and buttressed by a thorough reading of legal and sociological literature. It is less clear, as the author acknowledges, that this approach will convince judges or Supreme Court justices to rule differently, or advocates to change the way they frame their claims. Indeed, Graber's calls to depoliticize abortion law are likely to fall on deaf ears when organized groups on both sides of the issue have developed interests in maintaining the appearance of a credible threat from their opponents. Still, Graber's volume injects a welcome candor into a public debate that will not soon disappear.

DAVID S. MEYER
City College of New York

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Uplifting the Race: Black Leadership, Politics, and Culture in the Twentieth Century *by Kevin K. Gaines. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1996. 312 pp. Paper, $17.95.*

As the coming millenium edges nearer, the blushes of analogy between race relations in the United States today and race relations at the end of the last century—the era of Redemption, xenophobia, Booker T. Washington, and academic theories of racial superiority—are increasingly hard to ignore. We see the resurgence of mean-spirited, recidivist efforts to turn back the clock on legal rights and public policies, from welfare reform to California's Propositions 187 and 209; we also see the elevation of minority voices from Shelby Steele to Louis Farrakhan who advocate self-help; and we see a return to social scientific research, such as Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray's *Bell Curve*, used to justify and perpetuate racist public policies. These parallels and the abiding faith in the lessons that history has to offer shade the background of Kevin Gaines's insightful, provocative, and timely analysis of African American political thought from the aftermath of Reconstruction to the rise of the New Negro in the 1920s.

In *Uplifting the Race*, Gaines maps out the ideological contours of what he calls "racial uplift ideology"—summarized roughly as "an emphasis on self-help, racial solidarity, temperance, thrift, chastity, social purity, patriarchal authority, and the accumulation of wealth" (p. 2). Substantively, Gaines seeks to uncover how black elites strive towards racial progress in times that are virulently hostile to racial progress. What he finds is multivocality, strategic ambiguity, and often internal contradiction in the attempt to simultaneously negotiate indigenous constructions of black identity and interests and situate such constructions in an external reality of U.S. imperialism, industrialism, immigration, black migration, the women's movement, the commodification of "authentic" black culture, popular and academic conceptions of racial superiority, and the brutality of debt peonage, lynchings, the rape of black women by white men. The idea of racial uplift that evolves is thus inherently exclusionary: black elites sought to subvert racist stereotypes by embracing dominant signifiers like higher education, bourgeois tastes, and patriarchal families; in doing so, they came to define racial progress in class-based, Western civilizationist, and masculinist terms.

Methodologicaly, Gaines resists the common strategy of viewing history solely through iconographic, canonical texts—in this case, the writings of Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. DuBois. Rather, Gaines gives voice to a rich diversity of ideological incarnation from less well known black elites, such as William Ferris, Anna Julia Cooper, Alice Dunbar-Nelson, and Hubert Harrison. In weaving together a polysemy of racial uplift ideologies, Gaines successfully debunks the myth of a monolithic black leadership and a homogeneous black public opinion. In addition, he achieves a remarkably subtle, compelling elaboration on the complex intersections of race, class, and gender. Lastly, Gaines is careful to document everywhere the importance of black institutions as an oppositional site in the formation and promulgation of racial uplift ideologies.

That *Uplifting the Race* accomplishes all this is no minor feat, but these successes do not come without a few drawbacks. For one thing, readers expecting a quick read or a linear narrative may be disappointed. For another, while Gaines's unabashed willingness to take critical, polemical positions is laudatory, such positions sometimes beg for more detailed textual support than Gaines gives. And (this author's personal reservations about Washington aside), Gaines does not render Booker T. Washington's texts with the same intentional ambiguity and attention to historical context and structural location that he does to the other black thinkers in the book. These quibbles, of course, should not obscure the obvious value of

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this book. In today's all-too-common milieu of sound and fury about race, Gaines demands and deserves a wide readership of academics, policy makers, and engaged citizens.

TAEKU LEE
The University of Chicago

Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia *by Daniel Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya, and David Martin Jones. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995. 197pp. $59.95.*

This timely book by a group of political scientists teaching in Singapore argues that the new Asian democracies in Taiwan, Malaysia, South Korea, and the other countries of the region are "illiberal" democracies. Asian democrats, the authors maintain, are not concerned with protecting the individual's freedom of autonomy as are "liberal" western democracies. Rather, the leaders of these Asian countries see democracy as a way to mold a consensus, create a national identity, and so establish a strong powerful nation. Indeed Brown and Jones argue that democratization might never have occurred in Asia if the region's Western-trained elites had not mistakenly assumed their growing middle classes would demand democracy; and so in order to preempt them and prevent discord, they gave it to them in advance.

The idea that there can be more than one kind of democracy is an important point well argued in many of these essays. The authors also make a justified and long-overdue attack on the simplistic notion that economic development somehow leads inevitably to liberal democracy. Still, the weakness of the book lies in the authors' repeated comparisons of Asian politicians and their constituencies, many of whom have only recently started to practice democracy, with thoughtful and experienced Western political theorists. The authors, for instance, argue that it would be impossible to imagine a "sane" Western politician suggesting, as did Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, that it was too bad Western governments had given equal rights to women, because it limited their marriage prospects to Asian men who wanted helpers (p. 14). Yet, wouldn't it be easy to imagine someone like Jesse Helms making similarly obnoxious statements? In spite of the commitment to pluralist ideas by Western democratic thinkers and institutions, Western politicians are often willing to restrict everything from communist ideas to abortions. Others have successfully insisted that Americans insert the words "under God" into the pledge of allegiance that all school children must say every morning. Similarly, patronage politics is a familiar feature of ward politics in cities like Chicago and New York and is not necessarily evidence of a uniquely Asian preference for rule by good men rather than law, as David Martin Jones seems to believe is the case when errant constituencies in Singapore lose their bus routes or nurseries.

In one of the more interesting chapters in this book, Kanishka writes that democracy in East Asia has allowed the rise of bureaucratic technocrats at the expense of the old political leader. Capital and civil society in East Asia cannot shake a still heavy and overpowering state role in which a wealthy elite exercises a predominant role in the government. This point is further elaborated in the scintillating last chapter, "Towards a Model of Illiberal Democracy," where all the authors join to suggest that "there are three distinctive features of East Asian illiberal democracy; first, a non-neutral understanding of the state; second, the evolution of a rationalistic and legalistic technocracy that manages the developing state as a corporate enterprise; finally, the development of a managed rather than a critical public space and civil society" (p. 163).

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In 1964, Benjamin Schwartz's pioneering study, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West*, noted that early democratic interpreters in China saw democracy as a way of building a wealthy, powerful nation. But Schwartz also has pointed out that so-called liberal democratic values have an intrinsic appeal in their own right, a point this study ignores and one whose truth or falsity may help determine the ultimate direction of democracy in Asia.

LEE FEIGON
Colby College

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

The Case Against the Bomb: Marshall Islands, Samoa, and Solomon Islands before the International Court of Justice in Advisory Proceedings on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons *edited by Roger S. Clark and Madeleine Sann. Camden, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1996. 360 pp. $20.00.*

A Concise Historical Atlas of Eastern Europe *by Dennis P. Hupchick and Harold E. Cox. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1996. 120 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $17.95.*

Constitution-Making in the Region of Former Soviet Dominance *by Rett R. Ludwikowski. Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1996. 641 pp. $75.00.*

Defender of the Public Interest: The General Accounting Office, 1921–1966 *by Roger R. Trask. Washington, DC, U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996. 607 pp. $37.00.*

Encyclopedia of the Inter-American System *by G. Pope Atkins. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1997. 592 pp. $115.00.*

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

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